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ABSTRACT
This thesis argues that principles of economy play an important role in determining the
form of linguistic structures at the interface with the semantic component. The argument
comes in the form of a variety of proposals regarding specific mechanisms that are active at
this interface. Specifically, I suggest that Economy plays a role in determining relative
scope, variable binding, and the form of Operator Variable Constructions.
Economy and Scope (chapters 2-3): In these chapters I investigate the scopal properties
of sentences that are semantically identical under Surface- and Inverse-Scope (Scopally
Uninformative sentences). Based on a variety of empirical tests, I argue for the following
generalization:
(1) Scopally Uninformative sentences are restricted to Surface-Scope. (i.e. Inverse-
Scope is possible only when it is semantically distinct from Surface-Scope.)
This generalization argues for an economy condition (Scope-Economy) which rules out
semantically vacuous applications of operations (such as QR and QL) which reverse the
relative scope of two expressions.
Economy and Variable Binding (chapter 4): In this chapter I investigate the scopal
properties of sentences that are semantically identical under Local- and Non-local Variable
Binding (Binding Uninformative sentences). Using one of the tests from the previous
chapters, I argue for the following generalization:
(2) Binding Uninformative sentences are restricted to Local Variable binding (i.e. Non-
local Binding is possible only when it is semantically distinct from Local-Binding.)
This generalization argues for an economy condition (VB-Economy) which rules out Non-
local Binding when it is semantically vacuous (a condition which was suggested on
independent grounds in Heim (1993)).
Economy and Operator Variable Constructions (Chapters 5-6): In these chapters, I
use Binding Theory (BT) to argue that A-bar chains are converted to operator variable
constructions under an economy condition which prefers to maintain as much of the
material at the tail of the chain as possible for interpretability (OV-Economy). OV-
Economy accounts for an observation of Fiengo and May that QR affects BT(C) only when
ACD is involved. The discussion yields new evidence that BT applies at LF (and only at
LF) as suggested in Chomsky (1993).
Thesis Supervisors: Profs. Noam Chomsky, Kai von Fintel, Irene Heim and David
Pesetsky
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Preface:
The work reported here began in September 1993 when I was a first year student at MIT.
Chapter 2 is a revised version of material that was presented at MIT in November 1993
(Ling-lunch) and has since appeared in Natural Language Semantics (Fox 1995a).
However, the manner of presentation has changed quite extensively (hopefully for the
better), and there are some substantial revisions (most notably in sections 2.3-2.6).
Chapter 3 is completely new. It involves a rejection of a hypothesis that I made in Fox
(1995a) and allows for what I believe is a real simplification of the proposal. Chapter 4 is
an almost unchanged version of a paper I presented in the optimality workshop at MIT
(May 1995) which appeared in the proceedings of this conference (Fox 1998a). Chapters
5-6 combine material that appeared in Fox (1995b) with material that is going to appear in
Fox (in press).
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8Chapter 1: An Overview
Much recent work in lingristic theory shares the idea that among the principles of grammar
there are some principles of optimization. Such principles (usually known as principles of
Economy or Optimality) become operative under (certain) circumstances in which
grammar, as determined by other principles, is non-deterministic. Under such
circumstances, the optimality principles choose, from a set of options, those objects (e.g.
structures or steps in a derivation) which provide the most optimal solution to a given
problem. This idea is sometimes further articulated when coupled with the notion that
optimality is to be identified in some manner with "least effort".' Obviously, the idea itself
is far from an actual proposal. Indeed proposals vary extensively both in how they
measure effort (the economy metric) and in how they specify the problems for which
optimal solutions "are being designed" (the problem specification).
This work attempts to provide evidence in favor of the general idea. It argues that
principles of "least effort" (henceforth, principles of Economy) play an important role in
determining the form of linguistic structures at the interface with the semantic component.
The argument comes in the form of a variety of proposals regarding specific mechanisms
that are active at this interface. Specifically, I suggest that Economy plays a role in
determining relative scope, accommodation, variable binding and the form of Operator
Variable Constructions.
The proposals I make depart notably from a prevailing intuition regarding the
problem specification. 2 The prevailing intuition is that Economy is designed to ensure that
grammar yields an interpretable output in an optimal manner. Economy is oblivious to the
nature of the output. For a linguistic object to be considered "a possible solution" (i.e., a
member of the set from which "an optimal solution" is selected) all that matters is that it is
interpretable at the relevant interface. In other words, the "specified problem" is the
problem of yielding an interpretable output. The nature of the interpretation is irrelevant.
'For some discussion, see Chomsky (1986b, 1989, 1995, 1998a) and references therein.
Chomsky sometimes relates the hypothesis that there exists principles of optimality to
another hypothesis, namely that the language faculty is in some sense an optimal solution to
design specifications which are provided by the interface systems.
2 With respect to the economy metric, the assumptions I make are very much in line with
prevailing intuitions.
9My proposals, on the other hand, are based on the intuition that for some principles
of economy the nature of the interpretation is not irrelevant. T'hese principles are principles
of Interpretation-Sensitive Economy. They are designed to ensure that a particular
interpretation ("desired" by the outside system) is achieved in an optimal manner. For such
principles, a linguistic object is considered "a possible solution" only if it is interpretable at
the relevant interface, and only if the interpretation is identical to some designated
specification. In other words, the "specified problem" is the problem of yielding an
interpretable output with a designated intepretation.3 (C.f. also some related work: Golan
(1993), Reinhart (1994, 1995, 1997) and Adger (1996).)
In order to spell-out this intuition, some suggestion must be articulated regarding
the nature of an output that is utilized by the relevant outside systems. When the relevant
outside system is the semantic component, it is natural to think of a "desired outcome" as a
designated semantic interpretation, which, in turn, can be thought of (to a first
approximation) as a set of truth conditions (though see section 2.5.). The Economy
principles for which I argue are thus designed to ensure that a given set of truth conditions
is achieved with "no more effort than what is necessary".4
1.1. Economy and Scope (chapters 2-3)
The first Economy principle I propose disallows semantically-vacuous applications of
covert operations that reverse the relative scope of two expressions (henceforth, Scope-
Economy).5 In other words, Scope Shifting Operations (like Quantifier Raising, QR, and
Quantifier Lowering, QL) are allowed to apply only when they are necessary to achieve a
designated semantic interpretation: 6
3 The notion of a designated interpretation plays no role in the technical implementation that
I outline for the economy principles (in contrast to the implementation I proposed in Fox
1995a). However, I think that the notion has a motivational import. (See Chomsky's
(1998b) discussion of the motivation for strong features from the prospective of optimal
design. See also note 1.)
4 For the third economy principle I propose (OV-Economy), it is not clear (at the moment)
whether truth conditions are relevant. The reason is that in the cases under which the
principle is operative (at least those I've looked at) independent factors determine that the
set of competitors are interpretively identical.
5 This principle was proposed independently in Fox (1995) (which is revised in chapters 2-
3) and in Reinhart (1994, 1997).
6 This general idea will be qualified. See 2.5.
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(1) Scope-Economy: Scope Shifting Operations (SSOs) can't be semantically
vacuous.
To understand the nature of Scope-Economy, consider QR and its relevance for
sentences such as those in (2) and (3). These sentences differ in that in (2) the
interpretations are different when the subject takes scope over the object and when the
scopal relation is reversed, while in (3) the interpretations under the two scopal relations are
identical. The Economy principle predicts that sentences such as those in (3) will differ
from their counterparts in (2) in not allowing QR to reverse the relative scope of the subject
and the object.
(2) a. A boy loves every girl.
b. Many boys love every girl.
(3) a. John loves every girl.
b. Every boy loves every girl.
QR is a covert operation which has no obvious effects on phonology. Scope-
Economy states that it does not apply when it has no effects on semantics. In order to test
this statement, it is necessary to distinguish between linguistic representations which are
interpreted in an identical manner by both phonology and semantics. For example, it is
necessary to know whether the sentences in (3) can have the LF representations in (3sso),
in which the subject and the object scope is reversed, or whether (as predicted by Scope-
Economy) they are limited to the representations in (3_sso), in which scope has not been
reversed.
(3 ,,so) a. [lp John1 ........... [vP every girl 2 [vP tl loves t2111
b. [IP every boy1 ... [vp every girl 2 [vp ti loves t2]]]
(3ss o) a. *[IP every girl2 [Ip Johnl . . . . ......... [vp t2 [VP tl loves t2j]]
b. *[Ip every girl2 [IP every boyl... [VP t2 [VP tl loves t211]]
One way to distinguish between such "observationally identical" representations is to
identify constraints that would treat the two representations in a different way. Such
constraints could indicate the LF position of a quantifier even when semantics fails to
distinguish among the different possibilities. In sections 2.2., I will utilize a constraint on
phonological reduction and deletion (Parallelism) that has the desired property.
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Scope-Economy allows an SSO to apply in sentences such as those in (2) where it
has semantic effects. Such sentences, therefore, have both the LFs in (2sso) and in (2sso):
(2-sso) a. [ip A boy ........... [vP every girl 2 [vP tl loves t2111
b. [IP many boys1... [vP every girl2 [VP t1 love t2]]]
(2 sso) a. [IP every girl2 [IP a boyl
.....
......... [vp t2 [vP tl loves t2111
b. [IP every girl 2 [IP many boysl... [vp t2 [VP tl love t2]]]
Parallelism ensures that in ellipsis or phonological reduction environments two
sentences will have isomorphic syntactic representations at LF. It is thus possible to create
environments in which the sentences in (3) will have the sentences in (2) as their syntactic
images. In such environments, the sentences in (2) can serve as a litmus test indicating the
LF structure of the sentences in (3). The prediction of Scope-Economy is that in these
environments the sentences in (2) will only have the semantic interpretation that results
from the LF structures in (2,sso), thus indicating that the sentences in (3) can only have the
structures in (3sso). In other words, Economy predicts the Ellipsis Scope Generalization
(ESG) in (4), which is exemplified in the ellipsis construction in (5-6).
(4) Ellipsis Scope Generalization (ESG): A sentence that is semantically
equivalent under its two scopal relations will disambiguate its image (in favor of
-SSO), even when this image does show a scopal ambiguity when it appears in
isolation.
(5) a. Some boy admires every teacher. Mary does, too. (3 > V) *(V > 3)
b. Some boy admires every teacher. Every girl does, too. (3 > V) *(V > 3)
(6) a. Some boy admires every teacher. Some girl does, too. (3 > V) (V > 3)
b. Some boy admires every teacher. Many girls do, too. (3 > V) (V > 3)
Assume that Scope-Economy is operative in grammar (i.e., that it plays a role in
accounting for the ESG). There are still open questions regarding the way it is
implemented, some of which may have empirical consequences. One such question
concerns the "locality" of the computations that are involved in the implementation. For
example, does Scope-Economy consult the outside systems to figure out the exact semantic
interpretation of sentences that involve multiple quantification? I will make what I believe is
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a more natural assumption. I will assume that Scope-Economy applies a local algorithm in
which the only relevant aspect of semantic interpretation is the semantic commutativity of
two quantifiers whose relative scope is being reversed. The basic idea is that an SSO (QR
or QL) (which is not forced for independent reasons) can apply only if it reverses the scope
of two quantifiers that are semantically non-commutative.
If this implementation is correct, there should be some empirical consequences.
Specifically, under this implementation it is no longer the case that Scope-Economy allows
an SSO to apply whenever it has semantic effects. Rather, Scope-Economy allows an SSO
to apply only when it has semantic effects of a very local type. Suppose that QR or QL
moves an XP in a way that does not affect the relative scope of two non-commutative
quantifiers but nevertheless has semantic consequences. Suppose, for example, that it
allows an XP to bind a variable in a constituent that is not present at the point at which the
SSO applies or that it is a necessary step for a later application of an SSO. Scope-Economy
predicts that the movement would be impossible. I will try to demonstrate that this
prediction is borne out based on an investigation of coordination (section 2.3.) and the
locality of QR (section 2.4.)
1.2. Economy and Variable binding (chapter 4)
Scope-Economy compares representations that are interpreted in an identical manner by the
phonological and the semantic component. For this reason, the effects of Scope-Economy
are not very transparent and their detection requires sophisticated tools. A natural question
to ask is whether these tools can be utilized to uncover other economy conditions of a
similar nature.
In chapter 4 I suggest that the answer is positive. Specifically, I argue for a
generalization about the effects of ellipsis on variable binding which is parallel to the ESG.
This generalization, which I call the Ellipsis Binding Generalization (EBG), is stated in
(7).
(7) Ellipsis Binding Generalization (EBG): A structure that is semantically
equivalent under two variable binding relations will disambiguate its image (in favor
of local variable binding) even when this image does show a variable binding
ambiguity when it appears in isolation.
The EBG suggests that there is an Economy condition which prefers representations in
which a variable is bound from the closest position available for a given interpretation.
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(8) VB-Economy: Non local variable binding can't be semantically vacuous; i.e. if a
variable is bound non-locally, the representation must be semantically distinct from
local variable binding.
The effects of this condition, which I will call VB-Economy, cannot be detected in normal
circumstances. The reason for this is plain. Whenever two representation (with local and
non-local variable binding) are compared by VB-Economy, they are interpretively identical
and we cannot tell which is available. In other words, VB-Economy, just like Scope-
Economy, compares "observationally identical" representations. However, we can utilize
Parallelism to distinguish between the two representations.
To see the way the EBG is derived, consider the sentences in (9). In (9a) the
sentence that contains ellipsis will receive an identical interpretation with local and non-local
variable binding. VB-Economy, thus, rules-out non-local variable binding. Consequently,
Parallelism rules-out non-local variable binding in the sentence that contains the antecedent
VP. In (9b,c) non-local variable binding is semantically distinct from local variable binding
both in the sentence that contains the antecedent VP and in the sentence that contains the
elided VP. Non-local variable binding is licensed in both sentences and Parallelism is
satisfied.
(9) a. Every boy said that Mary likes his mother.
I I
But Mary didn't *<say that she likes her mother> . (ruled out by OV-Economy)
b. Every person said that Mary likes his mother.
Only Mary (herself) didn't <say that she likes her mother>.
c. Every boy said that Mary likes his mother.
Every girl didn't <say that Mary likes her mother>.
VB-Economy was suggested on independent grounds by Heim (1993). Modifying
work by Reinhart (1983), Heim demonstrates that certain obviations of Binding Theory
(BT) can be accounted for by the postulation of VB-Economy. Given the logic outlined
above, we can say that Binding Theory, just like Parallelism, enables us to distinguish
between (interpretively identical) representation, and in doing so it vindicates the prediction
of VB-Economy.
Given sufficient evidence for VB-Economy, we might want to ask the question of
implementation that we asked about Scope-Economy. Specifically, we might want to
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figure out a (perhaps local) algorithm which the system might use in order to determine
whether two representations are interpretively identical. At the moment I can't think of a
local statement of the problem for variable binding which would be comparable to the
statement that I offer for scope. I will tentatively suggest a way in which we might precede
to give a unified statement of the two economy conditions. However, at the moment I
don't find the suggestion extremely compelling. What we have at the moment, I believe,
are two economy conditions which have a similar conceptual flavor. However, they are
not identical. I believe that Scope-Economy is a better understood condition. The
definition of semantic identity which it utilizes is straightforward and lends itself to (fairly)
straightforward implementations.
1.3. Binding Theory and the Representation of Scope (chapters 5-6)
In chapter 2, Parallelism is utilized to test the predictions of Scope-Economy and in chapter
4, the same is done for VB-Economy only this time with Parallelism and BT. The obvious
questions to ask is whether BT can be used to test Scope-Economy. In order to address
this question, some preliminary issues need to be settled. First we need to find out whether
BT is sensitive to the LF position of quantifier phrases. The conclusions of chapters 5-6 is
that condition C of BT (BT(C)) applies no sooner than LF, and is therefore a potential
detector for the position of a QP. However, it will also be argued that an A-bar chain is
converted to an Operator Variable Construction under an Economy condition (OV-
Economy) which (modulo interpretability) doesn't delete material from the copy at the tail
of the chain. This, as we will see, makes it impossible to test the predictions of Scope-
Economy based on BT(C). The case of BT(A), which I address in the end of chapter 6, is
different. It seems that although normal cases of A-bar movement don't affect BT(C), they
can affect BT(A). Although this fact is ill-understood, it can be utilized to test the
predictions of Scope-Economy and once again the predictions are borne out.
1.4. BT(C) and Scope Reconstruction (chapter 5)
In this chapter I argue that BT(C) is affected by Scope Reconstruction. Specifically,
building on work by Heycock (1995) and Lebeaux (1989), I demonstrate that whenever
15
overt movement manages to obviate BT(C) it does so only if there is no constituent that
dominates the relevant r-expression which undergoes Scope Reconstruction.?
1.4.1. The nature of the argument: Consider the various options for interpreting the
output of movement:
(10) [xp....r-exp .... 2 ......... t2
As is well known, XP can take scope in the position of t2 (Scope Reconstruction) or in the
landing-site (Non Scope-Reconstruction). Consider next what happens when movement
bleeds BT(C):
(11) [xp ....r-exp....] ....pronounO......t2
If BT(C) is insensitive to the LF position of quantifiers we would expect that (11), just like
(10), would have two scopal interpretations. I will demonstrate (through a variety of
constructions) that that this is not the case and that in the configuration in (11) the
availability of Scope Reconstruction is determined by ET(C):
(12) The BT(C) and Scope Reconstruction correlation: In the structural
configuration in (11), an element that contains the r-expression cannot undergo
Scope Reconstruction.
This correlation argues that Scope Reconstruction feeds BT(C).
For an illustration of the argument, consider the contrast between (13a) and (13b);
A-movement Scope Reconstruction (QL) is possible only in the former. This contrast
follows from BT(C) if we assume that this condition applies to the output of QL.
(13) a. [A student of his,] seems to David, [t to be in the other room].
(3>seem) (seem >3)
b. [A student of David's,] seems to him [t to be in the other room].
(3>seem) ??(seem >3)
The contrast is more evident in (14) where the semantics of the construction requires Scope
Reconstruction:
7 Romero (1997) has independently come up with many of the arguments in chapter 5.
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(14) a. For these issues to be clarified,
[Many more/new papers about his, philosophy] seem to Quine, [t to be
needed].
a. #For these issues to be clarified,
[Many more/new papers about Quine's, philosophy] seem to him, [t to be
needed].
Another illustration of the argument can be seen by the following contrast, due to Lebeaux
(1989), from the domain of A-bar Scope Reconstruction:
(15) a. [The papers that hei gave to Ms. Brownj]
every studenti hoped [cP t' that shej will read t].
b. *[The papers that hei gave to Ms. Brownj]
slei hoped [cP t' that every studenti will revise t].
Because a variable must be in the scope of its binder, both (15a) and (15b) require some
form of Scope Reconstruction. The contrast between the two cases follows from BT(C).
In (15b), Scope Reconstruction yields a BT(C) effect. In (1 5a), by contrast, the moved
constituent can "reconstruct" to the intermediate trace, t', where the variable is bound and
BT(C) is not violated. The examples in (15), thus, illustrates that A-bar Scope
Reconstruction is possible only if it doesn't yield a BT(C) effect.
The feeding relationship which account for (13-15), and for many other cases
which I discuss, argues strongly that BT(C) is sensitive to the LF position of quantifiers.8
1.4.2. Consequences: The correlation between BT(C) and Scope Reconstruction
argues that BT(C) applies at the interface with the semantic component (and perhaps
beyond). This consequence, in turn, suggests that BT(C) can serve as a powerful tool for
distinguishing among various claims regarding the nature of LF and the inventory of
semantic mechanisms. In Chapter 6, I will utilize this tool to investigate the way in which
the output of QR is converted to an operator variable construction. However, already the
discussion of the correlation between Scope Reconstruction and BT(C) allows us to draw a
few conclusions.
8 One of the more compelling cases I discuss comes up in chapter 6 (6.5.2). After
introducing certain assumptions relating to the interpretation of A-bar chains, it turns out
that such constructions allow for "partial reconstruction". When there is partial scope
reconstruction, the predicted correlation is that BT(C) will be affected only if partial
reconstruction targets a constituents that includes the relevant r-expression.
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The fact that Scope Reconstruction affects BT(C) argues strongly that Scope
Reconstruction is the result of "literal" reconstruction. In other words, I believe that there
is a strong argument against the assumption that the semantic type of traces is sufficiently
flexible to yield "Scope Reconstruction" and "Non Scope-Reconstruction" from the same
syntactic structure.' This, I believe, is an important result. What we learn from the
correlation between BT(C) and Scope Reconstruction is that BT(C) has the potential of
distinguishing what would otherwise appear to be notational variants. Specifically what we
learn is that (in normal cases) traces, like pronouns, must be interpreted as variables that
range over individuals (type e).'O-"
As it turns out, the interaction between BT(C) and Scope Reconstruction could also
be used to investigate certain properties of LF representations. For example, the well
formedness of sentences such as (15a) indicates that the position of an intermediate trace is
available for Scope Reconstruction. This, if true, can be utilized to study the nature of
successive cyclic movement. For example, the fact the contrast in (15) resurfaces in (16-
17) indicates that Spec CP is not the only landing site available for successive cyclic A-bar
movement.
(16) a. [The papers that hei wrote for Ms. Brownj]
every studenti [vP t' asked herj to grade t].
b. *[The papers that hei wrote for Ms. Brownj]
shej [vp t' asked every studenti to revise t].
(17) a. [At the time hei saw Ms. Brown-]
I introduced every studenti [Xp t' to herj t]?
b. *[At the time hei saw Ms. Brownj]
I introduced herj [xp t' to every studenti t]
(16) indicates that VP adjunction is a possible landing site and (17) indicates the same for
another maximal projection. A plausible conclusion, it seems to me, is that intermediate
9 This assumption was made (among others) in Chierchia (1995) and Sternefeld (1997).
,o As we will see shortly, I assume that A-bar traces are not interpreted as variables but
rather as constituents that include a variable (of type e) and a restrictor.
"' Why this should be the case is a very interesting question. Why, for example, can't
traces receive the semantic type of generalized quantifiers and yield the semantic effects of
Scope Reconstruction with no syntactic reflex that could affect BT(C)? I will not provide
an answer to this question but I will raise various possibilities and refer the reader to an
interesting proposal made (in a different context) by Beck (1996).
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adjunction is in principle possible to every maximal projection (For some discussion see
Fox (1998b), Nissenbaum (1998), Richards (1997) and references therein.)
1.5. BT(C) and QR (chapter 6)
Consider the structural configurations in (18) and (19), where linear precedence represents
structural prominence.
(18) a. [DPi A boy] ....pronoun.... [DPj every... r-exp,...]
b. [Di Many boys] ....pronoun.... [oDPjevery... r-exp,...]
(19) a. [DPiJohn]....pronouno.... [DPj every... r-exp,...]
b. [Dpi Every boy]....pronoun1 .... [DPjevery... r-exp,...]
In (18), QR of DPj over DP, is possible whereas in (19) it should be ruled-out by Scope-
Economy. If this is the case, there is an obvious potential prediction. It is a potential
prediction that in (18) BT(C) would be obviated via inverse scope whereas in (19) there
would be a condition C violation. Unfortunately, this prediction is not borne out.
Sentences such as (18) are bad independently of the relative scope of DPj and DP,. This, of
course, doesn't cast doubt on the validity of Scope-Economy (since Scope-Economy does
not restrict the sentences in (18)). Rather, it shows that BT(C) cannot serve as a diagnostic
for QR. The obvious question is why.
1.5.1. The proposal: One possibility is to assume with Chomsky (1981) that BT(C)
applies before QR. However, such an assumption is suspicious for architectural reasons
(Chomsky 1993) and is very dubious given the correlation between BT(C) and Scope
Reconstruction presented in chapter 5. The discussion in Chomsky (1993) provides us
with a way out. Specifically, Chomsky suggests that, contrary to appearances, BT(C)
applies after QR. The unacceptability of the configuration in (18) (even when an SSO has
applied), he suggests, follows from a more general observation, namely that A-bar
movement is, under normal circumstances, unable to bleed BT(C). The explanation that
Chomsky provides for this general observation is based on the copy theory of movement
and an economy condition on operator variable formation (OV-Economy).
The aim of chapter 6 is to suggest a slight modification of Chomsky's proposal
(which would make a general theory of the semantics of A-bar chains more feasible) and to
provide new evidence for it based on Antecedent Contained Deletion (ACD). The new
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evidence is based on the observation that a natural formulation of OV-Economy predicts
that in ACD constructions QR would bleed BT(C). I demonstrate, building on certain
observations made in Fiengo and May (1994), that this prediction is correct. Furthermore,
I extend Fiengo and May's observations and establish that the length of QR which is
needed for ACD resolution coincides with the domain in which BT(C) is obviated. This
result argues that Chomsky's proposal is not only architecturally parsimonious but actually
needed on empirical grounds.
To appreciate the nature of the argument consider the contrast in (20).
(20) a. ??I reported himi to [every cop that Johni was afraid of t]
b. I reported himi to [every cop that Johni was afraid I would]
Assume (for concreteness) that every QP must undergo short QR (adjunction to VP) for
type reasons.12 The output of QR (assuming the copy theory of movement) is given in
(20').
(20') a. ??I, [every cop that Johni was afraid of t]
[t, reported himi to [every cop that Johni was afraid of t]]
b. I, [every cop that Johni was afraid I would]
[t, reported himi to [every cop that Johni was afraid I would]]
The structure must now be converted to an Operator Variable Construction. I assume that
this conversion is governed by an Economy condition along the lines of Chomsky (1993).
This Economy condition (OV-Economy) states (informally) that the resulting Operator
Variable Construction is as close as possible (up to interpretability) to the output of QR:
(21) OV-Economy: When an Operator Variable Construction, O V, is formed from a
chain, a, the structure of OV is the closest structure to a which is interpretable.
I will assume in the spirit of Chomsky (1993) that in principle a chain can be converted to
two interpretable Operator Variable Constructions. One contains a copy of the restrictor of
the quantifier at the tail of the chain and one doesn't. Under normal circumstances OV-
Economy prefers the former, and this preference accounts for the fact that (under normal
'2 This is an assumption that I make following Heim and Kratzer (1998). H-owever, it is
possible to reformulate almost everything I say without this assumption. Nevertheless, I
believe that the assumption is motivated on independent grouns (see chapter 2 note 5).
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circumstances such as (20'a)) BT(C) is not affected by QR:
(20"a) 1. *I, [every cop that Johni was afraid of t]Jx
[t, reported himi to [x cop that Johni was afraid of t]]
(violates BT(C))
2. *I, [every cop that Johni was afraid of t]Xx
[t, reported himi to x] (violates OV-Economy)
However, I assume that in ACD constructions the parallel of (20"al) is uninterpretable
given the constraints on ellipsis (Parallelism). Therefore OV-Economy licenses the
(otherwise sub-optimal) Operator Variable Construction and this construction obeys BT(C):
(20"b) 1. *I [every cop that Johni was afraid I would]Xx
[t, reported himi to [x cop that Johni was afraid I would]]
(violates BT(C))
2. I [every cop that Johni was afraid I would]Xx
[t, reported himi to x]
(doesn't violate OV-Economy given Parallelism)
The account predicts the correlation in (22) which extends to many cases beyond the one
we've seen in (20b). Among others (given the argument that A-bar movement has an
intermediate VP adjunction landing site) the contrast in (23) is predicted.
(22) The BT(C) and ACD correlation: In an ACD construction, QR can bleed
BT(C) iff the relevant step of QR (the one which might bleed BT(C)) is needed for
ACD resolution.
(23) a. I expected himi to read
[every book that Johni thought I would <expect him to read t>]
b. *I expected himi to read
[every book that Johni thought I would <read t>]
(c.f. I expected Johni to read [every book that hei thought I would <read t>])
1.5.2. Consequences: The fact that Scope Reconstruction feeds BT(C) (chapter 5)
forces the conclusion that Binding Theory applies (also) at LF. On the other hand there
appears to be evidence that BT(C) applies also at SS. Chomsky (1993) shows us a way to
maintain the simple hypothesis that BT(C) applies only at LF. The important consequence
of chapter 6 is that Chomsky's stance is virtually necessary on empirical grounds; there is
an intricate set of cases under which a theory that incorporates a version of Chomsky's
proposal predicts that covert operations would obviate BT(C) and the predictions are borne
out.
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1.6. BT(A) and Scope-Economy
What we learn from OV-Economy is that although we have ample evidence that BT(C)
applies after QR, there are no predicted interactions between the two unless ACD is
involved. For this reason BT(C) cannot be used to test the predictions of Scope-Economy.
In the end of chapter 6, I point out on the basis of overt A-bar movement that BT(A) is
different. Although I do not understand the difference, I use it to provide additional
confirmation for the predictions of Scope-Economy.
Overt Wh-movement (as van Riemsdijk and Williams (1981) point out) is identical
to QR in its inability to bleed BT(C) (unless the r-expression is contained within an adjunct;
Freidin 1986, Lebeaux 1988):
(24) a. ??[which picture of John,] does he, likes t?
b. ??[Which of the claims that someone hated John's, mother]
did he, worry about?
(cf. Which of the claims that someone hated hisi mother did Johni worry about?)
For some reason BT(A) is different. BT(A) can be affected by overt Wh-movement:
(25) John and Bill, wonder [which picture of each other1] Mary bought t?
(cf. ??John and Bill, wonder who bought [which picture of each otherj]?)
Although this fact is not well-understood (though see Chomsky 1993), it seems reasonable
to see whether it can be utilized to test the predictions of Scope-Economy. Specifically, we
might expect that an anaphor contained in a quantifier could be bound long-distance as long
as QR can appropriately extend the governing domain of the anaphor. If this expectation
turns out to be correct, we could use BT(A) to see what the restrictions on QR are.
Consider the contrast in (26). I will suggest that the contrast follows from Scope-
Economy. In (26a), the object QP [(every one of) each other's operations] can move by
QR over the subject. The output of QR is identical (in the relevant respects) to the output of
Wh-movement in (25) and BT(A) is satisfied. In (26b), by contrast, such long QR is
ruled-out by Scope-Economy and the result violates BT(A).
(26) a. The two rivals hoped that someone would hurt (every one of) each-other's
operations. *3 > V V > 3
b. ??The two rivals hoped that Bill would hurt (every one of) each-other's
operations.
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Part I: Interpretation-senitive Economy
Chapter 2: Economy and Scope
It is well known that for certain sentences which involve more than one quantificational
expression, there is semantic evidence for scope ambiguity. In the sentences in (1), for
example, we can use semantic judgments (judgments about truth, entailment, etc.) to detect
an ambiguity which we then characterized in terms of scope. Under such a characterization,
one interpretation results from a scopal configuration in which the subject DP takes scope
over the quantificational expression that it c-commands in Surface Structure (3 > V; many >
V; 3 > likely). In the other interpretation, the relative scope of the two quantificational
expressions is reversed (V > 3; many > V; likely > 3). I will call the former interpretation
Surface Scope and the latter Inverse Scope.
(1) a. A student admires every teacher. (3 > V) (V > 3)
b. Many students admire every teacher. (many > V) (V > many)
c. Someone from NY is likely [t to win the lottery]. (3 > likely) (likely > 3)
There are also sentences for which there is semantic evidence for lack of scope ambiguity.
The contrast between sentences of this sort and sentences such as those in (1) has figured
prominently in various attempts to discover the mechanisms responsible for scope
determination. (See, for example, the papers in Szabolsci 1997.) However, there is also a
similarity between the two types of sentences. Both types of sentences have semantic
properties that reveal the scopal relationships between the quantificational expressions that
they contain. In this sense, the sentences of both types are Scopally Informative. This
chapter brings to the fore a third set of sentences. In these sentences (which I will call
Scopally Uninformative) there is no semantic evidence that might reveal the relative scope
of two quantificational expressions:
(2) a. Every student admires every teacher. (Scopally Uninformative)
b. John admires every teacher. (Scopally Uninformative)
c. John is likely [t to win the lottery]. (Scopally Uninfonnative)
Scopally Uninformative sentences are semantically equivalent under their different scopal
relationships. For such sentences, it is impossible to use intuitions about meaning as
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evidence for determining scopal relationships (though see note 62). This, of course, does
not mean that scopal relationships fail to exist in such sentences. Nevertheless, uncovering
the scopal relationships can not rely on simple judgments of truth, entailment and the like.
The aim of this chapter is to suggest alternative methods that will allow us to investigate
these relationships. Specifically, I will identify various mechanisms that are sensitive to the
distinction between Surface and Inverse Scope and use them to determine the scopal
properties of Scopally Uninformative sentences. This investigation will reveal the
generalization in (3).
(3) Scopally Uninformative sentences are restricted to Surface Scope.
If this generalization is correct, we would like to understand its source. Assume
that Inverse Scope is the result of some operation (or set of operations) which we can call
OP, to keep at this point to a theory neutral term. What (3) tells us is that OP cannot be
semantically vacuous. This, if correct, lends support to an idea that has been very
influential in recent work: the idea that in general operations in the linguistic system cannot
be vacuous (in terms which need to be made precise). Furthermore, (3) suggests how the
general idea should be articulated in the case of OP, namely that in this particular case
vacuity is to be measured in semantic terms:'
(4) Economy condition on Scope Shifting (Scope-Economy):'OP can apply
only if it affects semantic interpretation (i.e., only if Inverse Scope and Surface
Scope are semantically distinct).
This much can be extracted from what is to follow independent of specific
assumptions about the nature of OP. In other words, the argument that OP cannot be
semantically vacuous will go through irrespective of whether or not OP is a movement
For other operations, vacuity seems to be measured in other terms. For NP movement
for example vacuity might be measured in terms of the checking of certain uninterpretable
features. For extraposition and scrambling vacuity might be measured in phonological
terms. See section 2.6.
2 This Economy condition was suggested independently in Fox (1995a) and Reinhart
(1994; 1997). Reinhart's argument for the Economy condition, however, were not based
on Scopally Uninformative sentences. The arguments were based on certain assumptions
about WCO. Unfortunately, these assumptions conflict with some of the arguments for the
.eneralization in (3). See note 23.This idea will be qualified shortly. Specifically, the relevant notion of "semantic
interpretation" will be limited to properties of "logical-syntax".
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operation, and (assuming that it is a movement operation) the argument is independent of
the precise nature of the operation. However, there is a general picture regarding OP which
I believe is very well-motivated. Specifically, I believe that there are good reasons to
believe that Inverse Scope is the result of an optional operations of Quantifier Raising or
Quantifier Lowering/Reconstruction. I will, therefore, state what follows assuming this
general picture with the hope that certain interaction between Scope-Economy and other
well-motivated assumptions will yield interesting results.4
In the next section, I will re-state Scope-Economy in the context of certain
background assumptions about the nature of OP. Once this is done, I will characterize the
nature of the predictions that Scope-Economy makes, and will outline the structure of the
chapter.
2.1. Scope-Economy, Quantifier Raising and Quantifier Lowering
There is widespread agreement that Inverse Scope is the result of an operation that reverses
the relative scope of two quantificational expression. I will assume, following Chomsky
(1976) and May (1977), that the relevant operation is a form of covert movement.
Furthermore, I will assume, following May (1977), that covert movement (which is scope
related) comes in two varieties. One variety involves Quantifier Raising (QR) and the other
involves Quantifier Lowering (QL). (I will sometimes use the term Scope Shifting
Operation (SSO) to refer to both types of movement.)
However, unlike May (1977;1985), I will not assume that a quantificational phrase
must always be affected by QR. Rather, I will adopt the standard assumption that a QP is a
second order predicate (type <et,t>). Therefore, I will assume with Heim and Kratzer
(1998) that when a QP is the sister of a one place predicate (either by base generation [e.g.
4 The predicted interactions between Scope-Economy and Parallelism (2.2.) are
independent of the assumptions that I make regarding the nature of OP and can easily be
translated to the terminology that is used when alternative theoretical assumptions are
adopted. (See Jacobson (1997).) The predicted interactions between Scope-Economy and
constraints such as the CSC (2.3.), Shortest Move (2.4.) and BT (section 6.7.) depend on
the underlying assumption that OP is a movement operation. To the extent that the
predictions are borne out, they lend support to the underlying assumption.
Forthermore, I believe that there are very strong independent arguments for an
account of Inverse Scope that involves movement, most notably from Antecedent
Contained Deletion (ACD) and from considerations of locality. These arguments will be
reinforced in chapters 6 where I consider the possible affects of covert movement on
Binding Theory.
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as subject of a transitive verb or as object of an unaccusative verb] or due to a movement
operation other than QR) it need not be affected by QR. When a QP is not a sister of a one
place predicate, I assume (again, with Heim and Kratzer) that it must move by QR to a
clause denoting expression (type t), and that movement forms a one place predicate
(through K-abstraction over the position of the trace).5
In order to predict the generalization in (3), I would like to add two economy
conditions to the system described above. One condition (which I call Scope-Economy)
blocks optional instances of SSOs from applying when they are semantically vacuous.
This condition ensures that an SSO which moves a quantifier out of a position in which it
can be interpreted, yields an interpretation which would be unavailable otherwise:
(5) Scope-Economy: SSOs which are not forced for type-considerations must have a
semantic effect.
In order to derive the generalization in (3), it is necessary to ensure (among other things)
that a QP in object position would not raise over the subject in Scopally Uninformative
sentences. (5) is insufficient; an Object QP must move for type-considerations, and (5)
does not ensure that this movement will not cross the subject position. I therefore propose
to add a locality condition on QR, which I call Shortest Move, with the hope that it follows
' The last assumption is not crucial for anything I say in this chapter. However, I believe
that it becomes crucial once ACD is taken into account. Some of the arguments for Scope-
Economy which are presented in this chapter are based on the assumption that QR is not
licensed in order to satisfy Parallelism (in contrast to the operation that converts the output
of QR to an interpretable structure, see chapter 6). If this assumption is correct, the fact
that ACD is possible in sentences such as John stood near every boy that Mary did lends
empirical support to Heim and Kratzer's claim
a The availability of ACD where there is no scope ambiguity virtually forces the
assumption that short QR is always motivated on independent grounds. (Heim and Kratzer
provide us with these grounds.) This assumption is reinforced by the observation that
ACD is impossible when the quantificational phrase is replaced by a referring expression
which can be interpreted in situ (*John stood near Bill, who Mary didn't Lasnik (1995). If
Lasnik is correct, the acceptability of John likes Bill who Mary doesn't is due to object
shift).
6 Note that obligatory instances of QR always have semantic effects. (With QR the
structures are interpretable; without QR they aren't.) It is therefore conceivable that Scope-
Economy applies to obligatory QR (as well as to optional QR). In order to implement this
possibility, we would like to see how the local algorithm for determining semantic non-
vacuity would be stated (in a uniform way) for the obligatory and the optional instances of
QR.
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from general considerations of locality:
(6) Shortest Move: QR must move a QP to the closest position in which it is
interpretable. I.e., a QP must always move to the closest clause denoting element
that dominates it.7.8
Scope-Economy, together with Shortest Move, yields the restriction on Scope
Inversion stated in (3). To see this, let's begin with a discussion of sentences such as
those in (7) and (8).
(7) a. A boy loves every girl.
b. Many boys love every girl.
(8) a. John loves every girl.
b. Every boy loves every girl.
In each of these sentences, the object QP is uninterpretable in its base position and must
move by QR.9 The first instance of QR is thus determined by type considerations and is
not restricted by Scope-Economy. It is licensed in all of the sentences, but restricted by
Shortest Move. Shortest Move determines that it must target the closest clause-denoting
expression dominating the object, namely the VP:
(7') Obligatory instance of QR:'o
a. [IP A boy1..... [VP every girl2 [VP t] loves t2 ]]]
b. [Ip Many boys 1..... [vp every girl2 IvP t1 love t211]
(8') Obligatory instance of QR:
7 At this point, I have no evidence that could indicate whether Shortest Move applies to QL.
If it does, the definition should be modified accordingly (where "c-commands" is replaced
with "c-commanded by").
8 Shortest Move predicts that QR is extremely local, perhaps more local than it really is. If
QR turns out to be less local than what Shortest Move predicts, this condition will have to
be modified. What is crucial for the purposes of this chapter is that obligatory QR satisfies
Shortest Move (as it is defined here), and that optional QR moves QP to the closest position
in which it crosses the relevant scope bearing element (see section 2.4.).
9 In these particular cases one might suggest to replace short QR with covert object shift.
However, as pointed out by Kennedy (1997) and Johnson and Tomioka (in press), this
cannot be a general solution.
,0 In chapter 6 I will argue (following Chomsky 1993) that both the obligatory anld the
optional instance of QR leave a copy at the tail of the chain which is partially interpreted in
that position. This copy is irrelevant for the considerations in this chapter, and will thus be
ignored.
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a. [1p John1I.... [vp every girl 2 [VP tl loves t2111b. [Ip Every boy 1.... [vep every girl 2 [vP tl loves t2111
Scope-Economy is responsible for determining whether a second (optional) instance of an
SSO is licensed. Both QR and QL need to be considered. Let's begin with QR. In the
constructions in (7'), the optional instance of QR has semantic effects while in (8') it
doesn't. Scope-Economy thus licenses only the former:
(7") Optional instance of QR:"
a. [ipevery girl2 [Ip A boyIl.....[VP t'2 [VP t1 loves t2]]]
b. [ipevery girl 2 [IP Many boys1 ..... [Vp t'2 [VP tl love t2]]]
(8") Optional instance of QR:
a. *[Ipevery girl2 [[p John1 ..... [vp t'2 [VP t1 loves t211] (violates Scope-Economy)
b. *[Ipevery girl 2 [Ip Every boy1..... [vp t'2 [vp tl loves t2]]] (violates Scope-Economy)
Consider now the effects of Scope-Economy on QL. In contrast to QR, QL is
never forced for type considerations. (The subject can always be interpreted in its surface
position.) QL is totally optional and (by Scope-Economy) is allowed to apply only when it
has semantic effects. For this reason QL, like QR, can yield Inverse Scope from (7'), but
not from (8'):
(7'") Optional instance of QL:
a. [IP. ..... [vP every girl2 [vp A boy1 loves t2]]]
I IL
b. [lp .....[vp every girl2 [vpMany boys1 love t2]]]
I
(8"') Optional instance of QL:
a. *[Ip .... [vp every girl2 [vP Johnl loves t2]]] (violates Scope-Economy)
b. *[Ip .... [VP every girl 2 [vp Every boy , loves t2]]] (violates Scope-Economy)
I ,, -
QL and QR provide two derivations for Inverse Scope in (7) and given Scope-Economy,
" In chapter 5-6, I will provide independent evidence that t' exists in QR and in other
forms of A-bar movement.
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both derivation are unavailable for (8). '2
Scope-Economy also distinguishes the sentences in (9) from the sentences in (10).
QL can move the subject under the intensional verb in sentences such as (9) but not in
sentences of the type in (10) (where QL would be semantically vacuous).
(9) An American runner seems to Bill to have won a gold medal.
(9') a. An American runnerl seems to Bill [Ip tl to have won a gold medal]
b. _ seems to Bill [1p[An American runner] to have won a gold medal]."
(10) John seems to Bill to have won a gold medal.
(10') a. John1 seems to Bill [apt! to have won a gold medal]
b. * _ seems to Bill [ [John] to have won a gold medal]
I (violates Scope-Economy)
We thus derive the generalization in (3) repeated below:
(3) Scopally Uninformative sentences are restricted to Surface Scope.
If we can establish this generalization, there will be strong reasons to assume that Scope-
Economy (and Shortest Move) are operative in grammar.
However, there could be additional sources of evidence. To facilitate discussion, I
will define Scope-Economy with reference to the semantic properties of the two
quantificational expressions whose scope is being reversed:
(11) Scope-Economy: An SSO can move XP, from a position in which it is
interpretable only if the movement crosses XP 2 and <XP,, XP 2> is not scopally
, ommutative.
<XP,, XP 2> is scopally commutative (when both denote generalized quantifiers) if
12 Given the option for QL (or given another mechanism for Scope Reconstruction, see
Chapter 5), it is very tempting to suggest that optional QR does not exist (See Kitahara
(1994), Pica and Snyder (1994) and Homstein (1995)) and that the restrictions imposed by
Scope-Economy are relevant only for QL. However, as we will see in 2.2.3.2. and
2.3.2.2. this cannot be the case.
'
3The graphics I use might suggest that QL is an operation that restores a quantifier to its
trace position. However, this is just arn artifact of notation. The claims I make about QL
are independent of the specific landing site. As far as I am concerned, QL could restore a
quantifier to its trace position. However, it could also involve adjunction to a position that
c-commands the trace (see Chomsky (1995 4.7.4.)).
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for every model, and for every ý e DE ,,
[[XP, ]](x[[XP2]](y (y)(x))= [[XP2]](Xy[[XP,]](x (y)(x)).'4
It might be plausible (for computational reasons) to assume that Scope-Economy applies a
local algorithm in determining whether or not an SSO has semantic effects (though see
Chomsky (1998) for cautionary remarks). If it does, the definition in (11) is a reasonable
first step in specifying this algorithm.
Before we see the evidence for Scope-Economy, I would like to say a few words
about the nature of this evidence. The evidence consists in part of arguments in favor of
the generalization in (3). Establishing this generalization requires a method for
distinguishing a representation with Inverse Scope from a representation with Surface
Scope in cases where they are semantically identical (and of course phonologically identical
as well). Distinguishing between such "observationally identical" representations is not a
trivial matter. What I will attempt to do is to identify grammatical constraints which are
sensitive to whether or not Inverse Scope is possible. In this chapter, the constraint that I
will propose for this identification will be the widely discussed constraint on parallelism in
constructions that involve phonological deletion or reduction (Parallelism). (In section
6.7., I will suggest that Condition A of Binding Theory can play a similar role.) This
constraint will indicate that Inverse Scope is impossible in Scopally Uninformative
sentences. As such, it will provide strong evidence for Scope-Economy.
The second type of evidence is based on certain assumptions about the structure of
coordination. Under these assumptions, the relative scope of coordination and a
quantificational phrase is invisible at the point at which an SSO applies. Therefore, scope
relative to coordination cannot motivate an SSO.'5 However, once an SSO applies, it has
'4 For the relative scope of generalized quantifiers and other scope bearing elements like
intensional verbs, modals and negation, we will need a more general definition of
commutativity. For the purpose of the definition, we can take all of these scope bearing
elements to be of semantic type <,j> (where I is the type of a proposition <s,t>), and for
simplicity we will lift generalized quantifiers to type <et,x>.
<O, XP> is scopally commutative ([[O]] e D , and [[XP]] e D., 1 ,) if for every
model, and for every 4 De,,
[[o]]([[xP]](Xx4(x))) = [[xP]](Xx[[O]](4(x))).
" Here (and elswere) I intend the word 'motivation' to be understood as a shorthand. The
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semantic consequences. These consequences can be utilized to test the predictions of
Scope-Economy.
The third type of evidence that I will provide is best understood under the
implementation of Scope-Economy that I proposed in (11). Under this implementation it
is no longer the case that an SSO can apply whenever it has semantic effects. Rather,
Scope-Economy allows an SSO to apply only if it has semantic effects of a very specific
(and local) type. Suppose that QR or QL have semantic consequences that do not depend
on reversing the relative scope of two scopally non-commutative expressions. Suppose,
for example, that the SSO is a necessary step for a later application of an operation ca that
has its own semantic consequences. In such a case, Scope-Economy predicts that the
consequences of a will be visible only if the SSO also reverses the relative scope of two
scopally non-commutative expressions.
I will focus on one case of this sort. Specifically, I will argue that a first instance of
QR can bring an XP to the domain in which it can be affected by a second instance of QR
(given considerations of locality, e.g., Shortest Move) only if the first instance (on its own)
reverses the relative scope of two scopally non-commutative expressions.' 6
Assuming Sufficient evidence for Scope-Economy, there would still be open
questions regarding implementation. Among others, we would like to know how the
claim that an SSO is motivated is to be understood as a shorthand for the claim that it
satisfies the relevant economy conditions, i.e. that it crosses a scopally non-commutative
expression satisfying Shortest Move.
26 In Fox (1995a), I suggest that there is arother case of this sort. Specifically I suggest
that QL can bring an XP into the domain of existential closure (Heim (1982), Kamp
(1981)) only if (independently) QL reverses the relative scope of two scopally non-
commutative expression:
(i) a. Jewish woman are related to Chomsky. False
b. Jewish woman are related to every Jewish man. True but only under Inverse Scope
However, there was a problem in that suggestion. If existential closure is relevant for the
interpretation of indefinites, then indefinites are not quantificational, and shouldn't be
affected by scope-shifting operations. (Thanks to Gennaro Chierchia for discussion of
related issues.)
What I would like to suggest is that bare plurals are existential QPs which (because
of an ill-understood constraint, C) cannot be interpreted existentially in SPEC IP (see von
Fintel 1995). In (ib), in contrast to (ia), Scope-Economy licenses QL and thus allows
satisfaction of C.
In a sentence involving a Stage level predicate, the subject can undergo QL in order
to have its time argument bound by a quantifier (over events) which is absent with
individual level predicates (a possibility suggested to me by Irene Heim, cf. Musan 1995).
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cognitive system in which an SSO applies (Syntax) determines whether or not an
application of an SSO is semantically vacuous. The answer to this question bears on issues
that have broad theoretical implications. One of these issues has to do with modularity. Is
it the case that syntax can "see" all of what we might (pre-theoretically) call the interpretive
properties of linguistic expressions?
This doesn't seem very plausible. Instead, I will argue that there is a very narrow
class of formal logical properties that certain words have and that these properties alone are
accessible to syntax. These properties, which we could call properties of "logical-syntax",
are the properties which determine whether or not an SSO can apply. What I will suggest
(tentatively) is that the linguistic system contains a deductive system with various formal
rules of inference which can "prove" logical equivalence in various cases. When logical
equivalence is proven, an SSO is blocked.
The remainder of this chapter has the following structure. In section 2.2., 1 discuss
certain well-known puzzles that arise from the scopal interaction of quantifiers in VP
ellipsis contexts. I go over some previous unsatisfactory attempts at an explanation and
present data (mostly from Fox 1995a, but also some new data) that will motivate an
explanation in terms of Scope-Economy. The explanation, as will be seen shortly, will be
based on the idea that Parallelism can detect scopal relationships in Scopally Uninformative
sentences. In section 2.3., I will present data that have to do with the scope of quantifiers
in coordinated structures. These data will follow from an interaction of Scope-Economy
and certain assumptions about the structure of coordination. Section 2.4. will be devoted
to a proposed account for the locality of QR which is a necessary consequence of Scope-
Economy and Shortest Move. In section 2.5., I will discuss broader potential ramifications
of Scope-Economy. Specifically, I will discuss ramifications for modularity, and introduce
the suggestion that grammar contains a deductive system. Finally in section 2.6., I will
speculate on the reasons why SSOs, in contrast to other operations, are subject to Scope-
Economy.
2.2. Scope-Economy and Parallelism
In this section, I will use Parallelism as a detector of scopal relationships in Scopally
Uninformative sentences. Parallelism ensures that in certain environments (environments
that involve phonological reduction or deletion (ellipsis)) two sentences will receive
isomorphic syntactic representations at LF. In such environments, one sentence, S,, can
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indicate the LF structure of another, S2. Specifically (for scope), if S, is Scopally
Informative it can inform us of the scopal relationships in S2, even if the latter is Scopally
Uninformative. More specifically, if S2 is Scopally Uninformative and if (as predicted by
Scope-Economy and Shortest Move) it is restricted to Surface Scope, we can detect this
restriction by looking at S,. The result of a variety of experiments based on this logic will
indicate that, indeed, Scopally Uninformative sentences are restricted to Surface Scope.
I begin this section with a discussion of puzzling facts that emerge from work by
Williams (1977), Sag (1976) and HirschbUhler (1982). I then show that if we assume
Scope-Economy (and consequently assume that Scopally Uninformative sentences are
restricted to Surface Scope) the facts are no longer puzzling. They are interpreted as
involving a simple case in which a Scopally Informative sentence indicates that Scopally
Uninformative sentences are confined to Surface Scope. I then move on to show that the
logic described above makes very intricate predictions, and finally, I attempt to demonstrate
that the predictions are in fact borne out.
2.2.1. A Puzzle: It is widely known that ellipsis sometimes disambiguates
constructions involving multiple quantification. More specifically, a construction involving
multiple quantification, which would normally show scopal ambiguity, sometimes looses
this ambiguity when it serves as an antecedent for ellipsis.
Consider the fact exemplified in (12-13). The scopal ambiguity in a sentence such
as (12) disappears when the sentence is an antecedent for VP ellipsis as in (13). For the
first sentence in (13) to be true, there must be a single boy that admires all of the teachers,
whereas in (12) the boys can vary with the teachers.
(12) A boy admires every teacher. (3 > V) (V > 3)
(13) A boy admires every teacher. Mary does, too. (3 > V) *(V > 3)
This phenomenon was already noted in Sag (1976) and Williams (1977). However, the
accounts that Sag and Williams proposed, although very elegant, were both based on a
mistaken factual assumption. Specifically, both Sag and Williams assumed that ellipsis
will always bar Inverse Scope in a sentence of the type in (12). However, Hirschbtihler
(1982) showed that this assumption is incorrect. Despite ellipsis, the sentences in (14)
allow the subject to receive narrow scope relative to a QP that it c-commands at surface
structure.
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(14) a. A Canadian flag is in front of every building, and an American flag is too.
b. A Canadian flag is in front of many buildings and an American flag is too.
c. A Canadian flag is in front of most buildings and an American flag is too.'7
d. One guard is standing in front of every building and one policeman is too.
e. A boy admires every teacher. A girl does, too.
(3 > V) (V > 3)
We therefore confront a puzzle: what is the difference between (13) and (14)? Why
is Inverse Scope possible in (14) but not in (13)? Previous attempts to deal with this puzzle
(e.g. Cormack (1984) and Diesing (1992)) assumed that the relevant difference between
(13) and (14) has to do with the grammatical properties of the subject in the sentence that
contains ellipsis (henceforth, the ellipsis-sentence). In (13) the subject of the ellipsis
sentence is a referring expression and in (14), the subject is quantificational.
However, this assumption seems to be incorrect. Although the relevant difference
does concern properties of the ellipsis sentence, it is not limited to properties of the subject
alone. Rather, as we shall see, it relates to a semantic property of the ellipsis sentence as a
whole. I will argue that the crucial difference concerns the fact that the ellipsis sentence in
(13), but not in (14), is Scopally Uninformative. Mary admires every teacher is
semantically identical under Surface and Inverse Scope, whereas its counterpart in (14), A
girl admires every teacher isn't.
2.2.2. Parallelism as a detector: It is a well-known fact that constituents that involve
phonological reduction or deletion require an antecedent with which they share various
interpretive properties.'" Among many other properties, the scope bearing elements in the
antecedent sentence (PA) must receive parallel scope to the corresponding elements in the
ellipsis/reduction sentence (PE). This is demonstrated by the sentences in (15). (Small Italics
are used to indicate Phonological Reduction.)
(15) al. [,, I introduced one of the boys to every teacher] and
[pBill did, too].
"7 Examples (14b,c) are designed to rule out an analysis in which the object quantifier in the
antecedent sentence has scope over both conjuncts (ATB scope). See Hirschbiihler (1982),
Fiengo and May (1994), and Fox (1995a).
'~8 There are certain cases in which VP ellipsis doesn't have an antecedent and an antecedent
therefore needs to be accommodated (See Johnson 1997 and references therein). Such
cases do not affect the arguments made here. (For some relevant discussion see chapter 3.)
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a2. [, I introduced one of the boys to every teacher] and
[P Bill introduced one of the boys to every teacher, too].
bhi [, One of the boys was introduced to every teacher], and
[Pone of the girls was, too].
c2 [, One of the boys was introduced to every teacher], and
[4 one of the girls was introduced to every teacher, too].
c 1. [P An American runner seems to Bill to have won a gold medal], and
[,a Russian athlete does too].
c2. [', An American runner seems to Bill to have won a gold medal], and
[PEa Russian athlete seems to Bill to have won a gold medal , too].
All of the sentences in (15) are scopally ambiguous. However, the scopal
relationships in PA cannot be different from the scopal relationships in iE. If one is
interpreted with Surface Scope, so must the other; ambiguities do not multiply in
ellipsis/reduction contexts.
Facts such as those in (15) reveal the existence of a principle which I have called
Parallelism. In chapter 3, I will further investigate this principle. For the time being, I will
state what I think comes close to a necessary consequence of Parallelism. In chapter 3, we
will see that this statement is not totally accurate. However, it is good enough for the time
being:
(16) Parallelism (a consequence of): In an ellipsis/phonological-reduction construction
the scopal relationship between the elements in PA must be identical to the scopal
relationship between the parallel elements in PE.
It should also be noted that Parallelism cannot follow from operations such as LF copying
(as suggested, e.g., in Williams 1977). There are two reasons for this. First, as noted in
Lasnik (1972), Chomsky and Lasnik (1993) and Tancredi (1992), Parallelism holds in
constructions that involve phonological reduction (for example, the (b) sentences in (15)).
In phonological reduction constructions there is no LF copying and Parallelism must be
independently postulated. Second, Inverse Scope in sentences such as those in (15)
involves operations (QR and QL) which relate positions internal and external to the
putatively copied material. It is far from clear how the Parallelism effects in these cases
would follow from a copying algorithm. I will therefore assume that VP ellipsis involves
phonological deletion which is subject to Parallelism at a semantic level. In chapter 3, I
will discuss accounts of Parallelism in terms of an independently needed theory of Focus
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(as in Tancredi (1992) and Rooth (1992)) and show that such accounts when combined
with Scope-Economy yield additional predictions that are corroborated.
But now let us return to the puzzle that was presented in the previous section. The
problem was to explain the contrast between the sentences in (13) and (14). Why does
ellipsis restrict the sentences in (13) but not in (14) to Surface Scope? Given that
Parallelism is independently needed, Scope-Economy provides the answer. To see this,
compare (13) and (14e).
(13) A boy admires every teacher. Mary does, too <admire every teacher>.
(3 > V) *(V > 3)
(14e) A boy admires every teacher. A girl does, too <admire every teacher>.
(3 > V) (V > 3)
The relevant difference between the two constructions, I propose, is that in (13) the ellipsis
sentence is Scopally Uninformative. Therefore, Scope-Economy restricts the ellipsis
sentence in (13) to Surface Scope. Consequently, Parallelism blocks Inverse-Scope in the
antecedent sentence. In (14e), the ellipsis sentence is Scopally Informative and is therefore
unrestricted by Scope-Economy. Both the ellipsis and the antecedent sentence can receive
Inverse Scope as long as Parallelism is maintained. The availability of Inverse Scope in the
other constructions in (14) follows in an identical manner (since, as mentioned, in all cases
the ellipsis and the antecedent sentence are Scopally Informative).
Given that Parallelism applies to phonological reduction as well as to phonological
deletion, Scope-Economy predicts that the facts in (13) and (14) will not change when the
deleted VPs are replaced by phonologically reduced VPs. This is demonstrated below.
(17) A boy admires every teacher. Mary admires every teacher, too.
(3 > V) *(V > 3)
(18e) A boy admires every teacher. A girl admires every teacher, too.
(3 > V) (V > 3)
The discussion that follows will be restricted to ellipsis, but this is done only for the sake
of brevity.
By now it should be obvious that Parallelism can be used to investigate the scopal
properties of Scopally Uninformative sentences. Suppose that S is such a sentence.
Semantics cannot help us figure out the assignment of scope. However, Parallelism
provides us with a sentence, S' (the syntactic image of S) which must be isomorphic to S.
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Whenever S' is Scopally Informative we can use its scopal properties in order to figure out
the scopal relationship in S. Scope-Economy predicts the following generalization.
(19) Ellipsis Scope Generalization (ESG): A sentence, S, will disambiguate its
syntactic image, S', (in favor of Surface Scope), whenever S is semantically
equivalent under Surface and Inverse Scope (i.e. whenever S is Scopally
Uninformative).' 9
Stated somewhat differently, the ESG is a predicted interaction of Scope-Economy and
Parallelism. From Scope-Economy it follows that Inverse Scope is impossible in S if S is
semantically equivalent under Surface and Inverse Scope. (Since Inverse Scope would
involve a semantically vacuous SSO.) From Parallelism it follows that the LF of S'
involves Inverse Scope iff the LF of S does. The ESG is derived from these two principles
in the following way. If S is semantically distinct under Surface and Inverse Scope,
Inverse Scope is licensed in S. In such a case, S does not block Inverse Scope in S'. If,
on the other hand, S is semantically equivalent under Surface and Inverse Scope, then
(a) Scope-Economy doesn't allow Inverse Scope in S. And consequently,
(b) parallelism doesn't allow Inverse Scope in S'.20
The contrast between the sentences in (13) and (14) provides initial support for the ESG
and (consequently) for Scope-Economy. However the ESG has a wider extent. If we can
test and corroborate it to its full extent, we will have very strong support for our initial
account of the contrast between (13) and (14), and (consequently) for Scope-Economy.
The aim of the next sub-section is to provide this support.2'
'9 In Fox (1995a), I assumed that the ESG is slightly different. Specifically, I assumed
that S can disambiguate S' only if S' is the ellipsis sentence. In this chapter, as in Fox
(1995a), I concentrate on cases in which S' is the ellipsis sentence. However, in contrast to
Fox (1995a), I don't restrict myself to such cases. (See example (36).) In Chapter 3, I
argue that despite certain examples that suggest otherwise, disambiguation goes in both
directions.
20 This prediction depends on the assumption that an SSO is never licensed in S in order to
satisfy Parallelism (given that it has "already" applied in S'). For further discussion see
Chapter 3.
2' In Fox (1995a) I discuss apparent counter-examples to the ESG and argue that upon
closer scrutiny they end up supporting the generalization. I will not go overt these
arguments here. Johnson and Lappin (1997) provide two counter-examples, which I
cannot account for. I think that many ill-understood factors enter into the analysis of the
two sentences they discuss (involving conjuncts likeone divides every prime number which
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2.2.3. The ESG: The ESG states that in ellipsis constructions the ellipsis sentence will
disambiguate the antecedent sentence if and only if the ellipsis sentence is Scopally
Uninformative (and vice versa, see note 19). I will start by showing that the
generalizations holds for scopal interactions between two DPs (2.2.3.1). Then I will argue
that it holds for scopal interactions between DPs and sentential operators which are
accounted for by QR (2.2.3.2.) and QL (2.2.3.3.).
2.2.3.1. The ESG and scopal interactions among DPs: To see that the ESG
holds for scopal interactions between two DPs, we will go over the paradigm in (20-35).
This paradigm is constructed by minimally varying the semantic properties of the subject in
the ellipsis sentence. Just as in (13) and (14), Inverse Scope is possible in the antecedent
sentence only when the ellipsis sentence is Scopally Informative.
In the construction in (20), the antecedent sentence is restricted to Surface Scope.
This provides corroboration for the ESG. A definite description and a universal quantifier
are (in this case) scopally commutative. In other words, the ellipsis sentence in the
constructions in (20) have the same meaning under Surface and Inverse Scope. For this
reason the antecedent sentence is expected to be restricted to Surface Scope.
(20) a. Someone in the audience knows the capital of every country. The lecturer does,
too. (3 > V) *(V > 3)
b. One of the film reviewers admires every movie. The organizer of the film
festival does, too. (3 > V) *(V > 3)
The next question to ask is whether there are environments in which a definite description
and a universal quantifier are scopally non-commutative. If such environments exist, we
should be able to form minimal pairs with the sentences in (20). Such minimal pairs would
provide a pretty decisive test for the validity of the ESG. One possibility that comes to
mind is to embed a variable inside the restrictor of the definite description. Such a variable
could be bound by the universal quantifier only under Inverse Scope, and thus could make
is a "law-like" sentence about arithmetic, and the prime-minister bears responsibility for
every parliamentary office which very likely involves incorporation of at. indefinite
quantifier some responsibility which might reverse the predictions of Scope-Economy). In
any event, I don't agree with their conclusion that given the counter-examples the proposal
"should be abandoned". I believe it would be more reasonable to try and investigate the
properties of the counter-examples.
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Surface and Inverse Scope semantically distinct.22
Ail obvious confound for the experiment is Weak Crossover (WCO). Sentences
such * those in (21) are marginal to some speakers when the variable inside the subject is
bound under Inverse Scope.
(21) a. ??[Its, prime-minister] knows the capital of [every country],.
b. ??[Its, producer] admires [every movie],.
There are, however, environments in which WCO is very weak, perhaps non-existent.
Although we don't understand what characterizes these environments, we can use them for
our experimental purposes.23 '24
(22) a. [The person who produced it,] admires [every movie],.
b. [The expert who was invited to talk about it,] knows the capital of [every
22 The definition of Scopal-commutativity in (11) did not make reference to assignment
functions and thus is not sensitive to veriable binding. This, however, could be corrected
with very little effort.
(11') Scope-Economy: An SSO can move XP, from a position in which it is
interpretable only if the movement crosses XP 2 and <XP,, XP 2> is not scopally
commutative.
<XP,, XP 2> is scopally commutative (when both denote generalized quantifiers) if
for every model, M, assignment function, g, and E D<e.c>
[[XP,]]M'"(,x[XPPZ]]Mg('y *(y)(x)) = [[XP2]]M'(Xy[[XP1,]]'g(•x 4)(y)(x)).
23 Reinhart's argument for Scope-Economy (Reinhart (1994, 1997)) are based on the idea
that this condition can account for WCO under the assumption that variables are invisible to
Scope-Economy. Unfortunately, this argument is inconsistent with the arguments for
Scope-Economy based on (23-25), (28-29) and (57-58).
24 In Fox (1995a) I didn't give enough thought to the possible effects of WCO. I used
constructions such as (i) in which there is no WCO. However, the lack of WCO (as
suggested to me by Kai von Fintel) makes the paradigm somewhat suspicious. As we can
see from (ii), in which WCO re-emerges, the obviation of WCO depends on having the
ellipsis sentence and the antecedent sentence within the same construction. This might
suggest an ATB analysis (as suggested to me by Daniel Hardt; see note 17). An ATB
analysis is very unlikely for the (b) cases in (23-24).
(i) One of the film reviewers admires every movie,, and its, director/the director does, too.
(ii) One of the film reviewers admires every movie,. ??Its, directorfThe director does,
too.
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country],.
c. [His, tutor] is admired by [every boy],.2
Consider now the pairs in (23-25). These pairs show that when the definite description
inside the subject of the ellipsis sentence contains a variable which can be bound by a
universal quantifier under Inverse Scope, the ellipsis sentence is not disambiguated. This
is exactly what is expected under the ESG.
(23) a. Someone in the audience knows the capital of every country. [The person who
was invited to talk about it] does, too. (3 > V) (V > 3)
b. Someone in the audience knows the capital of every country. [The person who
was invited to talk about these countries] does, too. (3 > V) *(V > 3)
(24) a. One of the film reviewers admires every movie. [The person who produced it]
does, too. (3 > V) (V > 3)
b. One of the film reviewers admires every movie. [The person who produced the
film festival] does, too. (3 > V) *(V > 3)
(25) a. At least one teacher is admired by every boy. His tutor is, too.
(3 > V) (V > 3)
b. At least one teacher is admired by every boy. The head master/My tutor is, too.
(3 > V) *(V > 3)
It is important to point out that there is a syntactic difference between the subjects of
the ellipsis sentence in the (a) and the (b) sentences in (23-25). The difference is that in the
(a) sentences the subjects of the ellipsis sentence contain a bound-variable. One might
suggest that this difference could be utilized for an account that cares about the formal
properties of the subject and is agnostic to scopal commutativity. However, this doesn't
seem to be the case. To see this, consider (26).26 In this construction, there is a variable
within the subject of the ellipsis sentence. Nevertheless, the antecedent sentence is still
disambiguated in favor of Surface Scope. The reason is that the variable in the subject of
the ellipsis sentence cannot be bound by the object quantifier under Inverse Scope. For
this reason, Inverse Scope is semantically identical to Surface Scope, and consequently the
ellipsis sentence disambiguates the antecedent sentence.
(26) Every producer, thinks that one film reviewer admires every movie and that his,
wife does, too. (3 > V) *(V > 3)
25 The obviation of WCO in (a) and (b) seems to be related to the embedding of the
pronoun. In (c) it is probably related to the existence of a trace in object position, perhaps
below the position of every boy. See chapter 5, section 1.
26 Thanks to an NALS reviewer for providing me with a sentence of this type.
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Consider now (27). In this construction, the subject of the ellipsis sentence is a bona fide
quantifier. Nonetheless, contrary to Diesing and to Cormack, the antecedent sentence is
restricted to Surface Scope. The reason for this restriction is that the ellipsis sentence every
girl admires every teacher is Scopally Uninformative. 27 (Two universal quantifiers are
scopally commutative.)
(27) A boy admires every teacher. Every girl does, too. (3 > V) *(V > 3)
Now consider (28-29).
(28) a. Someone in the audience knows the capital of every country. [Every person
who was invited to talk about it] does, too. (3 > V) (V > 3)
b. Someone in the audience knows the capital of every country. [Every person
who was invited to talk about these countries] does, too. (3 > V) *(V > 3)
(29) a. One of the film reviewers admires every movie. [Every person who was
involved in its production] does, too. (3 > V) (V > 3)
b. One of the film reviewers admires every movie. [Every person was involved in
this production] does, too. (3 > V) *(V > 3)
(30) a. At least one teacher is admired by every boy. [Every one of his tutors] is, too.
(3 > V) (V > 3)
b. At least one teacher is admired by every boy. [Everyone of my tutors] is, too.
(3 > V) *(V > 3)
The (b) constructions in (28-30) are similar to (27) in that the ellipsis sentence involves two
universal quantifiers, and is thus Scopally Uninformative. The ellipsis sentence in the (a)
constructions involves two universal quantifiers as well. However, in this case Inverse
Scope (given that it enables a variable within the subject to be bound) allows the domain of
quantification of the subject universal quantifier to be determined by the elements that the
QRed expression quantifies over. Specifically, in (28a) Inverse Scope allows the invited
people to vary with respect to the countries. Similarly, in (29a), it allows the production
staff to vary with to the movies, and in (30a), it allows the tutors to vary with the students.
In these constructions, there are semantic consequences to Inverse Scope in the ellipsis
sentence, and, thus, Inverse Scope is possible in the antecedent sentence as well.
27 I thank Kyle Johnson for suggesting this line of research.
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The constructions in (31-32) differ minimally from (27) and from the (b)
constructions in (28-29). The difference is that the semantic properties of the subject
quantifier in the ellipsis sentence in (31-32) make the truth conditions different under the
two different scopal relations.
(31) a. One of the film critics admires every movie. Almost everyone in the film festival
does, too. (3 > V) (V > 3)
b. One of the film critics admires every movie. Most visitors to the film festival
do, too. (3 > V) (V > 3)
c. One of the film critics admires every movie. Many visitors do, too.
(3 > V) (V > 3)
(32) a. One student (in the school) knows the capital of every country. Almost every
teacher (in the school) does too. (3 > V) (V > 3)
b. One student knows the capital of every country. Most teachers, do too.
(3 > V) (V>3)
c. One student knows the capital of every country. Many teachers, do too.
(3 > V) (V > 3)
In the (a) constructions, the modifier almost makes the ellipsis sentence Scopally
Informative. When the subject in the ellipsis sentence of (3 1a), for example, has wide
scope, the sentence can be true only if there is a set of people in the film festival that is
sufficient in cardinality to be considered "almost everyone", and only if each member of
this set admires all of the movies. However, when the object of (3 1a) has wide scope, the
sentence can be true also when the set of admiring people vary with respect to the movies.
In other words, the sentence can be true even when there is no single sufficiently large set
of people that admires all of the movies. All that is required is that for each movie there
would be a sufficiently large set of admirers. The ellipsis sentence is thus Scopally
Informative and therefore does not block Inverse Scope in the Antecedent Sentence. 'The
other sentences in (31-32) are parallel to (31a) and again the antecedent sentence is not
restricted to Surface Scope.
Compare now the sentences in (33). (33a) is a Scopally Uninformative sentence.
(33b), which is syntactically very close to (33a), is Scopally Informative (see Keenan and
Faltz (1985)). (For the sentence to be true under Surface Scope (or > V), there must be a
way of choosing a person from tile set containing John, Bill and Fred such that the chosen
person likes every teacher; under Inverse Scope (V > or) the choice can vary with the
teachers.)
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(33) a. John, Bill and Fred like every teacher. (Scopally Uninformnnative)
b. (Either) John, Bill or Fred likes every teacher. (or > V) ?(V > or)
The speakers I consulted find Inverse Scope somewhat difficult in (33b). Nevertheless,
the reading seems to be available. Scope-Economy predicts that (to the extent that Inverse
Scope is available in (33b)) this sentence will contrast with (33a), in that only (33a) will
disambiguate its image under ellipsis. This prediction seems to be correct:
(34) a. A girl admires every teacher. John, Bill and Fred do, too. (3 > V) *(V > 3)
b. A girl admires every teacher. (Either) John, Bill or Fred does, too.
(3 > V) ?(V > 3)
(35) a. A girl admires every teacher. Both John and Bill do, too. (3 > V) *(V > 3)
b. A girl admires every teacher,. Either John or Bill does, too. (3 > V) ?(V > 3)
To summarize, (20-35) demonstrate that the antecedent sentence in a VP ellipsis
construction can receive Inverse Scope only if the ellipsis sentence is semantically distinct
under Surface and Inverse Scope. To make this point clear, I list the sentences that
disambiguate the antecedent sentence in (I) and those that do not in (II). The difference is
that in (I) a Scope Shifting Operation does not affect truth conditions, while in (II) it does.
(I) a. Mary likes every teacher.
b. The person who produced the film festival admires every movie.
c. Every person who was involved in this production admires every movie.
d. John and Bill like every teacher.
(Scopally Uninformative)
(II) a. Some girl likes every teacher.
b. The expert who was invited to talk about it knows the capital of every country.
c. Every person who was involved in its production admires every movie.
d. Almost everyone in the film festival admires every movie.
e. Many visitors to the film festival admire every movie
f. An American flag is in front of many buildings.
g. John or Bill like every teacher.
(Scopally Informative)
What we've learned in this sub-section is that in ellipsis constructions the sentences in (I)
restrict an otherwise ambiguous sentence, SScop,,Indica,,or , to Surface Scope. This
corroborates the predictions of Scope-Economy. Reversing the scope of the DPs in (I)
would be semantically vacuous and is predicted by Scope-Economy to be impossible. In a
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Parallelism environment, SScope-Indi,,or, can be used to test this prediction. The results of the
experiment confirm the prediction.
More specifically, because Inverse Scope in a sentence such as SScope-nd,,or can
result from two possible derivations (compare (8") and (8"')), we conclude that Scope-
Economy blocks both of these derivations for the Scopally Uninformative sentences in (I).
This suggests that both optional QR and optional QL are subject to Scope-Economy. In the
next two sub-sections, I will provide additional evidence that this is the case.
First, however, I would like to discuss additional support for the ESG which
comes from pseudo-gapping.2 8 Pseudo-gapping is a construction similar to VP ellipsis in
its compliance to Parallelism. In this respect pseudo-gapping can, like ellipsis, be used to
test Scope-Economy. However, pseudo-gapping is also different from VP ellipsis (and
superficially similar to gapping) in that part of the VP is not elided. 29 This property of
pseudo-gapping is important for our purposes because it allows us to vary the semantic
properties of a sentence (which must comply to Parallelism) while keeping its subject
constant. 30 Such an experiment can give the final blow to an account of the facts we've
discussed based on properties of the subject in the ellipsis sentence.
Consider the instances of pseudo-gapping in (36a). In this sentence both the first
and the second conjunct are Scopally Informative and neither is restricted to Surface Scope.
The sentence thus conforms to the ESG. The sentence also exemplifies the fact that pseudo-
gapping obeys parallelism. The relative scope of the two quantifier must be identical in the
two conjuncts." If the sentence allows the boys to vary with respect to the professors, it
must also allow the girls to vary with respect to the parents. Similarly, if variance is
disallowed for the boys it is also disallowed for the girls.
28 I thank Martha McGinness for suggesting pseudo-gapping as a further test for the
validity of the ESG.
29 It seems reasonable to claim that pseudo-gapping involves movement of material out of
the VP, followed by VP ellipsis. For analyss along these lines, see Jayaseelan (1990) and
Lasnik (1995).
30 Phonological down-stressing has the potential of serving the same role that pseudo-
gapping does. If conjunctions involving phonological down-stressing in one of the
conjuncts must obey Parallelism (see Lasnik (1972), Chomsky and Lasnik (1992),
Tancredi (1992), Rooth (1992) as well as Chapter 3), then the absence of full ellipsis could
allow us to vary lexical choices within the VP. However, I found that judgmicnt with
these constructions were too difficult. This is not surprising since the phonological
realization of VP with a focused object and a non-focused verb is not necessarily distinct
from the phonological realization of a focused VP.
' In Chapter 3, we will understand the relevant properties of Pseudo-Gapping which make
it comply with Parallelism.
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(36) a. A boy was introduced to every professor and a girl was to every parent.
(3 > V) (V > 3)
b. A boy was introduced to Jane and a girl was to every parent.
(3 > V) *(V > 32
c. A boy was introduced to a parent and a girl was to every professor.
(3 > V) *(V > 3)
Consider now (36b) and (36c). In both cases, the subject must have wide scope relative to
the object. The reason should by now be clear. In both sentences the antecedent sentence
is Scopally Uninformative (a boy was introduced to Jane in (36b) and a boy was
introduced to a parent in (36c)). Thus, according to the ESG, the ellipsis sentence is
restricted to Surface Scope. The same phenomena is exemplified in (37), where (given the
conflict between world knowledge and Surface Scope) the judgment is more striking.33
(37) a. Yesterday, a guard stood in front of every church, and a policeman did, in front
of every mosque. #(3 > V) (V > 3)
b. #Yesterday, a guard stood in front of this church, and a policeman did, in front
of every mosque. #(3 > V) *(V > 3)
c. #Yesterday, a guard stood in front of a church, and a policeman did, in front of
every mosque. #(3 > V) *(V > 3)
These examples are important because they show decisively that the relevant
difference between (13) and (14) cannot be traced to properties of the subject of the ellipsis
sentence. All of the sentences in (36-37) have the same subject (both in the ellipsis and the
antecedent sentence) and yet some group with (13) and some with (14).
The ESG provides strong evidence that SSOs are restricted by the particular
consideration of economy outlined in the beginning of this paper. The evidence is strong
because Parallelism is needed independently of the ESG and because Scope-Economy is
32 The careful reader might wonder why (36) is constructed with the Scopally
Uninformative sentence as antecedent. This becomes clear in chapter 3, once we
understand the possible affects of accommodation on Parallelism. (See, in particular, the
discussion of examples (38) in chapter 3.)
"33 Asher et. al. (1998) propose an alternative to Scope-Economy based on the assumption
of DRT that referential elements always receive widest scope. The proposal they make
cannot account for the ESG in its full extent. Furthermore, (as far as I understand it) the
proposal predicts that Scopally Uninformative sentences in which an r-expression is c-
commanded by a quantifier will disambiguate their image in favor of Inverse Scope.
Specifically, in (36b) and (37b) it is predicted that only Inverse Scope (V > 3) would be
possible.
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exactly what is needed to fill in the gap between the results of Parallelism and an account of
the ESG.34
2.2.3.2. The ESG and QR:35 To this point, I have provided what I think is strong
evidence in support of the ESG. I have also shown how this generalization follows in a
natural way from an interaction between Parallelism and Scope-Economy. However, all of
the cases we've looked at to this point involve scopal interactions between two DPs. As
such, Inverse Scope could be the result of two potential derivations. Based on this, I
concluded that the optional step in both derivations is restricted by Scope-Economy
(optional QR and optional QL). In this sub-section, I will provide independent evidence
that this is the case for QR. In the next sub-section, I will do the same for QL.
Consider the sentences in (38). Both sentences are ambiguous with respect to the
relative scope of the object quantifier and of negation. To illustrate with (38a), the meaning
could be either that it is not the case that there are more than three languages that I speak (-
> more than 3) or, alternatively, that there are more than three languages that I do not
speak (more than 3 > -).
(38) a. I don't speak more than 3 languages.
[ (--, > more than 3) True; (more than 3 > -) True]
b. Ken Hale doesn't speak more than 3 languages.
[ (- > more than 3) False; (more than 3 > -) True]
"4 A potential consequence of obligatory short QR (adjunction to VP) is that the effects we
observed in (36-37) will disappear in (i). In (i) the modal operator should licenses QL. If
the landing site of QL is below the landing site of obligatory QR (which is not at all
obvious given the possibility that Shortest Move applies to QL, and given some
observations in Johnson and Tomioka (in press)), the object quantifier should be allowed
to outscope the subject in the antecedent sentence despite the fact that the two are scopally
non-commutative. The effect seems to be week. Nevertheless, the speakers I consulted
feel that the judgments go in the predicted direction.
(i) a. A guard should stand in front of this church, and a policeman should, in front
of every mosque. #(3 > V) (V > 3)
b. A guard should stand in front of a church, and a policeman should, in front of
every mosque.
"JI thank Noam Chomsky for comments that stimulated the experiment presented in this
subsection.
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Although both sentences are ambiguous, there is a difference between them which has to
do with our knowledge of the world, and which helps us in conducting an important
experiment. The sentence in (38a) is true irrespective of the relative scope of the object and
of negation. The sentence in (38b), by contrast, is true only if the object has wide scope
over negation. We can thus embed (38b) in ellipsis constructions and use its truth value to
determine which of its readings are available.
Compare the two constructions in (39).
(39) a. I don't speak more than 3 languages. Rob Pensalfini does. (True)
b. Ken Hale doesn't speak more than 3 languages. Rob Pensalfini does.
(False)
c. Ken Hale doesn't speak more than 3 languages. Rob Pensalfini doesn't as well.
(True or False)
While (39a) is true, (39b) must be false. This indicates that the antecedent sentence must
be interpreted with the object having narrow scope relative to negation (Surface Scope).
Why should this be the case? Again, Economy and Parallelism provide the answer. The
ellipsis sentence is Scopally Uninformative. For this reason, Scope-Economy blocks
optional QR in this sentence, and the LF position for the object QP is the lowest
interpretable position (adjunction to VP). Consequently, Parallelism blocks optional QR in
the antecedtnt sentence, and the sentence is restricted to Surface Scope. In (39c), where
both sentences are Scopally Informative, Inverse Scope is possible. Consequently, (39c)
could be either true or false.36
If we assume that the ambiguity in a sentence such as (38) is to be accounted for by
QR, (39) provides unambiguous evidence that this operation is restricted by Scope-
Economy.
2.2.3.3 The ESG and QL: In the previous sub-sections, I have argued that Quantifier
Raising must be restricted by Scope-Economy and is allowed to apply only when it yields
an interpretation which would be unavailable otherwise. In this section, I will argue that
the same holds for Quantifier Lowering.37
36 For those who don't know the characters involved, Ken Hale speaks many languages
and Rob Pensalfini does, too.
37 Recent attempts to eliminate QR assume that all scopal ambiguities are achieved by
Quantifier Lowering (Reconstruction). Given a checking theory of case, objects move out
of the VP independently of scope. Thus narrow scope for the subject can be achieved by
reconstruction. (c.f. Hornstein (1995), Pica and Snyder (1994) and Kitahara (1994)). At
this point I see many problems with these approaches. One obvious problem is that they
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Consider the sentence in (40). This sentence is ambiguous with respect to the
relative scope of the subject quantifier and of the attitude verb seems. If the subject
quantifier has wide scope, the sentence can be true only if Bill has some American runner
in mind, and only if it seems to Bill that that particular American runner won a gold medal.
If the attitude verb has wide scope, the sentence merely requires that Bill have the belief that
some American runner or other won a gold medal. Bill need not have any particular
American runner in mind. The sentence would be true, for example, in a situation in which
Bill sits in the Olympic cafeteria, hears the American anthem and concludes that an
American runner won the medal.
(40) An American runner seems to Bill to have won a gold medal.
(3 > seems) (seems > 3)
The two readings of the sentence in (40) are the result of the two positions in which
the subject can be interpreted. If the subject is interpreted in its SS position, it has wide
scope relative to the attitude verb. However, if it is lowered to the embedded IP at LF, the
attitude verb has wide scope. (See, among others, May (1985) and Diesing (1992).) The
two LFs for (40) are thus represented in (40').
(40') a. An American runnerl seems to Bill [tl to have won a gold medal].
b. _ seems to Bill [[An American runner] to have won a gold medal].
The obvious question to ask now is what happens when we embed (40) in a VP
ellipsis construction. Let's start with (41), which shows the same ambiguity which we
have seen in (40).
(41) An American runner seems to Bill to have won a gold medal, and a Russian athlete
have to stipulate that all PPs move to a case position. Further, it is not clear how such
approaches would account for cases of ambiguity other than those involving two arguments
of a verb. For example, it is not clear how such approaches would deal with the scopal
ambiguity of object quantifiers and heads such as modals, negation and attitude verbs (as in
(38) above and in (64) below), or with cases of inverse linking. Yet another problem is
that they cannot deal with certain cases in which scope is not clause-bound. (see
Appendix, see, also Kennedy (1997)). Finally, as pointed out to me by Noam Chomsky,
the data in section 2.3. indicate that Inverse Scope can result from two different
derivations, as outlined in 2.1. (c.f. (7", 7"')
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does, too. (3 > seems) (seems > 3)
However, since Parallelism must be maintained, the relative scope of the subject and the
attitude verb must be the same in the two conjuncts. Bill could know the identity of the
Russian and the American runner, or alternatively he could be sitting in the cafeteria hearing
the consecutive playing of the two anthems. What is important, however, is that if (for the
sentences to be true) Bill is required to know the identity of the American runner, he must
also know the identity of his Russian colleague and vice versa. (41'a,b) are possible LFs
for (41) while (41'c,d) are impossible.
(41') a. An American runnerl seems to Bill [tl to have won a gold medal] and a
Russian athlete, seems to Bill [ti to have won a gold medal].
b. seems to Bill [[An American runner] to have won a gold medal] and
seems to Bill [[a Russian athlete] to have won a gold medal].
c. * An American runner1 seems to Bill [tl to have won a gold medal] and
seems to Bill [[a Russian athlete] to have won a gold medal].
(violates Parallelism)
d. * seems to Bill [[An American runner] to have won a gold medal] and
a Russian athletel seems to Bill [ti to have won a gold medal].
(violates Parallelism)
Consider now (42). This sentence, contrary to (41), is restricted to Surface Scope. For the
sentence to be true, Bill must know the identity of the American runner.
(42) An American runner seems to Bill to have won a gold medal and Sergey does, too.
(3 > seems) *(seems > 3)
This follows naturally from the assumption that QL is restricted by Scope-Economy. If
QL, just like QR, is subject to Scope-Economy, it can apply in a structure only if it has
semantic consequences. Since in a sentence such as (43) the meaning remains the same
whether or not QL takes place, QL is impossible. For the same reason QL cannot apply to
the second conjunct in (42), and because of Parallelism it cannot apply to the first conjunct.
(42'c,d) are ruled out by Parallelism and (42'b) is ruled out by Scope-Economy.
(43) Sergey seems to Bill to have won a gold medal.
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(42') a. An American runnerl seems to Bill [tj to have won a gold medal] and
Sergeyl seems to Bill [t; to have won a gold medal].
b. *_seems to Bill [[An American runner] to have won a gold medal] and
seems to Bill [[Sergey] to have won a gold medal].
c. *An American runnerl seems to Bill [tl to have won a gold medal] and
seems to Bill [[a Russian athlete] to have won a go!d medal].
d. * seems to Bill [[An American runner] to have won a gold medal] and
Sergeyl seems to Bill [t1 to have won a gold medal].
2.3. Scope-Economy and coordination
Consider a situation in which movement of QP over a (either by QR to a position above a
or by QL to a position below a; henceforth crossing a) has semantic effects. Suppose,
now, that (under certain circumstances), the relevant semantic effects are "invisible" to
Scope-Economy. What this means is that although crossing ao has semantic effects, it is
not licensed by Scope-Economy. If such circumstances exist, Scope-Economy would
make very intricate predictions. Specifically, Scope-Economy would predict that QP could
cross a only if the structure contains another scope bearing element, 0, such that (a) QP is
allowed by Scope-Economy to cross 0 (QP and 0 are scopally non-commutative) and (b)
Crossing 0 necessarily involves crossing a.
In this section, I will suggest that such a circumstance exists, and that the
predictions of Scope-Economy are borne out. Specifically, I will suggest that semantic
effects of movement across coordination are invisible to Scope-Economy, and that we
therefore predict the following generalization.
(44) The Coordination Scope Generalization: 3" An SSO can move a QP across
coordination only if the structure contains a scope bearing element, 3, such that
(a) QP and p are scopally non-commutative.
(b) The SSO that moves QP across 0 also moves QP across coordination (P and QP
are on different sides of the coordination.)
This generalization has two parts depending on whether the relevant SSO is QR or QL. In
38 As will become clearer in the next sub-section, 'movement across coordination' refers to
cases in which an XP moves (sometimes Across The board) from within a conjunct to a
position that c-commands coordination (or vice versa in the case of lowering).
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this section, I will provide evidence that both parts of the generalization are correct.
Furthermore, I will argue that the invisibility of coordination follows from a multi-
dimensional analysis of coordination which has been proposed to account for the
Coordinate Structure Constraint (CSC). In order for the discussion to be more concrete, I
will begin with a discussion of the multi-dimensional analysis.39
2.3.1. The Multi-dimensional analysis of coordination: In this sub-section, I
will present assumptions that are shared by a family of accounts of the CSC. As we will
see, these assumptions will yield the invisibility which was characterized somewhat
abstractly above.
The effects of the CSC are exemplified in (45). The relevant generalization is that
extraction out of a coordinate structure is possible only if it occurs across the board
(ATB).40
(45) a. * Who do you think Mary likes t and Bill hates Sue?
b. Who do you think Mary likes t and Bill hates t.
Certain accounts of this generalization are based on the two assumptions in (46).4'
(46) a. Extraction out of a coordinate structure is possible only when the structure
consists of two independent sub-structures, each composed of one of the
coordinates together with material above it up to the landing site (henceforth,
Component Structures).
b. Grammatical constraints are checked independently in each of the Component
Structures.
'9 The discussion of the multi-dimensional analysis is provided for concreteness.
Specifically, it is provided in order for us to be clear about the set of operators that are
relevant in coordination for the licensing of an SSO. If one feels strong distaste for the
multi-dimesnional analyses, one can read this section as providing evidence for Scope-
Economy based on an ill-understood invisibility assumption.
Another possibility that might be considered is to captialize on the fact that a
universal quantifier and a coordinator and are scopally non-commutative. However, this
will raise problems for cases that involve downward entailing quantifiers, such as (62), or
for the case of ATB lowering discussed in 2.3.2.
40 There are certain counter-examples to the CSC due to Lakoff (1986). My hope is that the
correct account of these examples will not affect the arguments presented in this section
see previous note).
' These assumptions are made most explicit (and, as far as I know, are most natural) under
theories which analyze coordinate structures with the use of multi-dimensional phrase
structures (cf. Goodall (1987), Muadz (1991) and Moltman (1992)).
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With these assumptions, the contrast in (45) follows as a direct consequence of the
constraint against vacuous quantification. When movement takes place out of one of the
coordinates (and not the other), as in (45a), the Component Structures are those in (47).
As we see, the second Component Structure involves vacuous quantification. When
movement is ATB, both Component Structures are well-formed, as we can see in (48).42
(47) Component Structures of (45a)
1. Who do you think Mary likes t
2. Who do you think Bill hates Sue
(48) Component Structures of (45b)
1. Who do you think Mary likes t
2. Who do you think Bill hates t
Given (46b), Scope-Economy, like any other grammatical constraint, should be
satisfied independently in each Component Structure. The prediction is that an SSO which
moves a QP across coordination must be motivated internal to the Component Structures in
which it occurs. This yields the invisibility which was necessary for deriving the
Coordination Scope Generalization. More specifically, if a QP crosses coordination, it must
cross some quantificational expression 0 (such that P and QP are scopally non-
commutative) within the Component Structure(s) in which it applies. Global semantic
effects that result from the complete structure (i.e. from the composition of the derivative
components and the semantics of coordination) are invisible to Scope-Economy.
2.3.2. Scope-Economy and coordination - the case of QR: In this section, I
will argue that the Coordination Scope Generalization holds of QR. The generalization as it
applies to QR can be stated more explicitly in the following manner:
4 2Note that this account doesn't predict that ATB movement must take place in parallel.
That is, it doesn't predict that ATB extraction from different structural positions would be
ill-formed. I don't think that this is necessarily a bad result. Although ATB extraction
tends to be better when it takes place from parallel positions, it is known that this is only a
tendency. Non-parallel ATB extraction such as that in (i) are perfectly acceptable. (see
Williams (1978))
(i) John, who Mary invited t to the party and Bill said t would come late.
(49) The Coordination QR Generalization (CQRG): In a structure such as (i), an
optional instance of QR can move QP outside of the coordination only if there is
some scope bearing element 0 c-commanding the coordination such that (a) P and
QP are scopally non-commutative and (b) QR moves QP over P, as in (ii).
(i) [ype.... [,.....QP.. ] and [u2.......]]
(ii) QP,[ypi3.... [ xal .. x .. ] and [2 ....... ]]
The CQRG follows straightforwardly from Scope-Economy under a multi-dimensional
analysis. Given Scope-Economy, an optional instance of QR must move QP above a
scopally non-commutative expression, P. Given the multi-dimensional analysis of
coordination, 0 must be an element in the Component Structure in which QP applies
(lyp .....[, ....QP.. ]). Furthermore, given Shortest Move, QR will target the maximal
projection that immediately dominates P. Therefore, the only way for QR to move QP over
and is for it to move over p and for 3 to c-command tal (and hence c-cormnand
coordination as well).
However, before we test the CQRG, we should go over some background
regarding the affects of the CSC on QR.
2.3.2.1. Setting the stage: May (1985) and Ruys (1993) have argued that QR obeys
the CSC (see also Lakoff (1970) and Rodman (1976)). One of the arguments is based on
the observation that a QP within a coordinated VP cannot out-scope the subject. Thus, the
option for Inverse Scope in (50a) disappears in (50b).
(50) a. A (different) student likes every professor. (3 > V) (V > 3)
b. A (#different) student [[likes every professor] and [hates the dean]]
I (3 > V) *(V > 3)
This observation supports the claim that QR obeys the CSC, and, thereby supports the
claim that QR involves syntactic movement.
Ruys (1993), however, has observed that a pronoun in one of two conjuncts can
license QR out of the other in apparent violation of the CSC. This is demonstrated by the
contrast in (51).
(51) a. A (#different) student [[likes every professor] and [hates the dean]]
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(3>V) *(V>3)
b. A (different) student [[likes every professorl] and [wants him1 to be on his
committee]] (3 > V) (V > 3)
(51b), in contrast to (51 a), allows the object to QR over the subject in apparent violation of
the CSC. Ruys suggestion (stated in the terms of a multi-dimensional analysis) is that the
pronoun in the second conjunct allows the quantifier to move out of the first conjunct
without violating the constraint on vacuous quantification in any of the Component
Structures. More specifically, he suggests that the pronoun is analyzed in LF as a
resumptive pronoun. The two Component Structures are provided in (52), and neither
involves vacuous quantification.
(52) 1. Every professor1, a student likes ti.
2. Every professor1 , a student wants himr to be on his committee.
Although Ruys doesn't point this out explicitly, I think that his observation lends support
to an explanation of the CSC along the lines discussed above. (51) shows that there is no
requirement of ATB movement. The appearance of a requirement is an artifact of the two
Component Structures which are checked independently for vacuous quantification. In
(51b), where vacuous quantification is avoided by a resumptive pronoun, there is no need
for ATB movement.
In (51b), movement takes place only out of one of the conjuncts. However, the
principles from which the CSC follows do not require ATB movement. What they require
is that each of the Component Structures obey all grammatical constraints, in particular the
ban on vacuous quantification. Movement takes place only out of one of the Component
Structures. However, the other Component Structure doesn't suffer from vacuous
quantification due to the presence of the pronoun.
Ruys' suggestion is further supported by his observation that quantifiers behave
like in situ Wh-phrases. (53a), just as (51 a), involves vacuous quantification in one of the
Component Structures and is thus ruled out. In (53b), just as in (51b), a resumptive
pronoun obviates the CSC.43
4 Note that this point does not depend on the claim that in situ WH-operators undergo LF
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(53) a. *Which student likes which professor and hates the dean?
b. Which student likes which professor and wants him to be on his committee?
2.3.2.2. Testing the generalization: What we've learned in the previous section is
that there is a restriction on QR which follows from vacuous quantification (the CSC) and
that this restriction is independent of Scope-Economy. We can thus restate our expectation
for coordination in (49') where a (resumptive) pronoun x is inserted into the second
conjunct ac2 so as to nullify the effects of vacuous quantification:
(49') The Coordination QR Generalization (CQRG): In a structure such as (i), an
optional instance of QR can move QP outside of the coordination only if there is
some scope bearing element 0 c-commanding the coordination such that (a) 0 and
QP are scopally non-commutative and (b) QR moves QP over 0, as in (ii).
(i) [yp..... [a,,.....Q P.. ] and [a2....x...]]
(ii) QPJ[Yp .... [al.....x .. ] and [ 2 X...x....]]
How would we know if QR has moved QP outside of the coordination? The most obvious
way is to see whether the variable x can be bound by QP.
Consider the contrast in (54).
(54) a. *Billy [.,wants to date [every girl in this class],] and
Uhas already asked [her], out].
b. A boy [,0 wants to date [every girl in this class],] and
t I
[,2has already asked [her], out]. *(3 > V) (V > 3)
movement. Analyses that do not assume LF movement (e.g., Baker (1970) and more
recently Reinhart (1994) and Tsai (1994)) assume that the in situ WH-operator provides a
variable that is bound by a matrix (null) operator. This matrix operator will bring about
vacuous quantification in (53a) but not in (53b). Note that if there are arguments against
LF WH-movement (c.f., Reinhart 1994), then the ill-formedness of (53a) provides a
strong argument for an analysis that divorces the CSC from movement (such as the multi-
dimensional analysis that I assume).
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This contrast follows from Scope-Economy. In (54b), QR over the subject reverses the
relative scope of two scopally non-commutative expressions (every girl in this class and a
boy), while in (54a) it doesn't. Therefore, in (54a) there is nothing that allows QR to
move the object QP outside of coordination. Consequently, binding the variable in a2 is
impossible. It is also important to notice that (54b) is restricted to Inverse Scope.44 This is
exactly what we expect under Scope-Economy; optional QR to any position above
coordination will have no motivation.
However, the predictions are more intricate. Specifically, we predict that sentences
such as those in (54) will be acceptable if and only if the subject and the object in the first
conjunct are scopally non-commutative:
(55) The CQRG (a consequence of): In a structure such as (i), QP2 can bind x only
if QP1 and QP2 are scopally non-commutative.
(i) [ypQP, [v,,.....QP 2.. i and [VP2....X...
This prediction, as far as I can tell, is correct:
(56) a. *Every boy [,iwants to date [every girl in this class],] and
44 Demonstrating the restriction to Inverse Scope in (54b) is not trivial given the entailment
relations. (There is no situation in which the sentence is false under Inverse Scope and true
under Surface Scope. See Abusch (1994) and references therein.) The restriction is
apparent when we consider operators that reverse entailment relations. Consider (i).
(i) I doubt that a boy [,,wants to date [every girl in this class],] and
[,2has already asked [her], out]. *(3 > V) (V > 3)
For this sentence to be true, the speaker must doubt that every girl in the class has an
admirer (with the appropriate properties). The speaker cannot utter the sentence to express a
doubt that all of the girls have the same admirer. This is clear when we compare (i) with
(ii).
(ii) I doubt that there is a boy who [,awants to date every girl in this class] and
[,ahas already asked every girl out].
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[has already asked [her], out].
b. Many boys [,want to date [every girl in this class],] and
t I
[have already asked [her], out]. *(Many > V) (V >Many)
(57) a. *The boy sitting next to me L,wants to date [every girl in the class],] and
[alhas already asked [her], out].
b. The boy sitting next to her •. 2 [,,wants to date [every girl in the class],] and
t I
[,,2has already asked [her], out].
(58) a. *Every boy who loves Mary [,iwants to date [every girl in the class],] and
"a I
[ahas already asked [her], out].
b. Every boy who loves her,,., [,wants to date [every girl in the class],] and
It I
[,ahas already asked [her], out]. 45
What is common to all of the (b) sentences in (54-58) is that there is no motivation for QR
of every girl in the class to a position above al in the Component Structure that contains
this DP. We thus expect that in all these cases movement of every girl in the class to a
position above cl is not licensed, and, subsequently, binding of the pronoun in a2 is
impossible.
2.3.2.3. The problem of Telescoping: Unfortunately, the paradigm in (54-58)
doesn't always hold. As noted by Reinhart (1987) and by Ruyc (1993) constructions such
as (59) are well-formed.4 6
45 Some speakers find (58b) as well as (57b) slightly marginal. However, these speakers
do find a contrast between (a) and (b). I think it is reasonable to assume that the
marginality of (58b) and (57b) is due to WCO, See the discussion of WCO in 2.2.3.1.
46A few speakers, myself not included, find (5!b) (under Inverse Scope) better than (59).
Although these judgments support my general claim, I ignore them, since they are very
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(59) Mary likes every professorl and wants himl to be on her committee.
(59) seems to disconfirm the CQRG. However, there is a confound in the experiment.
The confound is that constructions that contain universal quantifiers sometimes exemplify a
phenomena which we might call illusory variable binding. Sometimes a universal quantifier
can appear to bind a pronoun even though it is obvious that it doesn't c-command the
pronoun at any level of representation. Such, illusory binding, called telescoping by
Roberts (1987), is illustrated in (60)
(60) a. Every graduating student walked up to the stage. He shook the dean's hand
and returned to his seat. (Roberts 1987)
b. Every story pleases these children. If it is about animals, they are excited. If it
is about witches, they are enchanted, and if it is about humans they never want
it to stop. (Belvadi 1989)
The precise restrictions on telescoping are not clear (cf. Poesio and Zucchi (1992)).
It is therefore unclear whether it can apply in (59). However, I don't think that this should
cast serious doubt on the validity of the evidence I provided in (54-58). What we saw in
(54-58) is that whenever we can tell that variable binding is impossible in a configuration of
the form [i,,.....QP2.. I and [VP2...x...x (whenever telescoping is impossible) we observe
that variable binding becomes possible if the subject and QP2 are scopally non-
commutative. This is exactly what we expect given Scope-Economy.
2.3.2.4. Downward entailing operators: One way to control for telescoping is by
the use of downward entailing operators, such as only one. With such operators (as noted
by Evans (1980)) there is an interpretive difference between real and illusory variable
binding. This is illustrated in (61).
(61) a. Only one student walked up to the stage. He shook the dean's hand and
returned to his seat.
b. Only one student walked up to the stage, shook the dean's hand and returned to
his seat.
In (61a) only one student doesn't c-command the pronoun. Still, the pronoun is
subtle (perhaps for the reasons I discuss below).
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somehow related to the operator. This relation, however, is not that of syntactic binding,
which is available in (61b). The two are semantically distinct. (61a) makes a stronger
assertion. For this utterance to be truthful, there must be no more than one student that
walked up to the stage. Further, the unique student that walked up to the stage is required
to do two other things. (61 b) makes a weaker assertion. For this sentence to be true, there
could be 3 students who walked up to the stage, as long as only one of them did the two
other things. This difference follows naturally from the assumption that in (61a) the
pronoun is outside the scope of the operator and is related to it by some other strategy
(e.g., an e-type strategy) . This is illustrated in the pseudo-logical paraphrases in (61').
(61') a. [Only one x: (student(x) & walked up to the stage (x))] & [the unique student
that walked up to the stage shook the deans hand and returned to his seat]
b. Only one x: [student(x) & walked up to the stage (x) & shook the deans hand
(x) & returned to one's seat (x)]
We could thus replace a downward entailing quantifier in the position of every
professor in (59) and see whether variable binding is available. That only illusory binding
is possible is indicated by the utterance in (62). The second sentence in this utterance
contradicts the first one. The reason for this contradiction is the lack of real variable
binding.
(62) John loves 3 of the women he knows. However, he loves only one of them and
expects her to love him back. (contradiction)
Had variable binding been possible, the meaning of the second conjunct in (62) would be
parallel to that of (61 b). In other words, the sentence would merely require that there be no
more than one woman that has two properties (the property of being loved by John and the
property of being expected by him to show some love in return). The existence of no more
than one woman who has both properties doesn't contradict the existence of 3 who have
one of them. Therefore, had syntactic binding been available in the second sentence of
(62), we would expect there to be no contradiction with the first sentence. What (62)
would mean, had syntactic binding been possible, can be illustrated by an utterance which
involves syntactic binding but is parallel to (62) in all other respects. In (63) we see that
such an utterance involves no contradiction.
(63) John loves 3 of the women he knows. However, there is only one of them that he
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loves and expects to love him back. (no contradiction)
The lack of syntactic binding in the second sentence of (62) argues that only one
cannot QR out of the coordinate structure. The reason, I suggest, is that the movement is
not licensed within the Component Structure in which it would take place. Further
evidence that this is the case is given by the contrast between (62) and (64).
(64) John can love 3 of the women he knows. However he can [love only one of them]
and [expect her to love him back]. (not necessarily a contradiction)
In (64), optional QR of only one has motivation (within the relevant Component Structure).
The motivation for QR is to have scope over the modal can (can and only one are scopally
non-commutative). A by-product of QR is that syntactic binding is possible in the second
Component Structure, and that consequently there is no contradiction with the first
sentence.47
The utterance in (65) contrasts with (64) in the size of the constituent that is being
coordinated in the second sentence. In (65), this constituent includes the modal can (as we
can tell by the appearance of the agreement marker s in the second conjunct). Therefore,
although QR is licensed, Shortest Move restricts its length; the QP only one cannot move
outside the coordination and therefore cannot bind the pronoun in the second conjunct.
Only e-type binding is possible, and the semantic result is a contradiction.
(65) John can love 3 of the women he knows. However he [can love only one of them]
and [expects her to love him back]. (contradiction)
2.3.3. Scope-Economy and coordination - the case of QL: Let's consider again
the contrast in (50), which argues that QR obeys the CSC.
47 As pointed out to me by Irene Heim and Satoshi Tomioka, (64) has two non-
contradictory interpretations, Under one interpretation, only one has scope over the modal
can. Under the other interpretation, the sentence means something paraphrasable as it is
not the case that John can love more than one woman and expect her to love him back. As
Irene Heim pointed out, the second interpretation might require a decomposition of only
one into not more than one (perhpas) followed by QR of not. Note that this doesn't bear
on the argument I make. For the argument to go through it is enough to establish that (64)
has one representation which involves QR out of the coordination. Such a representation is
demonstrably unavailable for (62).
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(50) a. A student likes every professor. (3> V) (V > 3)
b. A student [[likes every professor] and [hates the dean]].
.0N-(3 > V) *(V>3)
As mentioned, the contrast argues that QR obeys the CSC. However, when we consider
the option for Quantifier Lowering and the existence of VP internal subjects, there is a gap
in the explanation of the contrast. We understand why in (50b) the object can't raise by QR
over the subject, but we don't understand why the subject can't lower by QL under the
object. (See (7"'-8'") .)
In order to deal with this, one might want to seek a principle that, in general, blocks
the subject in coordinate structures from lowering into the coordinates. Example (66),
however, shows that this is a wrong strategy. In (66), although the object quantifier is
within a coordinated VP, it can have scope over the VP external subject. Assuming that
QR obeys the CSC, the subject must be lowered under the object.
(66) A guard is standing in front of every church and sitting at the side of every mosque.
Further, the interpretation of (66) indicates that it is the subject that lowers under the object
rather than the object that QRs over the subject. To see this, we must first observe that in
order for the subject to have narrow scope relative to the object of one of the VPs, it must
also have narrow scope with respect to the other object. Putting aside the CSC, there are
two principled ways for the subject to have narrow scope relative to both objects. One
would be by moving both objects over the subject as in (66'a) and the other would be by
combining obligatory VP-level QR in both conjuncts with ATE lowering of the subject to
the two coordinated VPs, as in (66'b).
(66') a. every mosquel every church 2 [A guard is [standing in front of t2] and
[sitting at the side of tj].
b.__ is [v every churchI [VP [a guard] standing in front of t 1]] and
[vr every mosquel [vP [a guard] sitting at the side of ti]].
I t
There is an obvious difference in the interpretation of the LFs in (66'a) and in (66'b). For
the LF in (66'a) to be true, each pair of a mosque and a church must have a single guard
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standing both in front of the church and in front of the mosque. For the LF in (66'b) to be
true, the guards can vary independently with respect to the churches and the mosques.
(66'b) is an LF equivalent to the one achieved by independent wide scope for the object in
the two conjuncts of (67).
(67) A guard is standing in front of every church and
a guard is sitting at the side of every mosque.
It seems clear that the interpretation of (66) is that of (66'b) and not that of (66'a). It is
therefore reasonable to conclude that the LF of (66) is achieved by ATB lowering and not
by QR out of both conjuncts. (66), therefore, doesn't raise any problem for the claim that
QR obeys the CSC. However, we want an explanation for the difference between (50b)
and (66). Why is ATB lowering allowed in (66) and not in (50b)?
Scope-Economy together with the multi-dimensional analysis of coordination
provide the answer. First, notice that from the multi-dimensional analysis of coordination
it follows that lowering is possible into a coordinate structure only if it is ATB. To see
this, consider (66'b) and its two Component Structures in (68). Had lowering taken place
only in one of the Component Structures, the trace in the other Component Structure would
not have an antecedent (as we see in (69)).
I 4,
(68) 1. _ is [vP every churchl [vp [a guard] standing in front of till]]
2. _ is [vP every mosque1 [vp [a guard] sitting at the side of tl]]
I f
I 4,
(69) 1. is [vP every churchi [vP [a guard] standing in front of t1]]
2. is [vp every mosquel [vp t sitting at the side of tl]]
Consider the point in the derivation of (66) at which the object has already
undergone short QR (adjunction to VP), but the subject has not yet undergone ATB
lowering. The structure at this point is represented in (66").
(66") a guard2 is [vP every churchi [vP t2 standing in front of tl]] and
[VP every mosques [vp t2 sitting at the side of t1]]
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The two Component Structures:
1. a guard 2 is [vp every churchl [VP t2 standing in front of tl]]
2. a guard 2 is [vp every mosquel [vp t2 sitting at the side of tll]]
To determine whether Scope-Economy allows QL to move the subject into both conjuncts
we must take an independent look at each of the Component Structures. Scope-Economy,
like any other grammatical constraint, is checked independently in the two Component
Structures. Therefore, at each Component Structure, QL must reverse the relative scope of
two non-commutative quantifiers. As we see in (66"), in both Component Structures, QL
alters the scope of an existential and a universal quantifier. Since these quantifiers are
scopally non-commutative, QL is licensed in both Component Structures.
In (50b), by contrast, lowering the subject into the second conjunct will not reverse
the relative scope of two non-commutative quantifiers within the second Component
Structure and is thus ruled out.
More generally, we predict the following generalization:
(70) The Coordination QL Generalization (CQLG): In a structure such as (i),
ATB QL is possible only if there are two expressions 0 and 3' such that (a) both
<Pc,QP> and <P',QP> are scopally non-commutative and (b) QL (in one
Component Structure) moves QP under 3, and (in the other Component Structure)
under i', as in (ii).
(i) [vpQP ,1..... [,.....t,.....] and [1 2....t' 1...]]
(ii) [v y..... [•, ...QP...] and [12P'..QP..] 1
Further evidence in favor of this generalization is provided in (71).
(71) a. A guard is standing in front of every church and sitting at the side of every
mosque.
b # A guard is standing in front of every church and sitting at the side of this
mosque.
In (71a(=66)), Scope-Economy licenses QL in both Component Structures in (66"). ATB
QL is licensed and results in (66'b). In (71 b), by contrast, QL into the second conjunct is
not licensed. Consequently, the sentence is semantically anomalous (since we cannot
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imagine a single guard standing in front of all churches).48
To sum up, in this section we have seen that an invisibility assumption (which
follows from a multi-dimensional approach to coordination) provides a test for Scope-
Economy. The basic idea is that the CSC follows (as a by-product) from the necessary
formation of Component Structures. These structures must independently obey all
grammatical constraints. In particular, movement within a Component Structure must be
motivated (internal to the structure). However, once movement takes place, it has effects
also outside of the Component Structure (binding of a pronoun and scope relative to
coordination). Testing for these effects confirms Scope-Economy. When an SSO doesn't
have the semantic effects (required by Scope-Economy) within a Component Structure
(when it doesn't reverse two scopally non-commutative expressions), it can't have other
semantic effects that would result from movement.
2.4. The Locality of QR
In the previous sections I have claimed that QR is restricted by Scope-Economy and
Shortest Move. In this section, I would like to discuss a consequence that this claim has
for the locality of QR. Specifically, I would like to point out that this claim could help us
understand the clause boundedness of this operation.
The clause boundedness of QR is attested in sentences such as (72), which are
48 If the CQLG is correct, we expect the following paradigm:
(i) A guard is standing in front of every church and
sitting at the side of every mosque.
(ii) A guard is standing in front of every church and
sitting at the side of almost every mosque.
(iii) A guard is standing in front of every church and
sitting at the side of most of the mosques.
(iv) A guard is standing in front of every church and
sitting at the side of two of the mosques.
(v) #A guard is standing in front of every church and
sitting at the side of one of the mosques.
(vi) #A guard is standing in front of every church and
sitting at the side of this mosque.
Checking (i-vi) I found that all speakers accept (i) and reject (vi). With respect to (ii-v) 1
found some variation. About half the speakers I checked displayed judgments in accord
with the CQLG.
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restricted to Surface Scope.49
(72) a. #Someone said that every man is married to Sue. #(3 > V) *(V > 3)
b. #Someone said that Sue is married to every man. #(3 > V) *(V > 3)
This restriction is extremely puzzling under the assumption that QR is a form of A-bar
movement. Interestingly, is an immediate consequence of Scope-Economy and Shortest
Move.50 To see this, let's start with the structures that would result from the sentences in
(72), once obligatory QR has applied. In (72a), the QPs are interpretable in their surface
positions, and there is therefore no obligatory QR. In (72b), Obligatory QR moves every
man to a position in which this QP can be interpreted. Shortest move determines that the
landing site of this movement will be the embedded VP, yielding the structure in (72'b):
(72') a. Someone said [cpthat [,pevery man is married Sue]].
b. Someone said that [,,Sue, is [w, every man2 [VPt1 married to t2f]l.
At this point, every man is 'stuck'. There is no way for an optional step of QR to
satisfy both Shortest Move and Scope-Economy. Shortest Move determines that if a
second step of QR is to apply, it would target the nearest clause-denoting maximal
projection (the embedded CP in (72'a) and the embedded IP in (72'b)). Scope-Economy
determines that such a step is unavailable. (It doesn't reverse the relative scope of two
scopally non-commutative operators, and, as such is unmotivated.)
Shortest Move predicts that every step of QR is restricted to the closest XP that
dominates QP (where XP ranges over clause-denoting maximal projections). Scope-
Economy determines whether QR is licensed. If a QP is in an interpretable position which
is separated from another expression, oa, by an XP (and even if <oc,QP> are scopally non-
commutative), Scope-Economy and Shortest Move predict that the scopal relationship
between the quantifiers will be restricted to Surface Scope.
This suggestion makes a prediction, which is unexpected under any other approach
49The factual claim that quantifiers are clause-bound has not remained unchallenged. See
May (1988), Reinhart (1991; 1995) and Wilder (1997).
50 As pointed out by Hornstein (1995), the restriction is expected if QR is a form of A-
movement. However, this has been contested by Kennedy (1997) and Johnson and
Tomioka (1997). Furthermore, in chapter 6 we will see that treating QR as A-bar
movement allows us to account for various interactions between QR and Binding Theory.
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to locality. The prediction is that the locality of QR would be obviated in cases where
movement to each intervening XP is motivated by Scope-Economy. Evidence that this
prediction might be correct can be drawn from an observation made in Moltmann and
Szabolcsi (1994): 5,
(73) a. One girl knows that every boy bought a present for Mary. (3 > V) *(V > 3)
b. One girl knows what every boy bought for Mary. (3 > V) (v > 3)
In (73a), just as in (72), the universal quantifier in the embedded sentence cannot out-
scope the existential quantifier in matrix subject position. The reason for this is that Scope-
Economy rules out movement to the embedded CP, and that longer movements are ruled-
out by Shortest Move. In (73b), by contrast, movement of the universal quantifier over the
Wh-operator is semantically motivated (it provides a pair list reading, or, more accurately,
it reverses the relative scope of a universal and an existential quantifier).52 After the
5' Moltmann and Szabolcsi (1994) analyze the contrast in (73) without abandoning the
clause-boundedness of QR (though, see next note). In particular they claim that in (73b),
the effects of (V > 3) result from QR of the embedded interrogative accompanied by QR
internal to the interrogative (over the wh-phrase). Moltmann and Szabolcsi provide one
strong argument for this view. They show that when a pronoun in the embedded
interrogative is bound by the matrix subject, wide scope for the universal quantifier is
ruled-out:
(i) A girl, know what every boy bought for her, mother. (3 > V) *(V > 3)
Many speakers I consulted agree with Moltmann and Szabolcsi. However, it appears that
the contrast between (73b) and (i) re-emerges in (ii), where an extension of Moltmann and
Szabolcsi's analysis would be extremely implausible.
(ii) a. A girl, expected every boy to come to the party. (3 > V) (V > 3)
b. A girl, expected every boy to come to her, party. (3 > V) *(V > 3)
(ii) suggests to me that Inverse Scope is very difficult for a surface structure configuration
of the form [QP, ...QP2...pronoun,] (but cf. Hornstein (1995:160, 180) and Pica and
Snyder (1994: 345)). If this is in general true, Moltmann and Szabolcsi's observation
doesn't pose a serious threat to the proposal I am making.
52 It is well-known that pair-list reading are possible whenever the universal quantifier c-
commands the base-position of the wh-phrase. (See, among other, Aoun and Li (1993).):
(i) what did you say that every boy bought.
(ii) Someone knows what you said that every boy bought. (3 > V) (V > 3)
I assume that the wh-phrase has a landing site in every maximal projection and that the wh-
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universal quantifier moves over the Wh-operator, it can adjoin to the matrix VP (reversing
the relative scope of an Intensional verb and a universal quantifier). Finally it can move
over the subject position, yielding the attested (V > 3) interpretation.5 3
Notice, however, that given the way Shortest Move is defined, the predicted
restriction on QR might be too stringent. Consider, for example, the sentences in (74).
(74) a. Someone expects Sue to marry every boy. (3 > V) (V > 3)
b. He demanded that we read not a single book. (Kayne 1981).
(demand > not a single) (not a single > demand )
In these sentences, QR appears to cross many clause-denoting expressions. Given the
results of this chapter, there are two possible explanations for this fact. The first possibility
is that the sentences in (74) contain null (modal) operators which provide motivation for the
necessary intermediate instances of QR.' 4 The second possibility is that Shortest Move is a
trace (copy) provides motivation for every step of QR.
53 It is possible that this suggestion makes further predictions. One potential prediction is
that replacing the subject of (72b) with an existential quantifier would allow matrix scope
for the embedded universal quantifier. A few speakers I consulted found a contrast
between the sentences in (i) and (ii). According to these speakers, the universal quantifiers
in (i) but not in (ii) can have matrix scope. However, this contrast is not necessarily
predicted. The contrast would be predicted only if adjunction to IP can serve as an escape-
hatch for crossing an embedded CP.
(i) a. *A different person said that Sue is married to every man.
b. At least one person said that Sue is married to each ot these men.
(ii) a. A different person said that someone will marry every boy
b. At least one person said that someone is married to each ot these men.
54 David Pesetsky (p.c.) has pointed out that such a proposal might shed light on the fact
that a subjunctive clause (in contrast to an indicative clause) is not a barrier to QR.
Similarly consider the following contrast.
(i) a. Someone expects Sue to marry every man.
b. Someone believes Sue to be married to every man.
(ii) a. Someone expects Sue to know every man.
b. Someone believes Sue to know every man.
Although the judgments are subtle, it seems that Inverse Scope is easier in the (a)
sentences, which plausibly contain a modal operator in the embedded clause. (Consider the
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weaker condition than what I've assumed.
In order to investigate the second possibility we must ask what aspects of Shortest
Move were crucial in order to capture the generalizations reported in this chapter. It seems
to me that the account depends on three claims; (a) that optional QR applies only when it
reverses the relative scope of non-commutative expressions (Scope-Economy), (b) that
obligatory QR (assuming that it exists) is necessarily short (it targets the closest VP) and (c)
that optional QR targets the closest position that dominates the relevant scope bearing
element which is being crossed. A very natural way to capture these generalizations is by
Scope-Economy and Shortest Move (as I've defined it). However, there are other
possibilities. Among other things, it is possible to assume that (a) and (c) are part of the
definition of optional QR and that Shortest Move applies only to obligatory QR. Whatever
turns out to be the right account of (a-c) , it should yields certain locality restrictions on
QR. (Any statement of the relevant economy conditions that would capture (a-c) will
restrict intermediate steps of QR.) For this reason, it seems to me that Scope-Economy
(under any formulation) yields the attested result that QR is more restricted than other cases
of A-bar movement.
2.5. Modularity - an argument in favor of a deductive system ss
In the previous sections we have seen a variety of arguments in favor of the claim that
optional SSOs are allowed to apply only when they have certain effects on semantic
interpretation (Scope-Economy). If the claim is correct, it raises various questions
regarding the possible interactions between systems that construct linguistic objects and
systems that interpret these objects.
However, these questions can be formulated only given certain assumptions about
the nature of the relevant systems. Based on the results of research in generative grammar,
the following assumptions seem very plausible:
I-
paraphrase: for every world consistent with x's desire, w, there is an extension of w,
w', such that 4.) Thanks to Jon Nissenbaum and Rajesh Bhatt.
5" Many of the arguments that appear here have appeared in a different context in Fox and
Nissenbaum (1996). Additional considerations came up in discussions with Noam
Chomsky and Philippe Schlenker.
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* There is a separate cognitive system, Syntax, which consists of Syntactic Operations
that combine primitive object (e.g., words or features) to form Syntactic Structures.
* There are interpretive systems (distinct from Syntax) that access Syntactic Structures
and determine the way these structures can contribute to thought and communication
(Semantic Systems). ' 57
Given these assumptions, we might try to ask how exactly Syntax interacts with Semantic
Systems. In a state of ignorance, the best strategy is to postulate a simple working
hypothesis with the hope that it can be corrected as we gain further understanding. A very
simple working hypothesis for the interaction between Syntax and Semantic Systems,
which we can call the Modularity Hypothesis (MH), is that although the products of Syntax
are interpreted, Syntactic Operations apply blindly, oblivious to the resulting
interpretations:
* Modularity Hypothesis (MH): The application of Syntactic Operations is not
conditioned by the interpretation of the Syntactic Structures that would result.
MH has been a very productive working hypothesis. However (assuming that optional QR
and QL are Syntactic Operations, see note 63) it is inconsistent with Scope-Economy.
Scope-Economy states that the relevant Syntactic Operations are conditioned by the nature
of the semantic interpretations that they generate, and thus is inconsistent with the claim that
Syntactic Operations are oblivious to their interpretive consequences.
If Scope-Economy is correct, as I have tried to argue, MH needs to be modified.
What are the possible modifications? The most radical modification is that Syntactic
Operation are (in principle) conditioned by every property that relates to the way a sentence
can contribute to thought or communication. However, this is not a very plausible
56 The term "Semantics" has many uses. Here the term "Semantic Systems" is defined so
as to refer to the internal (cognitive) systems which take a Syntactic Structure and
contribute to determining the way it can be used in thought and communication. Under this
definition, a system that contains syntactic rules of inference (if it exists) is a Semantic F
System.
SObviously, there are also Interpretive systems that access Syntactic Structures and
determine the way in which they can contribute to phonetic realizations (Morpho-
Phonolgical Systems). However, Scope-Economy has very little to say about the
interactions between these systems and Syntax (though it might be relevant to discussion of
Marantz's (1997) notion of late insertion (See Fox (1995a: note 9)).
See Bobaljik (1998) for a discussion of an economy condition which raises
questions about the interactions between Syntax and Morpho-Phonology which are very
similar to the considerations that I address here.
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possibility. We know very well that the entirety of effects that a sentence can have on
thought processes is totally chaotic (See, for example, Davidson's (1986) discussion of the
considerations that enter into the construction of a "passing theory" that would determine
the truth conditions of a sentences. See also Chomsky (1992:214-215).) The correct
modification will have to be less radical.
We've seen that Scope-Economy is sensitive to semantic properties. However, the
semantic properties we've looked at concern the meanings of logical terms, such as
universal and existential quantifiers, conjunction, disjunction, negation, modal/intensional
operators (which can be viewed as universal and existential quantifiers over possible
worlds) and variable binding.58 The properties of such logical terms, which we can call
properties of "logical syntax", can be formalized by deductive systems. Suppose that
among the faculties of the mind there is such a (language dedicated) deductive system (DS),
and that DS consists of various rules of inference (familiar from proof theory). We can then
say that optional QR and QL are ruled out by Scope-Economy whenever DS is capable of
"proving" logical equivalence for two logical representations (with and without the SSO).
What I think Scope-Economy suggests is that DS, and DS alone, can condition the
Syntactic Operations of QR and QL:
Revised Modularity Hypothesis (RMH): Among the Semantic Systems there is
a formal deductive system (DS) which conditions certain Syntactic Operations.
Syntactic Operations are not conditioned by other Semantic Systems.
One argument in favor of RMH has already been provided. If Scope-Economy is
correct, MH needs to be revised by an alternative working hypothesis. Radical revision is
implausible, and RMH is a coherent alternative (For a somewhat related discussion see
Hintikka (1977) and the response in Chomsky (1979).)
The next argument is based on the observation that semantic properties that are not
plausibly attributable to DS are irrelevant for Scope-Economy. As mentioned, the
properties that are relevant to Scope-Economy are the properties of logical terms. This can
be seen in more detail by comparing the cases in which logical equivalence is provable (and
an SSO is blocked) with the cases in which it isn't and an SSO is licensed:
58 As mentioned (notes 2, 23), Reinhart's argument for Scope-Economy was based on the
suggestion that this condition is not sensitive to variable binding.
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(75) a. John likes every teacher.
b. A boy likes every teacher.
(76) a. Every boy likes every teacher.
b. Many boys like every teacher.
(77) a. Every person who was involved
festival admires every movie.
b. Every person who was involved
movie
(78) a. The person who produced the film
(Scopally Uninformative)
(Scopal!y Informative)
(Scopally Uninformative)
(Scopally Informative)
in the production of the film
(Scopally Uninformative)
in its production admires every
(Scopally Informative)
festival admires every movie.
(Scopally Uninfonnrmative)
b. The person who produced it admires every movie.
(Scopally Informnnative)
(79) a. John and Bill like every teacher.
b. John or Bill like every teacher.
(Scopally Uninformative)
(Scopally Informative)
(80) a. John does speak more than three languages (Scopally Uninformative)
b. John doesn't speak more than three languages. (Scopally Informative)
(81) a. John seems to have won a gold medal.
(Scopally Uninfonnative)
d. An American athlete seems to have won a gold medal.
(Scopally Informative)
(82) a. A guard is standing in front of a building.
b. A guard is standing in front of every building.
(83) a. A guard is standing in front of this building.
b. A guard is standing in front of every building.
(Scopally Uninformative)
(Scopally Informative)
(Scopally Uninformative)
(Scopally Informative)
In the (a) sentences, which I have called Scopally Uninformative, Scope-Economy doesn't
allow Inverse Scope. The reason (under RMH) is that DS can prove that the boldfaced
quantificational expressions in the (a) sentences are scopally commutative, whereas for the
(b) cases proof of commutativity is impossible (since commutativity doesn't hold).
The question to ask is what happens in cases in which commutativity does hold but
not due to properties that are plausibly attributable to DS. In such cases, RMH would lead
us to expect that Inverse Scope would be possible despite commutativity. Evidence that
this is the case can be extracted from the sentences in (84).
(84) a. In our class that consists of 40 students, at least one girl is taller than every boy.
b. An odd number of guards is standing in front of an odd number of buildings.
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c. Rob doesn't speak more than half of the 9 languages spoken in Sydney. 59
If we take into account the contribution that arithmetic expressions make to truth
conditions, the sentences in (84) are equivalent under Surface and Inverse Scope. For
(84a) and (84c), observing truth conditional equivalence is trivial, for (84b) it involves a
more intricate proof. (See Westerstahl 1994.) What is important, however, is that for all
the sentences, a proof of truth conditional equivalence must access the meaning of
arithmetic terms, and cannot be determined by properties of logical syntax which are
plausibly attributable to a language dedicated deductive system. (In (84a), the proof
depends on the fact that 40 is a finite number, in (84b) it depends on the meaning of the
word odd, and in (84c) it depends on the meaning of half and on the fact that 9 is an odd
number.6")
If we assume that Scope-Economy accesses DS and no other semantic system (i.e.
that it is only sensitive to the meaning of logical terms) we would predict that the truth
conditional equivalence of Surface and Inverse Scope in sentences such as those in (84)
would not affect the licensing of SSOs. In other words, we would predict that sentences as
those in (84) would not be limited to Surface Scope. This predictions seems to be correct.
The first indication that this is the case is the fact that speakers have a clear feeling
that the sentences in (84) are scopally ambiguous.6" The speakers I consulted report that
the sentences have two meanings, and it takes some work to illustrate to them that (as far as
truth conditions go) the meanings are identical. 62 The second (perhaps more important)
59 I thank Philipp Schlenker and Ed Keenan for providing me with (84b), and for
mentioning Westerstall's paper. (84c) is from Fox and Nissenbaum (1996).
60 If, as I suggest, Scope-Economy uses a local algorithm that considers properties of two
elements whose relative scope is being reversed, (84a) is irrelevant. The meaning of the
comparative will not be accessible to Scope-Economy. Therefore, even if the deductive
system cared about the meaning of the numeral expression 40, Scope-Economy would not
rule out Inverse Scope. (84a) provides an argument for a deductive system only if I am
wrong about the local algorithm for Scope-Economy (which is indeed a possibility)
6' For (84b), the intuitions are pretty difficult since the most prominent reading is the
cumulative interpretation under which we really cannot distinguish Surface from Inverse
Scope.
62 How can we make sense of this fact? What I think it suggests is that speakers have an
intuition about verification procedures (cf. Reinhart 1995). In (84a), for example, they feel
that there is one interpretation (Surface Scope) in which the default procedure for
verification will involve scanning the girls to see whether there is one who is taller than all
the boys. The other interpretation (Inverse Scope) suggests a different verification
procedure. Under the Inverse Scope procedure, one is guided to start with the boys and to
see whether each one of them is shorter than some girl.
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indication is that we can use the tests designed in the previous sections (as well as other
tests) in order to demonstrate that the intuitions are real. I.e., we can demonstrate that the
sentences in (84) differ from the Scopally Uninformative sentences in (75-83) in a way that
indicates that in the former (in contrast to the latter) Inverse Scope is possible.
In order to see the availability of Inverse Scope in (84a), consider the contrast in
(85). In (85a), Scope-Economy rules out QR of every boy to a position in which it can
bind the pronoun him. As discussed in 2.3., the reason for this is that in the Component
Structure in which QR applies, there are no semantic consequences to Inverse Scope.
Under RMH, the unavailability of QR would be the result of a proof by DS that an
interpretation of the relevant Component Structure with Surface Scope is equivalent to an
interpretation with Inverse Scope.
(85) In our class, which consists of 40 students
a. *Mary is [taller than every boy,] and [has threatened to beat him, up].
b. At least one girl is [taller than every boy,] and [has threatened to beat him, up].
In (85b), Inverse Scope will not have semantic consequences within the relevant
Component Structure. Nevertheless, Inverse Scope is licensed. The conclusion is that
Scope-Economy is not sensitive to the semantic properties that would yield truth
If this speculation is correct, it might sugge t'at (in general) sentences provide us
with verification procedures. If we learn how to investigate these procedures, Scopally
Uninformative sentences might turn out to be Scopally Informative. In such a case, we
might be able to find direct tests for Scope-Economy. Consider, for example, the two
sentences in (i):
(i) a. Every boy loves every girl.
b. Every girl is loved by every boy.
Here intuitions are very unreliable, and, needless to mention, should be viewed with
skepticism. Nevertheless, it does seem that the default verification procedure for (ia)
involves scanning the boys to see whether each one of them loves every girl, whereas in
(ib), default verification will start out with the girls. DS can prove "that the two verification
procedures are equivalent", hence Scope-Economy doesn't allow Inverse Scope, and
consequently each of the sentences in (i) is limited to one verification procedure.
It is very difficult to probe intuitions about verifications procedures because we are
capable of using various sorts of deductions (way beyond those determined by DS), and
these deductions obscure the default (putative) procedures (though sometimes the
procedures are very apparent as in the difference between All Ravens are black and All non
black things are non ravens ). Nevertheless, if we had a way to probe intuitions about
verification procedures, we could broaden the realm of linguistic evidence, and (among
other things) subject Scope-Economy to further tests.
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conditional equivalence for Surface and Inverse Scope in (84a).
In order to see the availability of Inverse Scope in (84b), Consider the contrast in
(86). In (86a), as I have claimed in 2.2.3., Scope-Economy blocks Inverse Scope in the
antecedent sentence, and Parallelism blocks Inverse Scope in the ellipsis sentence yielding
an anomalous interpretation. Assuming that DS is responsible for proving logical
equivalence, we would say that DS treats the subject quantifier in (86a) as an existential QP
(ignoring the adjective odd), and proves that such a quantifier phrase is scopally
commutative with respect to a definite description.
(86) a. #An odd number of guards stood in front of this building and two policemen
did, in front of every church.
b. ?An odd number of guards stood in front of an odd number of buildings and
two policemen did, in front of every church.
In (86b), Inverse Scope is licensed in the antecedent sentence despite scopal commutativity.
We can see this by the availability of Inverse Scope in the ellipsis sentence. The conclusion
is that Scope-Economy is not sensitive to the semantic properties that would yield truth
conditional equivalence for Surface and Inverse Scope in (84b).
To see the availability of Inverse Scope in (84c) requires a more complicated test
which was designed in Fox and Nissenbaum (1996). To set the stage for this test,
consider the contrast in (87).
(87) a. Rob doesn't speak more than 2 of the 9 languages spoken in Sydney.
Perhaps he will never learn to speak them. (them = the languages spoken in
Sydney that Rob doesn't speak)
b. There is no way that Rob speaks more than 2 of the 9 languages spoken in
Sydney.
*Perhaps he will never learn to speak them. (them = the languages spoken in
Sydney that Rob doesn't speak)
In (87a), there is a pronoun in the second sentence which refers to the languages spoken in
Sydney that Rob doesn't speak (probably an e-type pronoun). Such an interpretation for
the pronoun depends on Inverse Scope. In (87b), there is an island intervening between
the two scope bearing elements, thus blocking Irverse Scope. Consequently, the pronoun
cannot get the intended interpretation. Given the contrast in (87), it is plausible to view the
intended interpretation of the pronoun as an indicator of the availability of Inverse Scope.
The contrast in (88) suggests that Inverse Scope is possible in the first sentence of (88b),
which is identical to (84c).
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(88) a. Rob doesn't speak more than half of the 9 languages spoken in Sydney.
Perhaps he will never learn to speak them. (them = the languages spoken in
Sydney that Rob doesn't speak)
b. There is no way that Rob speaks more than half of the 9 languages spoken in
Sydney.
*Perhaps he will never learn to speak them. (them = the languages spoken in
Sydney that Rob doesn't speak)
To sum up, we have seen that the sentences in (84) are different in an important
way from the (a) sentences in (75-83). Scope-Economy is sensitive to the truth conditional
equivalence of Surface and Inverse Scope in (75-83), but is oblivious to this equivalence in
(84). This difference is exactly what we would expect under the existence of a deductive
system together with RMH. We can therefore take the difference as evidence in favor of
the postulation of a deductive system.63
The discussion in this section is admitedly very speculative, and might be extremely
pre mature. However, if there is something to the speculations, the potential gain might be
significant. Specifically, we can hope to distinguish between properties of meaning which
are determined by the linguistic system (hence accessible to Scope-Economy) from
properties of meaning that come about from other cognitive systems (hence, like our
knowledge of arithmetic, are incapable of conditioning Syntactic Operations).
2.6. What is special about SSOs?
As far as I can tell, there are no operations other than optional SSOs which are subject to
Scope-Economy. Why should this be the case? In this section, I would like to make a
speculation inspired by a proposal made in Chomsky (1995: 377) and Krifka (1998). This
speculation capitalizes on the fact that optional SSOs are the only optional operations that
do not affect phonology.
63 Noam Chomsky has pointed out to me that MH is threatened by Scope-Economy only
under the assumption that optional QR and QL are Syntactic Operations. If the operations
are part of the interpretive system itself, there would be no need to modify MH. However,
there is a lot of evidence that SSOs affect structure. SSOs are structure building operations
with many properties of (non-putative) syntactic movement (see chapter 6). Given this
fact, Chomsky suggests that they should (perhaps) be viewed as structure building
operations that apply in a post-syntactic system. Modularity questions could be avoided all
together (he suggests) if the rules of inference needed for Scope-Economy apply in the
same system that applies SSOs (i.e., if SSOs apply in DS).
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Suppose that it is in general necessary that all optional operations have either a
phonological or a semantic effect. 64 In the previous sections, I claimed that the relevant
notion of a semantic effect has to do with scopal non-commutativity. Suppose that the
relevant notion of a phonological effect has to do with word order (though see Krifka
1998). We can then view Scope-Economy as a special case of a more general condition,
which we can call Output-Economy.
(89) Output-Economy: Optional operations must affect the output.
Output-Economy has as its consequence two different economy conditions:65
(90) a. Scope-Economy: Covert optional operations (i.e., QR and QL) cannot be,
scopally vacuous (i.e., they must reverse the relative scope of two non-
commutative quantificational expressions).
b. Word-Order-Economy: Overt optional operations cannot be string vacuous
(i.e., they must reverse the relative order of two [perhaps phonologically overt]
expressions)66
.
If we could provide evidence for Word-Order-Economy, we will have an argument
for this line of reasoning. In order to engage is such an investigation, we need to identify
certain optional cases of overt movement. Among the operations that come to mind are
optional scrambling and extraposition. I think that there is some indication that, in the case
of extraposition, further investigation might yield an interesting confirmation. (For a
related discussion of Scrambling [and a related speculation] see Krifka (1998).)
To set the stage for the test, consider the contrast in (91-92). The (a) sentences are
ruled out by Condition C of the Binding Theory (BT(C)). The (b) sentences show that
optional extraposition has an effect on BT(C). (See Taraldsen 1981.)
64 Chomsky assumes that all movement is feature driven. Under this assumption, optional
movement operations are those operations for which the triggering feature is not
obligatorily present in the Numeration. The generalized economy condition states that these
features can be inserted only if they have effects on the output.
65 The way I state things here assumes that the kind of output effects that on operation must
have depends on whether it is overt or covert. If this is correct, it would mean that an
affect on Scope cannot obviate the requirement that an overt optional operation will have
effects on phonology. This is more in line with Krifka's suggestion than with Chomsky's.
66 AS pointed out to me by Noam Chomsky, it is possible that Word-Order-Economy
restricts certain instances of obligatory movement. See Chomsky (1986a: 48-54) and
references therein.
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(91) a. ??I introduced him, to the woman that John, likes yesterday.
b. I introduced him, to the woman yesterday that John , likes.
(92) a. ??/* I want him, to explain the argument that John, was making with all my
heart .
b. ? I want him, to explain the argument with all my heart that John, was making.
Given this contrast, the ill-formedness of the sentences in (93) is somewhat mysterious.
(93) a. ??I Introduced him, to the woman that John, likes.
b. ??/* I want him, to explain the argument that John, was making.
Why can't the derivation for these sentences include an instance of string-vacuous
extraposition that would be structurally identical to the extraposition we've seen in (91b)
and (92b)? Output-Economy provides the answer. Extraposition is an overt optional
operation. Therefore, by Word-Order-Economy, it cannot be string-vacuous.
Another domain where we might hope to find interesting results is the domain of
optional overt SSOs. If such operations exist, Output-Economy predicts that they will not
have to affect semantic interpretation. Consider Hungarian. This language has been
claimed to have both overt and covert QR. (See Szabolcsi (1998).) If this claim is correct,
Output-Economy would predict that in Hungarian QR will need to affect semantic
interpretations only when it is covert. This claim should be testable with the tools that were
introduced in this chapter.
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Chapter 3: Asymmetries in Ellipsis and the Nature of Accommodation
In Chapter 2, I have argued that Scope Shifting Operations (SSOs) are subject to a
Semantics-Sensitive Economy condition (Scope-Economy, henceforth, for brevity, just
Economy). Under this condition, an SSO is licensed only when it affects Semantic
Interpretation.' Because SSOs (generally) don't affect phonetic interpretation, the
argument for Economy had to be based on various mechanisms that distinguish
"observationally identical" representations. In particular, I focused on cases in which a
certain constraint C can detect whether or not an SSO has applied. I have shown that in
such cases, C indicates that the predictions of Economy are correct; the SSO applies only
when it has semantic effects.
It is worth noting, however, that the predictions depend on the assumption that the
SSO -- although licensed in order to get a distinct interpretation -- is not licensed in order to
satisfy C. For illustration, let us look at the case of ATB QL, in which the relevant
constraint is the CSC (see 2.3.3):
(1) a. A guard is [t standing in front of every church] and
[t sitting at the side of every mosque].
b #A guard is [t standing in front of every church] and
[: sitting at the side of this mosque].
The CSC (which, as I have mentioned, could follow from the ban on vacuous
quantification and the requirement that every trace be bound) determines that QL is allowed
to occur into one of the conjuncts in the sentences in (1), only if it occurs into the other
conjunct as well. In (la) both instances of QL are licensed, while in (Ib) QL into the
second conjunct doesn't yield a distinct semantic interpretation, and is therefore not
licensed. The CSC thus indicates that QL cannot occur if it doesn't have a semantic effect.
However, this prediction is based on the assumption that QL cannot occur into the second
conjunct in order to satisfy the CSC (given that it has "already" occurred into the first
conjunct). In other words, what we need to assume is that while Economy "sees" the
semantic effects of the relative scope of two quantifiers, it does not "see" the effects of the
CSC.
SThe term Semantic Interpretation is to be understood with the qualifications stated in
Chapter 2. See, in particular, 2.5.
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The same point could be made when we consider the interaction of Economy and
Parallelism. In (2a2), QR of the object over the subject affects interpretation, and therefore
should be licensed by Economy. In (2b2), by contrast, QR of the object over the subject
does not affect interpretation and is therefore predicted to be ruled-out.
(2) al. Some boy admires every teacher. a2. Some girl does, too. (3 >V) (V>3)
<admire every teacher>
b 1. Some boy admires every teacher. b2. Mary does too. (3 >V) (V>3)
<admire every teacher>
In this case, the constraint that is used to test the prediction of Economy is Parallelism.
From Parallelism it follows that QR must apply in the same manner to (2bl) and (2b2).
The fact that (2bl) is disambiguated in favor of the interpretation in which long QR has not
applied is an indication that Economy rules out long QR in (2b2). Once again, the
predictions depends on the assumption that Economy doesn't "see" the effects of the
detector; if QR were allowed to apply in the second sentence in order to satisfy Parallelism
with the first sentence (in which QR has "already" applied) disambiguation would never be
predicted. This assumption is a necessary consequence of the local definition of Scope-
Economy which I advocated in Chapter 2. However, in Fox (1995a), I provided an
argument for a global definition of Scope-Economy, which conflicts with the assumption.
In this chapter, I would like to confront this argument.
In Fox (1995a), I assumed that Economy sees the effects of Parallelism and that the
disambiguation in (2) follows from Economy, given additional assumptions about the
ordering of operations at LF. The argument in favor of this (alternative) picture was based
on certain first/second conjunct asymmetries in disambiguation:
(3) a. Some boy admires every teacher and Mary does, too. (3 >V) *(V>3)
b. Mary admires every teacher and some boy does, too. (3 >V) (V>3)
(4) a. Some boy admires every teacher and [Mary],admires every teacher, too.2
(3 >V) *(V>3)
b. Mary admires every teacher and some [boy], admires every teacher, too.
(3 >V) (V>3)
2 When the notions are relevant, I use the subscript, ,, to mark constituents that receive
semantic focus (i.e. are F-marked) and small italics to indicate constituents that are
phonologically down-stressed, and thus carnot be F-marked.
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In the (a) sentences of (3) and (4), Parallelism indicates that Economy rules out QR in the
conjunct in which it would not yield a semantic effect. In the (b) sentences, however,
Parallelism seems to make the opposite indication. This asymmetry was accounted for
under a version of the Strict Cycle Condition (SCC) which ensures that operations apply to
the complement of a head before they apply to the specifier. Given independent arguments
that in coordination the second conjunct is the complement and the first is the specifier (as
in (5)), it follows that SSOs apply in the second conjunct before they apply in the first
conjunct.
(5) [XP [and[YP]]]
The disambiguation in the (a) sentences of (3) and (4) could now follow even if one
assumes that Parallelism can motivate an SSO while the lack of disambiguation in the (b)
sentences (henceforth, anti-disambiguation) required this assumption. The idea was that
when the availability of the first SSO is considered, Parallelism is irrelevant; the SSO can
apply only if the two scopal relations are semantically distinguishable. However, when the
second SSO is considered, Parallelism is the condition that determines whether or not it
applies. Because the SCC determines that the SSO is considered in the second conjunct
first, the asymmetry is predicted.
In this chapter, I argue against the account of the asymmetry in (3) and (4) that I
provided in Fox (1995a). Specifically, I aim to show that the asymmetry follows from an
independently needed asymmetry in Parallelism. Building on work of Rooth (1992) and
Tancredi (1992), I will argue that Parallelism imposes a weaker requirement than the one I
have assumed in the previous chapter. Under certain circumstances, the sentence that
contains ellipsis (henceforth PE) need not be directly isomorphic to the sentence that serves
as its antecedent (henceforth PA). Under the relevant circumstances, a sentence f c, which
follows (together with reasonable presuppositions) from PA can be accommodated, and as
long as PAc is isomorphic tofE Parallelism is satisfied. This asymmetry in the definition of
Parallelism derives, as I will show, the asymmetry in (3) and (4). Furthermore, I will
show that there are cases in which the asymmetry in (3) and (4) is not attested. These
cases, which are incompatible with the assumption that Economy takes Parallelism into
account, are expected under the alternative that I will propose.
The chapter has the following structure. In 3.1., I present various problems for the
proposal made in Fox (1995a). In 3.2., I present the arguments from Rooth and Tancredi
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for an asymmetry in Parallelism and provide an appropriate working-definition of the
constraint. In 3.3., I demonstrate that the new definition of Parallelism yields the right
results for (3) and (4) and avoids the problems presented in 3.1. This demonstration will
rely crucially on the assumption that Parallelism cannot motivate QR and, as such, will
provide an argument for the assumption. Because not all constraints on accommodation are
well known, it will be difficult to characterize the set of predictions that the proposed
account makes. Nevertheless, in 3.4. I will discuss a natural constraint on accommodation
and show that this constraint makes certain clear predictions that are borne out.
3.1. Problems with the account of the asymmetry in Fox (1995a)
There are two types of problems with the account I provided in Fox (1995a) (Henceforth
the ordering account). The first type has to do with the assumptions that are made about
ordering. As we will see, there is no way for these assumptions to follow from the SCC.
The second type of problem is more substantial. The ordering account presupposes a
generalization which is wrong. It presupposes that a first (Scopally Uninformative)
conjunct will never disambiguate the second conjunct. However, it will turn out that in
many cases disambiguation works in both directions. We will see that the asymmetry in
(3) and (4) must be tied to the semantic properties of the quantifiers in these constructions.
3.1.1. The SCC: The assumption about ordering that I made in Fox (1995a) does
not follow from standard accounts of the SCC. Standard assumptions about the SCC entail
that no operations apply to XP after operations have applied to a constituent that dominates
XP. However, nothing is said about the ordering of operations that apply internal to a
specifier relative to operations that apply to a complement. For this reason, I had to assume
a non-standard characterization of the SCC. Jacobson (1997), however, presents a good
argument that even a non-standard characterization of the SCC would not yield the
assumptions about ordering needed for the ordering account.
The first observation that Jacobson makes is that for the ordering account to work,
the SCC must apply intersententially. This can be seen by the observation that the
asymmetry seen in (3) and (4) persists when 3E and PA are not contained in the same
sentence. This is demonstrated by the contrast in (6). The (a) and the (b) sentences in (6)
contrast in the same way that the (a) and the (b) sentence in (3) and (4) do. If the anti-
81
disambiguation in (6b) is to follow from the ordering account, it must be assumed that there
is a unit larger than a sentence which is constructed in accordance with the SCC.3
(6) a. Speaker A: At least one critic from the Times admires every movie.
Speaker B: [Pauline Kael]F does, too. (3 >V) *(V>3)
b. Speaker A: Pauline Kael admires every movie.
Speaker B: At least one film critic from [the Times], does, too.
(3>V) (V>3)
(Jacobson 1997)
A similar point can be made when we consider the contrast in (7). The disambiguation in
(7a) follows from Economy. Given Economy, the Subject of the second sentence John
cannot undergo QL and, given Parallelism, the first sentence is disambiguated in favor of
the interpretation in which the subject QP someone from NY has scope over the modal
verb likely. The anti-disambiguation in (7b) should follow from the Ordering Account.
However, this requires the assumption that there is a representation which contains both of
the sentences in (7b) and that this representation is constructed in accordance with the SCC.
(7) a. Someone from NY is very likely to win the lottery. Jon is, too.
(3>likely) *(likely>3)
b. Jon is very likely to win the lottery. Someone from NY is, too.
(3 >likely) (likely>3)
The contrasts in (6) and (7) demonstrate that if the assumptions about ordering which are
crucial for the ordering account are to follow from the SCC, there must be a component of
grammar subject to the SCC which combines sentences inter-sententially in the same way
that conjuncts are combined intra-sententially. If this is correct, the ordering account makes
very clear predictions about a discourse that contains more than two sentences. In
particular, in such a discourse, disambiguation is predicted iff Economy nirules out an SSO
in the last sentence, i.e. iff an SSO will have no semantic effect in the last sentence.
Jacobson demonstrates that this prediction is false:
' Some of the speakers I consulted didn't get the contrast in (6). Their initial responce was
that the CV>3) interpretation is impossible for both (6a) and (6b). However, when (6b) was
pronounced in a way that ensured narrow focus on the Times (when the [non-main] pitch
accent on critic is supressed), the (V>3) interpretation was made possible for most speakers
(and consequently, the contrast was attested). I hope to make the relationship between anti--
disambiguation and focus clearer in section 2.4.
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(8) At least one critic from the Times admires every movie. Pauline Kael does,
too, and at least one critic from the Post does, too. (Jacobson 1997)
(9) Someone from NY is very likely to win the lottery. Jon is, too. However, it is
not the case that someone from Boston is.
The first sentences of (8) and (9) are disambiguated in favor of the interpretation which
does not result from the application of an SSO. (In (8) the subject At least one critic from
the Times must take scope over the object every movie, and in (9) the subject Someone
from NY must take scope in its surface position.) This is not predicted by the ordering
account. Given that the ordering account is committed to an intra-sentential application of
the SCC, it is predicted that the availability of an SSO in the third sentence will license (via
Parallelism) an SSO in each of the preceding sentences.4 When (6) and (7) are put together
with (8) and (9), it is hard to imagine a way in which the assumption about ordering which
are needed for the ordering account would follow from the SCC.
3.1.2. The Presupposed Generalization: The ordering account is based on the
claim that in ellipsis constructions scopal disambiguation comes about only when Economy
rules out an SSO in the second conjunct. If we assume that Economy doesn't see
Parallelism, the predicted generalization is that disambiguation would come about whenever
Economy rules out an SSO in either of the conjuncts. This difference can be seen in the
two ways in which the Ellipsis Scope Generalization (ESG) could be stated:
(10) ESG (from Fox 1995): In constructions that involve phonological reduction or
deletion, Inverse Scope is possible only if it semantically distinct from Surface
Scope in the sentence that includes the phonologically reduced/elided VP.
(11) ESG (from Ch. 1): In constructions that involve phonological reduction or
deletion, Inverse Scope is possible only if it is semantically distinct from Surface
Scope both in the sentence that includes the phonologically reduced/elided VP and
in the sentence that includes the antecedent VP.
The asymmetry in (3) and (4) seemed to suggest that the generalization presupposed by the
ordering account, (10), is correct. However, once we consider a broader set of examples, it
4 This prediction was pointed out to me by David Pesetsky when I first proposed the
ordering account. However, at the time we were unable to come up with constructions that
would be simple enough to test the prediction (See Fox (1995: note 69).).
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turns out that in many cases (11) is the more accurate generalization. Consider the
sentences in (12) and (13). s
(12) a. Ken Hale doesn't speak more than three languages and Rob Pensalfini does.
(not > more than 3) *(more than 3 > not)
b. Rob Pensalfini spe, l.s more than 3 languages and Ken Hale doesn't
(not > more than 3) *(more than 3 > not)
(13) a. A boy talked to every teacher and a girl did, to Jane. (3 >V) *(V>3)
b. A girl talked to Jane and a boy did, to every teacher. (3 >V) *(rV>3)
In these sentences, the asymmetry we have seen in (3) and (4) is not attested. In (12b) and
(13b) a Scopally Uninformative first conjunct disambiguates the second conjunct. This
disambiguation falls under the ESG as it is defined in (11) but not as it is defined in (10).
Given (12) and (13) it is evident that the asymmetry in (3) and (4) should be tied to some
property of these constructions that goes beyonc, the structural asymmetry between a first
and a second conjunct. In the next sections, I aim to show that the asymmetry follows
from the semantics of the quantifiers in (3) and (4) together with an independently needed
asymmetry in the definition of Parallelism.
3.2. An Independent Asymmetry in Parallelism
In this section, I will go over various observations which demonstrate that an asymmetry is
required in the formulation of the Parallelism constraint. The aim of the section is to
formulate a working definition of Parallelism which, when combined with Economy, will
be shown (in the next section) to provide an account of the asymmetry in (3) and (4) that
avoids the problems for the ordering account discussed in the previous section.
' In Chapter 4, the explanation of the ESG extends to an explanation of the unavailability of
non-local binding in (i). The fact that (i) does not show the first/second conjunct
asymmetry that we've seen in (3) and (4) will provide an additional argument against the
ordering account.
(i) a. John said that he liked his mother.
Bill did, too <*said that John likes Bill's mother>.
b. Every boy said that Mary liked his mother.
Mary did, too <*said that she liked her mother>.
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Consider the asymmetry attested in (14) and (15). In (14a) and (15a), phonological
reduction is very natural. However, in (14b) and (15b), where the order of the sentences is
reversed, reduction feels inapropriate.
(14) a. First Bill called Mary an idiot. Then [John]F insulted her.
b. *First John insulted Mary. Then [Bill], called her an idiot.
(15) a. John talked to every woman he saw. [Bill] , talked to many women, too.
b. *Bill talked to many women. [John]F talked to every woman he saw, too.
Parallelism was the name we gave to the constraint that governs phonological reduction and
deletion (ellipsis). In order to account for the asymmetry in (14) and (15) there must be
some asymmetry in the definition of Parallelism.
In order to spell-out this asymmetry, I will have to get a little more technical. But
first I would like to use the contrast in (14) to illustrate the intuitive source of the
asymmetry (See Rooth (1992) and Tancredi (1992)). Let us start with (14a). The basic
idea is that Parallelism is licensed becau.. of a conclusion that we can plausibly draw from
the proposition that Bill calned Mary an idiot. Specifically, this proposition allows us to
conclude the proposition that Bill insulted Mary and the latter proposition is clearly an
appropriate antecedent for phonological reduction. In (14b), however, there is no inference
that can license phonological reduction. The proposition that Bill insulted Mary does not
allow us to infer the proposition that Bill called Mary an idiot, and therefore phonological
reduction is not licensed. The basic intuition is that phonological reduction is licensed
either by direct Parallelism with a linguistic object that is present in discourse or through
indirect Parallelism, which involves accommodation (via inference) of a new linguistic
object that satisfies direct Parallelism. This intuition is stated in (16) along the lines of
Rooth (1992), where Parallelism is seen as a consequence of the theory of Focus.6
6 The condition in (16) is stated as a condition on the licensing of phonological reduction.
An alternative way ot saying things is that phonological reduction is free. However, it
yields certain presuppositions which need to be satisfied. When I say that Parallelism is
not licensed, this could be read as a statement that focus presuppositions are not met.
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(16) Parallelism: Phonological reduction of a constituent ac is licensed only if at LF
there is some constituent 3 that reflexively dominates a and the discourse contains
an antecedent LF, PA, such that, either:7
a. Direct Parallelism: PA is an appropriate alternative to 3. [That is to say [[PA]]
belongs to the focus value of ; [[A]] F()]
or
b. Indirect Parallelism: PA together with shared presuppositions entails an
antecedent LF, PAC, (PA => PAC) and [[PAC]] F(). 9
The definition of Parallelism in (16) captures the asymmetries in (14) and (15). I will
illustrate this with (15) an(I allow the reader to verify that the informal discussion of (14) is
translatable to the langua&,. of (16). Consider (15b) and take P to be the sentence BILL
talked to many women. F(P) is now the set of structured propositions of the form x talked to
many women. There is no antecedent in the preceding discourse which is of this form, and
therefore Direct Parallelism is not satisfied. However, Indirect Parallelism is satisfied. The
Discourse includes the proposition that John talked to every woman he saw and this
proposition, together with some shared presuppositions, entails the LF John talked to many
women. Because John talked to many women denotes a (structured) proposition of the
form x talked to many women, it is a member of F(P). Consider now (15a) and take 3 to
be the sentence JOHN talked to every woman he saw. 0o F(P) is now the set of structured
7 0 reflexively dominates a if P dominates a or P = a.
8 There are two differences between the definition given here and the one in Rooth (1992).
1. Rooth assumes that the condition governing phonological down-stressing doesn't care
about structure. More specifically, he assumes that focus values contain sets of semantic
objects (devoide of structure). I assume with Wold (1995; forthcoming) that structure is
crucial for Parallelism (for both down-stressing and ellipsis). For this reason, I must
assume that focus values contain structural information. They could either be sets of
syntactic structures (in which case the condition that [[x]] e F(y) would be replaced by the
condition that x e F(y)) or sets of structured meanings (see Lewis 1972). For
presentational purposes, I will assume the latter.
2. I ignore the cases in which the discourse antecedent denotes a set of structured
propositions (e.g., the case of question answer-pairs). This is done for presentational
urposes and bears no significance.
The precise details of the definition of Direct Parallelism is not crucial for the purposes of
this paper. More specifically, for the purposes of this paper it would be possible to adopt
other definitions of Direct Parallelism that entail isomorphism in structure (e.g., the
definition in Fiengo and May (1994)). What is crucial is that Parallelism could be satisfied
also indirectly (via an accomodated proposition).
'0 I leave it for the reader to see that other choices of p3 do not affect the result.
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propositions of the form x talked to every woman he saw. There is no antecedent in the
preceding discourse which is of this form, and therefore Direct Parallelism is not satisfied.
However, in contrast to what we saw in the case of (15b), Indirect Parallelism is also not
satisfied. The Discourse includes the proposition that Bill talked to many women, and this
proposition does not entail (not even with plausible accommodations) an LF of the form x
talked to every woman he saw.
In this context, we can focus on cases in which P is a clause-denoting constituent
which is preceded by another clause denoting constituent PA. We can now see that the
definition of Parallelism in (16) makes a clear distinction between 0 and PA. Parallelism is
licensed either if PA is directly parallel to [ ([[PA]] e F(P)) or if there is some proposition
entailed by PA (together with additional plausible assumptions), PAc, which is directly
parallel to 0; it is sufficient for PAC to be entailed by PA; it is not sufficient for it to be
entailed by P. In the next section, I intend to show that this asymmetry in the definition of
Parallelism accounts for the asymmetry we have seen in (3) and (4).
But before that, we have to go over Rooth's demonstration that indirect Parallelism
(as defined in (16)) is relevant not only for phonological reduction but also for
phonological deletion (i.e., ellipsis). A first (theoretical) observation is that constructions
that involve ellipsis have an identical focus structure to parallel constructions that involve
phonological reduction. The reason for this is fairly evident. Focus must be marked by
pitch accent and pitch accent is inconsistent with both phonoligical deletion and reduction.''
For this reason, both deleted and phonologically reduced phrases cannot be Focus-marked
or contain a Focus-marked constituent.1 2 In other words, if there is a Parallelism condition
" Hubert Truckenbrodt (p.c.) raises the following question. What is the difference
between the phonological consequences of focus marking and the phonological
consequences of other syntactic objects, say the phonological instructions that are contained
in a lexical item? More specifically, why is it the case that an antecedent for ellipsis allows
us to ignore the latter (yielding VP deletion) but not the former (which would yield a
deleted VP with a Focus marked constituent)? The problem would disappear if we view
Focus not as an instruction to phonology but rather as a consequence of phonology (as in
Reinhart 1995).
12 An obvious question to ask is whether a constituent that contains ellipsis or down-
stressing can be dominated by an F-marked constituent with pitch accent outside the
domain of ellipsis/down-stressing. If this were possible, there would be a danger that it
would nullify the Parallelism requirement which is otherwise imposed by the lack of pitch
accent in the elided/down-stressed constituent. However, I believe that various
observations in Schwarzschild (in press) indicate that even if such a case were possible,
there is no real danger that Parallelism will be nullified. Specifically, I believe that,
although couched in a different view of focus, Schwarzschild presents srong arguments
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which follows from the theory of Focus, it must apply in the same way to ellipsis and
phonological reduction (See Lasnik (1972), Chomsky and Lasnik (1993) and Tancredi
(1992).)
The second observation is empirical. Rooth (1992) has demonstrated that Indirect
Parallelism plays a role in accounting for the interpretation of pronouns in ellipsis
constructions. To see this, we first have to go over a constraint that Direct Parallelism
imposes on the interpretation of pronouns. Once we understand the constraint, we will see
that it is obviated when the conditions for Indirect Parallelism are met.
Consider the sentence in (17) and focus on the case in which the pronoun in the
ellipsis site is interpreted via sloppy identity. Sloppy identity requires that the pronouns in
the elided and antecedent VP be bound from a parallel positions. (C.f. Jacobson (1992) and
Fiengo and May (1994), among others.) Thus (17a) is a possible interpretation of the
elided VP and (17b) is not.
(17) First John told Mary l I was bad-mouthing herl, and then [Sue]F told [Jane], I was
<bad mouthing her>
a. <bad-mouthing Jane> b. <*bad-mouthing Sue>'
The observation that sloppy identity requires identical dependencies in the sentence that
includes the antecedent and the elided VP follows from many theories of Direct Parallelism.
(See Fiengo and May (1994), among others; see also chapter 4.) In particular, it follows
from the definition of Direct Parallelism given in (16). (With no loss of generality, take 3
to be SUEj told JANE 2 I was <bad mouthing herl/2> for which the focus value is the set of
structured propositions of the form x told y I was bad-mouthing y for (I17a) and x told y I
was bad-mouthing x for (17b). John told Maryl I was bad-mouthing herl is a member of
the former and not of the latter. See Rooth 1992; Heim 1997.) What is important is that the
that an F-marked constituent does not release its sub-constituents from independently
satisfying focus preruppositions. This would mean that in the (putative) case we are
considering, P (in the definition of Parallelism; in Rooth's terminology, the domain of
focus or the constituent to which the - operator is adjoined) must be lower than the F-
marked constituent that contains ellipsis/down-stressing. See Sauerland (1997) for some
evidence in favor of such a charachtarization of Schwarzschild's proposal.
" Some speakers don't allow for any sloppy identity in (17). These speakers are irrelevant
for Rooth's argument. Rooth's point is that if sloppy idenetity is possible in (17) under
parallel dependencies, it is possible in (18) with non-parallel dependencies, hence the
argument for Indirect Parallelism.
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requirement of identical dependencies is obviated when the conditions on Indirect
Parallelism are met:
(18) a. First John told Mary2 I was bad-mouthing her2, and then [Suel] heard I was.
<bad-mouthing herl>.
(Rooth 1992)
b. John told every girl2 I was bad-mouthing her2. Even [Suel], heard I was.
<bad-mouthing her1>.
In both of the sentences in (18), the proroun in the elided VP is bound by a subject while
the parallel pronoun in the antecedent VI is bound by the object. This is blocked by Direct
Parallelism. However, it is licensed by Indirect Parallelism. To see this, let's focus on
(18a) and have 0 stand for the IP SUE1 heard I was bad-mouthing herl. F(1) is the set of
structured propositions of the form x heard I was bad mouthing x. There is no LF in the
preceding context which denotes a structured proposition of the relevant form. That is why
Direct Parallelism is not satisfied. However, Indirect Parallelism is satisfied. The
proposition that John told Mary2 I was bad-mouthing her2 entails (together with plausible
assumptions) the proposition that Mary2 heard I was bad-mouthing her2 and the latter is a
member of F(P).
If, as (18) suggests, Indirect Parallelism is relevant for constructions that involve
ellipsis as well as for constructions that involve phonological reduction, we expect to find
asymmetries in ellipsis which are parallel to the asymmetries we've seen in (14) and (15).
This expectation is borne out in (19). In (19a (=18a)) Indirect Parallelism is satisfied.
However, this is no longer the case when the two sentences in (19a) are reversed. The
reason is that the proposition that Sue heard I was bad-mouthing her does not entail a
proposition of the form x told y I was bad mouthing y.
(19) a. First John told Mary2 I was bad-mouthing her2, and then [Suel], heard I was.
<bad-mouthing her1 >.
b. *First Suel heard I was bad-mouthing herl, and then [John]F,) told [Mary2], I was
<had-mouthing her 2>.
We are now practically ready to see whether the asymmetry in Parallelism that
we've observed in this section can help us account for the asymmetry exhibited in (3) and
(4). But before that I would like to mention one distinction between ellipsis and
phonological reduction, which was discussed in Rooth (1992) and Tancredi (1992) (See
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also Wold 1995.) While Indirect Parallelism seems to be relevant for ellipsis as well as
phonological reduction, its affects are much more radical in phonological reduction. The
sentences with phonological reduction we have seen in (14b) and (15b) (repeated in (20))
do not have analogs with ellipsis, as we can see in (21).
(20) a. First Bill called Mary an idiot and then [John], insulted her.
b. John talked to every woman he saw. [Bill]F talked to many women, too.
(21) a. First Bill called Mary an idiot and then [John] , did. <*insulted her>
b. John talked to every woman he saw. [Bill], did, too.
<*talked to many women>
There must, therefore, be a condition that applies to ellipsis over and above the conditions
that apply to phonological reduction. In ellipsis, the elided VP must be identical (modulo
the interpretation of pronouns, and perhaps modulo Vehicle Shift (Fiengo and May 1994))
to an antecedent VP. The source of this condition is not crucial at this moment (See Rooth
1992 and Tancredi 1992 for different proposals. See also section 3.4.) The condition
which is our focus at the moment is the Parallelism condition that applies both to ellipsis
and to phonological reduction. This condition ensures parallel interpretation for pronouns
as in (17) and allows for Indirect Parallelism as we saw in (18).
If this condition is to play a role in the account of the patterns of scopal
disambiguation in ellipsis constructions (the ESG), it must (at least in normal cases) ensure
that quantificational expressions receive parallel scope in the antecedent and the elided VP.
If we put aside Indirect Parallelism, (17) has this necessary property. To see this, consider
the constructions in (22).
(22) a. A boy admires every teacher. [Many Girls], do, too <admire every teacher>.
b. A boy admires every teacher. [Many GirlsF, admire every teacher, too.
For illustration, take 0 to be the IP that dominates the elided material in (22a) and the
phonologically reduced material in (22b). Suppose that the object of R receives wide
scope.'" In both (22a) and (22b), F(1) is the set of structured propositions of the form
"4 I leave it to the reader to see that the point I'm making is rather general; it doesn't depend
on the choice of 3 or on whether there is Surface or Inverse Scope in the sentence that
contains ellipsis.
90
every teacher [Q [ x admires y]], where Q is a variable ranging over possible denotations
for DPs (i.e., generalized quantifiers). A boy admires every teacher denotes a structured
proposition of the relevant form iff the object receives wide scope. Hence parallel scope
assignment is ensured by Direct Parallelism. The obvious question is whether there are
conditions under which Indirect Parallelism obviates this result (as it did in the case of the
requirement of parallel variable binding.) In the next section I will claim that there are, and
that this is the source of the asymmetry we've seen in the previous section.
However, first I would like to state a consequence of Parallelism which is relevant
for the constructions that interest us. As I discussed above, the relevant constructions are
those in which P is a clause-denoting constituent which is preceded by another clause-
denoting constituent PA. Furthermore, the relevant consequence of Direct Parallelism is
that it ensures identical scopal positions for the DPs in the antecedent and the elided VP
(i.e., structural isomorphism).' 5 Indirect Parallelism could (under certain conditions)
obviate the necessary requirement. This is stated in (23)
(23) Parallelism (Consequnce of): Phonological reduction or deletion is licensed only
if, either:
a. Direct Parallelism: The LF of a sentence that contains the elided/down-
stressed material, PE, is structurally isomorphic to a sentence that contains the
antecedent, PA.
or
b. Indirect Parallelism: PA (together with shared presuppositions) entails an LF,
p AC, and PAC is structurally isomorphic to PE.16
~" Of course Parallelism requires more than structural isomorphism. It also requires
identical lexical items in all positions that are not dominated by an F-marked constituent.
This requirement will be irrelevant for most of the cases I will discuss, since for most cases
I will only consider pairs of strucutres where identity of the relevant lexical items is
satisfied. In the few cases in which the identity of lexical items will be relevant (e.g.
(33b,34b)) I will return to the definition of Parallelism in (16).
6 In the discussion that follows I will sometimes omit the mentioning of shared
presupositions and simply talk about entailments. This sloppy way of talking is motivated
for the sake of brevity, and does not affect the points that are being made.
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3.3. The Asymmetry of the ESG follows from the Asymmetry in
Parallelism
We are now in a position to see that the asymmetry which is built into the definition of
Parallelism can account for the asymmetry in (3) and (4).
(3) a. Some boy admires every teacher and Mary does, too. (3 >V) *(V>3)
b. Mary admires every teacher and some boy does, too. (3 >V) (V>3)
(4) a. Some boy admires every teacher and Mary admires every teacher, too.
(3 >V) *(V>3)
b. Mary admires every teacher and some boy admires every teacher, too.
(3 >V) (V>3)
The basic idea is that Economy is blind to Parallelism (as assumed in Chapter 2). For this
reason, Economy blocks QR over the subject in both the second conjunct of (a) and the
first conjunct (b). If Direct Parallelism were the only way to satisfy Parallelism, Inverse
Scope would be blocked in both (a) and (b). The contrast between (a) and (b) is related to
Indirect Parallelism. In (b), but not in (a), Indirect Parallelism allows Inverse Scope in the
Scopally Informative conjunct even though Inverse Scope is not allowed in the Scopally
Uninformative conjunct.
Now, to the actual details. Given Economy Inverse Scope is not allowed in the
Scopally Uninformative conjuncts in both (a) and (b). Let's see what happens if the
Scopally Informative conjuncts receive Inverse Scope. The obvious observation is that PA
and PE are not structurally isomorphic and Direct Parallelism is not satisfied. This is seen
in (3 ',,,,,):
(3' (,V3))
a. *PA :every teacher Xy (some boy Xx (x admires y)) ana
PE": Mary Xx every teacher Xy (x admires y)'7
b. PA: Mary Xx every teacher Xy (x admires y) and
tiE: every teacher Xy (some boy Xx (x admires y))
'
7 As mentioned in Chapter 2, I assume that non-subject quantifiers always move short-
distance for interpretability (type missmatch; see Heim and Kratzer 1998). However, this
assumption is not crucial for anything I say in this chapter.
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The options that are made available by Indirect Parallelism are less obvious. The goal is to
show that in (b), but not in (a), Indirect Parallelism is satisfied (or, in other words, that the
distribution of * is justified). Let's start with (3'b). The idea is that if Mary admires every
teacher, it follows that for every teacher there is a girl who admires that teacher (namely
Mary). In other words, fA entails the LF, PAc, which is structurally isomorphic to PE.
Therefore, Indirect Parallelism is satisfied. This is summarized in (3'b(,,.,).
(3'b(v,3)) Direct Parallelism is not satisfied. However Indirect Parallelism is satisfied:
I. (PA) Mary Xx every teacher Xy (x admires y) =>
(PAC) every teacher Xy (some girl Xx (x admires y))
2. every teacher Xy (some girl Xx (x admires y))
is an appropriate antecedent for
every teacher Xy (some boy Xx (x admires y))
Now let's move to (3'a). The reason Indirect Parallelism cannot help (3'a) is related to the
asymmetry of the condition. In (3'a), we need the entailment relation to go in the other
direction from the one which was utilized in (3'b). In other words, we need an LF with
wide scope for the subject to follow from the LF every teacher Ay (some boy Ax (x
admires y)). However, there is no (obvious) LF that could play this role. (See 3.4., where
more is said about the set of LFs that are available for accommodation.) An LF with a
(V>3) interpretation does not entail any (obvious) LF in which the relative scope of the two
quantifiers (associated with the two argument positions) is reversed. This is summarized in
(3' a(V>3)).
(3'a(V>3)) Direct Parallelism is not satisfied. Indirect Parallelism is not satisfied either.
There is no LF entailed by every teacher Ay (some boy Ax (x admires y)) which can
serve as antecedent for Mary Ax every teacher Ay (x admires y)
In particular,
every teacher Ay (some boy Ax (x admires y)) />
some boy Ax every teacher Xy (x admires y))
This account of the asymmetry makes no reference to the relative structural position of the
first and the second conjunct, and thus does not run into any of the problems discussed in
3.1.1. Furthermore, the account relies crucially on the semantic properties of the particular
quantificational expressions (specifically, their ability to contribute to various entailment
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patterns), and as such has the potential of accounting for the fact that the pattern of
disambiguation is different for different quantificational expressions, 3.1.2. What I'd like
to do now is to show that this potential can be realized. Specifically, I would like to go
over all of the cases we have looked at, and show that the asymmetry in Parallelism
together with (Parallelism-blind) Economy makes the right predictions.
Consider the case of QL discussed in (7). This case is very similar to the case of
(3) above.
(7) a. Someone from NY is very likely to win the lottery. Jon is, too.
(3>likely) *(likely>3)
b. Jon is very likely to win the lottery. Someone from NY is, too.
(3 >likely) (likely>3)
Economy rules out QL in the Scopally Uninformative sentences of both (7a) and (7b).
Direct Parallelism, thus predicts disambiguation in favor of (3 >Iikely) in both cases.
However, as we will see, Indirect Parallelism obviates this result in (7b).
The structures with QL in the Scopally Informative sentences are presented in (7'
likely>3)
(7' likely>3)
a. *flA: very likely (Someone from NY to win the lottery))
P;E: Jon Xx very likely (x to win the lottery)
b. PA :Jon Xx very likely (x to win the lottery) and
fi: very likely (Someone from NY to win the lottery))
W, and 1E are not structurally isomorphic and Direct Parallelism is not satisfied in both (a)
and (b). However, in (b) Indirect Parallelism is satisfied. Suppose (for example) that the
speaker/hearer makes the assumption that John is from Boston.' 8 Under such
circumstances, s/he can conclude from the fact that John is very likely to win the lottery that
it is very likely that someone from Boston will win the lottery (3x[likely [ox]] =>
likely[3xxx]). In other words, P, entails an LF, 0AC, which is structurally Isomorphic to
1E:
,8 Actually it is not crucial that the speaker/hearer have an assumption that John is from a
particular city. If there is no assumption made about the identity of John's city, the
accommodated proposition would be very likely (Someone from John's city to win the
lottery)).
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(7'b ,,,,,) Direct Parallelism is not satisfied. However Indirect Parallelism is satisfied:
1. (PA) Jon Xx very likely (x to win the lottery) ->
(PAC) very likely (Someone from Boston to win the lottery))
2. very likely (Someone from Boston to win the lottery))
is an appropriate antecedent for
very likely (Someone from NY to win the lottery))
In (a), Indirect Parallelism does not manage to save the situation. The reason is that the
entailment does not go in the other direction (likely[x3x]) •> -3x[likely [4x]]):
(7'a ,,ikel,,3) Direct Parallelism is not satisfied. Indirect Parallelism is not satisfied either.
There is no LF entailed by very likely (Someone from NY to win the lottery))
which can serve as antecedent for Jon Ax very likely (x to win the lottery)
In particular
very likely (Someone from NY to win the lottery)) />
Someone from NY Ax very likely (x to win the lottery)
I move now to the two cases of ellipsis in which scope disambiguation holds in
both directions. I will show that in these cases neither Direct nor Indirect Parallelism are
satisfied given the structures that are determined by Economy.
Let us start with the relative scope of a negative/affirmative operator and an object
QP. Economy allows QR over the negative operator but disallows parallel QR over the
affirmative operator.
(12) a. Ken Hale doesn't speak more than three languages and Rob Pensalfini does.
(not > more than 3) *(nmore than 3 > not)
b. Rob Pensalfini speaks more than 3 languages and Ken Hale doesn't
(not > more than 3) *(more than 3 > not)
Direct Parallelism will not be satisfied if the object moves by QR over negation (as we can
see in (12' ,,,,,, than ,,,,,)).
( 12' 9m,,,, , than .1 ,> not,,,,)
a. */jA :More than 3 languages Xx (not (K.H-I. speaks x))
P3E: yes (R.P. speaks more than 3 languages)
b. */ 3A: yes (R.P. speaks more than 3 languages)
PE: More than 3 languages Xx (not (K.H. speaks x))
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My aim is to show that this time Indirect Parallelism cannot obviate the result in either order
(in other words that both (12'am,,,w,j,.o,) and (12'b.,n,,,.j,,",,,) are ruled-out). Let us start
with (12 'a,r,,,,,,,,,,nj>,,). The question is whether there is an LF, flAC, which is entailed by
(PA) More than 3 languages Ax (not (K.H. speaks x)) and which is structurally isomorphic
to (PE) yes (R.P. speaks more than 3 languages). There is definitely no obvious LF of this
sort. In particular, reversing the scope of the object QP and the negative operator in (PA)
would not yield a proposition that is entailed by (PA). Therefore, Indirect Parallelism is not
satisfied:
( 12' a ,,,i,,,r  ,n, ,,,)
Direct Parallelism is not satisfied. Indirect Parallelism is not satisfied either.
There is no LF entailed by More than 3 languages Ax (not (K.H. speaks x)) which
can serve as antecedent for yes (R.P. speaks more than 3 languages).
In particular
More than 3 languages Ax (not (K.H. speaks x)) />
not (K.H. speaks more than 3 languages)
consider now (12'b ,,,,,,,,, .,,,). Once again there is no proposition to accommodate in
order to satisfy Indirect Parallelism. A potential proposition to accommodate would result
from reversing the scope of the affirmative operator and the object QP in the antecedent.
However, such a reversal would result in an illegitimate LF (an LF that violates Economy):
(12'b .,,,re, han 3 n,,,)
Direct Parallelism is not satisfied. Indirect Parallelism is not satisfied either
There is no LF entailed by yes (R.P. speaks more than 3 languages) which can
serve as antecedent for More than 3 languages Ax (not (K.H. speaks x))
Note that
more than 3 languages Ax yes (R.P. speaks x) is not generated by the grammar
because it violates Economy.
I now move to the other case discussed in 3.1.2. in which scope disambiguation
goes in both directions. The aim is to show that in (13), just as in (12), Indirect Parallelism
cannot obviate the results of Direct Parallelism
(13) a. A boy talked to every teacher and a girl did, to Jane. (3 >V) *(V>3)
b. A girl talked to Jane and a boy did, to every teacher. (3 >V) *(V>3)
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As is standard by now, we focus on the case in which an SSO applies in the Scopally
Informative sentence but (given Economy) not in the Scopally Uninformative sentence. The
aim is to show that Indirect Parallelism cannot obviate the violation of Direct Parallelism:
(13',,, 1V>3,)
a. *PA :every teacher Ly (a boy x (x talked to y))
1PE: a girl Xx Jane Xy (x talked to y)'9
b. *PA : a girl Xx Jane Xy (x talked to y)
PiE: every teacher Xy (a boy Xx (x talked to y))
Lets start with (13'b,,>3)). The reason Indirect Parallelism is not satisfied is that there is no
obvious LF, PAC, that is entailed by the proposition that a girl talked to Jane and would be
structurally isomorphic to (PE ) every teacher Ay (a boy Ax (x talked to y)). A potential LF
of this sort is one in which the scopal relationship of the two QPs in PA is reversed. But, as
in the case of (12b), this is not a legitimate LF since it does not obey Economy (hence is
not generated by the grammar):
(1 3' bv,3))
Direct Parallelism is not satisfied. Indirect Parallelism is not satisfied either
There is no LF entailed by a girl Ax Jane Ay (x talked to y)) which can serve as
antecedent for every teacher Ay (a boy x (x talked to y)
Note that
Jane Ay a girl Ax (x talked to y)) is not generated by the grammar because it
violates Economy.
The explanation of (13'aV,,,,) is at the moment incomplete. Given everything that was said
up to now, we would expect (i 3 'a(,,,)) to satisfy Indirect Parallelism. The reason is that
(PA ) [every teacher Ay (a boy Ax (x talked to y)] (with shared presuppositions) entails
the LF a boy Ax a teacher Ay (x talked to y)) and the latter is structurally isomorphic to PE.
If a boy Ax a teacher Ay (x talked to y)) were an accommodatable LF (if it could stand for
PAC in the definition of Indirect Parallelism), we would predict (13a) to allow Inverse
Scope. What I would like to suggest is that independent considerations block the
'~9 Jane is outisde the VP for reasons that are independent of scope. See Lasnik (1995) and
Jayaseelan (1990).
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accommodation of a boy Ax a teacher Ay (x talked to y)). These consideration are
discussed and motivated in the next section.
3.4. A Constraint on Accommodation
Indirect Parallelism is satisfied through accommodation of an entailed LF. However, it is
interesting to ask whether every entailed LF is (in principle) available for Indirect
Parallelism or whether there are any constraints on accommodation. In this section, I will
argue for one such constraint. This constraint, which is inspired by a proposal made in
Tancredi (1992), will allow for the accommodations needed to account for the data in the
previous section and will disallow the problematic accommodation with which we ended
the section. Furthermore, the constraint will generate a set of surprising predictions which
I will attempt to corroborate.
Tancredi argues for a theory of Parallelism which would work both for
constructions involving ellipsis and for those involving phonological reduction. The
challenge for such a theory is to explain the difference between the two types of
constructions pointed out in section 3.2. What is needed is an independent constraint
which will explain the fact that that the effects of Indirect Parallelism are much more limited
in ellipsis than in phono!ogical reduction:
(20) a. First Bill called Mary an idiot and then [John], insulted her.
b. John talked to every woman he saw. [Bill], talked to many women, too.
(21) a. First Bill called Mary an idiot and then [John], did. <*insulted her>
b. John talked to every woman he saw. [Bill], did, too.
<*talked to many women>
Tancredi points out that in phonological reduction, the pronounced deaccented material
provides guidance with respect to the nature of the accommodated LF. However, in ellipsis
there is much less guidance available. In (20a), for example, the speaker/hearer knows that
s/he must accommodate an LF of the form x insulted her. In (21a), however, there is no
guidance available since the VP is not pronounced. Hence in (21a) the relevant
accommodation is not available. What Tancredi suggests is that accommodation is possible
only if there is some pronounced material which indicates the nature of the accommodation
(Tancredi (1992: 127-131). see also Wold 1995, forthcoming).
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I would like to propose and motivate a constraint which, although different, is
inspired by Tancredi's suggestion. The constraint is based on the idea that accommodation
is a last resort. As such, I suggest that it must be minimal, given what we can call
"accommodation seeking material". The accommodation seeking material is the material in
PE which is presupposed (i.e. not dominated by a focus-marked constituent; henceforth
non-F-dominated) and is nevertheless not directly available (i.e. it is absent in PA [modulo
Vehicle Change]). The intuition behind the proposal I am making is that only
accommodation-seeking material indicates that accommodation is necessary; other material
is either already present in the antecedent or F-dominated (thus indicated as "new
information"):
(24) Accommodation of PAC must be minimal given the accommodation seeking material
(25) a. An accommodation PAC is minimal given a, if there is no alternative
accommodation to PAc, P', such that P' contains a and P' is closer to PA than
PAC is.
b. p' is closer to PA than PAC is, when the accommodated material of P' is a proper
subset of the accommodated material in PAC.
c. The accommodated material of an accommodation P consist of the lexical
material which is present in P and absent in PA.
For the purposes of this paper, I will make use of a consequence of (24):
(26) Accommodation of PAC must have a trigger.
(27) Accommodation has a trigger when PE contains accommodation seeking material,
i.e. when PE contains non-F-dominated material which is absent in PA.
This consequence follows trivially; If PE contains no accommodation seeking material the L
minimal accommodation will be the trivial one, i.e. PAc=PA.
3.4.1. Evidence for the constraint on accommodation: I would like to show that
this constraint makes some surprising predictions for the availability of ESG obviations.
But first I would like to provide some independent evidence for the constraint.
Specifically, I would like to show that both ellipsis and phonological reduction
constructions which rely on Indirect Parallelism must satisfy (26).
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Consider Rooth's examples in (18) repeated below. Rooth suggests that sloppy
identity is possible in these constructions given the existence of the accommodated
isomorphic LF required by Indirect Parallelism. I would like (a) to verify that (26) is
satisfied as well, and (b) to show that if (18) is changed minimally so that (26) is not
satisfied, sloppy identity ceases to be an option.
(18) a. First John told Mary2 I was bad-mouthing her2, and then [Suel], heard I was.
<bad-mouthing her1>.
(Rooth 1992)
b. John told EVERY girl I was bad-mouthing her. Even [Suel]F heard I was.
Focus on (18a). As we saw, Indirect Parallelism is satisfied; PA (=John told MaPy2 I was
bad-mouthing her2) entails the LF fAC (= Mary2 heard I was bad-mouthing her2 ) and the
latter belongs to the focus value of PE (=[Suel]F heard I was bad-mouthing herl). Now
let's verify that (26) is satisfied. This is trivial; the trigger for accommodation is the
phonologically reduced verb heard (which is non-F-dominated and is absent in PA).
Now consider the contrast between the constructions in (28). (28a) makes the same
point that was made by the constructions in (18). (28b) differs minimally and does not
allow the sloppy identity.
(28) a. First John convinced Mary I that I was bad-mouthing her1, and then
[Sue2]F believed that I was <bad-mouthing her2>.
b. First John convinced Maryl that I was bad-mouthing herl, and then [Sue21F
[denied]F that I was *<bad-mouthing her 2>.
This contrast is unexpected without the constraint on Indirect Parallelism stated in (26).
The reason it is unexpected is that the focus value of the relevant sentence that contains the
ellipsis site in (28b) properly contains the focus value of the parallel sentence in (28a).
Therefore, any antecedent for ellipsis in (28a) should be an antecedent in (28b). More
concretely, in (28b) the focus value of PE (= [Sue2]F [denied], that I was bad-mouthing
her2) contains all propositions of the form x V I was bad mouthing x. PA (= John2
convinced Maryl I was bad-mouthing herj) is not a proposition of the relevant form.
However, it entails the proposition flAC (= Maryj believed that I was bad-mouthing herl)
which has the relevant form.
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Why, then, is sloppy identity blocked in (28b)? (26) provides the answer. /E lacks
non-F-dominated material which is absent in PA, and thus there is no trigger for
accommodation.
In (29) we see that in certain cases (26) restricts phonological reduction as well as
ellipsis. (29a,b) are the phonological reduction analogs of (28a,b). (29c) shows that in
order to get the sloppy identity when (26) is not satisfied, it is necessary to focus the
pronoun and thus make accommodation unnecessary. (In (29c), F(PE) is the set of
structured propositions of the form x V I was bad mouthing y. PA denotes a structured
proposition of the relevant form if we make the independently needed assumption that
convinced Mary is a possible alternative to deny.)
(29) a. First you convinced Maryl that I was bad-mouthing herj, and then
[Fred2]F believed that I was bad-mouthing him2.
b. *First you convinced Maryl that I was bad-mouthing herl, and then [Fred 21][denied]F that I was bad-mouthing him2.
c. First you convinced Mary I that I was bad-mouthing herl, and then [Fred 2J1
[denied]F that I was bad-mouthing HIM 2. 20
To complete the argument for (26), it is important to show (empirically) that the
potential fAC (the LF Maryj believed that I was bad-mouthing herj ) is Parallel to PE in
(28b, 29b). In other words, it is important to provide empirical evidence that without (26),
Indirect Parallelism would predict Sloppy identity in these constructions. This evidence is
provided in (30). In the construction in (30), there is no need for accommodation in order
to achieve sloppy identity. Therefore, (26) is irrelevant and sloppy identity is possible.
(30) a. [Sue2]Fbelieved that I was bad-mouthing her2. However, [Jane31F
[denied]
, that I was <bad-mouthing her 3>.
20 A minimal variation on (29b) can show that the triggering requirement in (26) is
insufficient. In (i-ii), the non-F-dominated constituents provide a trigger which is
nonetheless insufficent for the accommodation which would yield sloppy identity The
unavailability of the accommodation in (i-ii) follows from the more complete minimality
condition in (24).
(i) First John convinced Maryl that Bill was bad-mouthing herl, and then [Sue2 1]
[denied], that this idiot was bad-mouthing *herj/HER2(ii) First John convinced Maryl that every boy was bad-mouthing heri, and then
[Sue2IF [denied], that many boys were bad-mouthing *her2/HER2
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b. [Sue2]F believed that I was bad-mouthing her2. However, [Fred31,
[denied]F that I was bad mouthing him3.
The evidenced is re-enforced in (31). (31 a, b) are very similar to (28b, 29b), respectively.
The only difference is that in (31a, b), the LF which must be accommodated in (28b, 29b)
to license sloppy identity is part of the discourse. Therefore in (3 1la, b) accommodation is
unnecessary and sloppy identity is available.
(31) a. First John convinced Maryl that I was bad-mouthing herl, and then
[Sue21F believed that I was <bad-mouthing her 2>. But lucky for me at least [Jane3]f
[denied], that I was <bad-mouthing her 3>.
b. First John convinced Maryl that I was bad-mouthing herl, then
[Fred2]F believed that I was bad-mouthing him2 . But lucky for me at least [Jane3]
[denied] , that I was bad-mouthing her3 .
An Independent piece of evidence for the constraint in (26) comes from the
paradigm in (32). I wouldn't pretend that I have a complete understanding of this
paradigm. Nevertheless, I think that it safe to take it as evidence for (26).
(32) a. *What John said revealed my identity. [BILL], did, too.
b. Bill revealed my identity. What [John] F said did, too.
Consider first the unacceptability of (32a). This unacceptability is most likely the result of
the elided VP and its antecedent being non-identical. [Specifically, it seems reasonable to
assume that the VP revealed my identity is different when it takes the animate subject Bill
and the inanimate subject what John said. It is possible, for example, that the theta role
assigned to the subject is different in the two cases (agent in one case and causer in the
other).] This non-identity makes PA a 5ad alternative to fE . ([[PAI] F(PE).) Why then is
(32b) acceptable. I suggest that in (32b) it is possible to accommodate the LF PAC ( =What
Bill said revealed my identity ) and that [[PAC]i] e F(PE). If this suggestion is correct, there
must be something that blocks a similar accommodation in (32a) (What John said revealed
my identity => John revealed my identity). (26) can serve this purpose, since fE, which
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doesn't contain novel material which is non-F-dominated has no trigger for
accommodation.21
3.4.2. Consequences for the ESG: It is now time to see whether (26), when
combined with Parallelism and Economy, makes any interesting predictions for the pattern
of disambiguation in ellipsis. Consider the constructions in (33) and (34) with unmarked
pronunciation. (Pitch accent is represented with an acute accent.) The ordering account
from Fox (1995a) predicts anti-disambiguation in all of the constructions in (33-34).
However, this predictions is not borne out in the (b) cases.
(33) a. Jon is likely to win the lottery. Someone from New Y6rk is, too.
(3 >likely) (likely>])
b. Jon is likely to win the lottery. Two people from New Y6rk are, too.
(32 >likely) *(likely>32)
(34) a. John likes every teacher. At least one girl does, too. (3 >V) (V>3)
b. John likes every teacher. At least two girls do, too. (32 >V) *(V>32)
This contrast follows from the account provided in this chapter once the constraint
on Indirect Parallelism in (26) is taken into account. To see this, we have to know what is
the focus structure of fE. Given that pitch-accent is on the most embedded constituent in
the DP, there are various possibilities for F-marking (See Jackendoff (1972). For more
recent theories of stress assignment, see Cinque (1993) Selkirk (1995) and Truckenbrodt
21 It seems to me that the correct formulation of (24/26) should allow accommodation in (i)
given the down-stressing of the subject. However, the present formulation is insufficient
because the non-F-dominated material in (i) is present in PA (modulo Vehicle Change).
(i) a. What John said revealed my identity. I wish he hadn't.
b. What he said revealed my identity. he didn't plan to.
This requires a modification in the definition of accommodation-seeking material:
(27') Accomodation has a trigger when PE contains accommodation seeking material, i.e.
when PE contains non-F-dominated material which is not present in PA in a parallel
structural position.
It is interesting to see whether Indirect Parallelism together with the constraint on
accommodation can play a role in accounting for other cases in which an antecedent and
elided VP are non-identical (e.g. Passive/active counter-parts). For discussion, see Hardt
(1992), Johnson (1997), Tancredil (1992: 130), Wold (forthcoming), among others.
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(1995)). These possibilities can be divided into two: F-marking can target (a) the whole DP
or (b) a smaller constituent which excludes the quantificational material (someone in (33a)
and at least one in (34a)).
Let's consider how Economy and Parallelism determine the LF representations of
(33-34) given the constraint on Indirect Parallelism in (26). I will focus on (34) and leave
it for the reader to see that the account extends to (33). In section 3.3., we mentioned that
anti-disambiguation is predicted for (34a). The idea was that disambiguation, which in
standard cases is predicted by Economy and Parallelism, is obviated by the availability of
Indirect Parallelism. (PA (=John likes every teacher) entails PAC (=at least one boy likes
every teacher with Inverse Scope) and fAC is structurally isomorphic to PE (=At least one
girl likes every teacher with Inverse Scope)
However, we now have to show that the constraint on Indirect Parallelism in (26) is
satisfied as well. In other words, we have to show that there is some material in fiE which
is non-F-dominated and is absent from PA. This is the case in (34a), if there is narrow
focus on the Common Noun girl (as in (34'al)), but isn't the case if there is focus on the
whole DP (as in (34'a2)).
(34'a) 1. [P, John likes every teacher]. [,,At least one [girl] F does, too]. (3 >V) (V>3)
2. [, John likes every teacher]. [s,[At least one girl] F does, too]. (3 >V) *(V>3)
Anti-disambiguation is predicted for (34a), because (34'al) is a possible focus structure. 2 2
Now consider (34b) and its two possible focus structures in (34'b). When there is
narrow focus on girls as in (34'bl), there is no way for Parallelism to be satisfied; F(PE )
is the set of structured propositions of the form Every teacher at least two N, x like y, and
PA does not entail a structured proposition of this form; In particular, PAC (above) does not
belong to F(PE) because it contains the wrong numeral expression.
(34'b) 1. [, John likes every teacher]. *[p,At least two [girls] F do, too].
22 As far as minimality is concerned, we have to show that the accommodated material in
PAC is minimal given the trigger (see note 20.) This is only relevant if there is a trigger (i.e.
only in (34'al)). To see whether flAC (=at least one boy likes every teacher with Inverse
Scope) is minimal we have to check whether there is some other accommodatable
proposition, P', which contains the trigger at least one and nevertheless contains less
accommodated material than flAc. (I.e., the accommodated material must consists of the
words at least one amd of nothing else.) This is obviously impossible, and I therefore
conclude that flAC is a possible accommodation in the case of (34'al).
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2. [, John likes every teacher]. [PE[At least two girls] F do, too]. (32 >V) *(V>32)
If there is focus on the whole DP, PAC does belong to F(PE ) (the set of structured
propositions of the form Every teacher, yQP, x like y), but (26) is no longer satisfied.
Compare (33b) and (34b) with the pairs of sentences in (35) and (36).
(35) a. Jon and Bill are likely to win the lottery. Two people from New Y6rk are, too.
(32 >likely) (likely>32)
b. Jon, Bill and Fred are likely to win the lottery. A few people from New Y6rk
are, too. (32 >likely) (likely>32)
(36) a. John and Bill like every teacher. At least two girls do, too. (32 >V) (V>32)
b. John, Bill and Fred like every teacher. A few girls do, too. (32 >V) (V>32)
In (35) and (36) narrow focus on the head noun allows for accommodation of an
appropriate LF. The difference between these sentences and (33b, 34b) strongly suggests
that the asymmetry in the ESG is related to patterns of entailment, and thus argues strongly
in favor of the account proposed here and against the ordering account that I advocated in
Fox (1995a).
Compare now (33b) and (34b) with the construction in (37), which were pointed
out to me by Kai von Fintel. I assume that the focus structures of the two sentences are as
represented in (37').
(37) a. John is likely to win the lottery. Twb 6ther people from NY are, too.
(32 >likely) (likely>32)
b. John likes every teacher. Twb 6ther boys do, too. (32 >V) ('V>32)
(37') a. [pA John is likely to win the lottery]. [,, [Two] F [[other] F people from NY] are, too].
(32 >likely) (likely>32)
b. [P John likes every teacher]. [, [Two] [[other] boys] do, too].
(32 >V) (V>32)
In both (37'a) and (37'b), the constraint on Indirect Parallelism in (26) is satisfied. (In
both cases accommodation is triggered by novel material which is non-F-dominated.)
Furthermore, in both cases it is possible to accommodate an LF with Inverse Scope which
will denote a structured proposition in the focus value of fE . To see this, focus on (37'b):
Pla entails the LF of a boy likes every teacher with Inverse Scope and the latter denotes; a
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structured proposition in F(PE). The relevant difference between (37b) and (34b) is that
in (34b) the only way to satisfy (26) is by excluding the, numeral two from the F-marked
constituent, and such a focus structure makes it impossible to satisfy Parallelism. In (37b),
by contrast, it is possible to focus the numeral and not the Common Noun, thus making the
accommodatable LF an appropriate alternative to PE.
Let us now return to the puzzle with which we ended the previous section. In
example (13) repeated below, disambiguation holds in both directions. This was not
predicted by the ordering account, but followed from the proposal made in this chapter with
a small residue.
(13) a. A boy talked to every teacher and a girl did, to Jane. (3 >V) *(V>3)
b. A girl talked to Jane and a boy did, to every teacher. (3 >V) *(V>3)
The remaining problem was to explain why there is disambiguation in (13a). Specifically,
even on the (V>3) interpretation, PA entails the LF A boy talked to a teacher (to which
Economy assigns Surface Scope) and this LF structurally isomorphic to the LF determined
by Economy for PE.
Once we take into account the constraint on accommodation in (26), the problem is
overcome. To see this, let us lood at the focus structure of (13a) in (13'a). As we can see,
E• doesn't contain any non-F-dominated material which is absent from PA. In other words,
there is no trigger for accommodation and (26) is not satisfied.
(13'a) [A A boy talked to every teacher]. and [p [a [girl] F] did, to [Jane] Fl]. (3 >V) *(V>3)
This explanation makes a surprising prediction. Specifically, it is predicted that if
we change (13a) minimally so that (26) is satisfied, the predictions of Economy will be
obviated by Indirect Parallelism. (In other words, once again there will be anti-
disambiguation.) Furthermore, it is predicted that (13b) will not be affected by the change,
since (as demonstrated in the previous section) in (13b) there is no way for Indirect
Parallelism to obviate the predictions of Economy even when the constraint in (26) is
ignored.
This prediction is borne out below:
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(38) a. [, At least one Republican senator talked to every CEO from NY], and
[,, [a [Democrat] F] did, to [Bill Clinton] F]. (3 >V) *(V>3)
b. [0, At least one Republican senator talked to every CEO from NY], and
[, [a [Democrat] F] did, to [a CEO from [Boston] F]. (3>V) ?(V>3)
c. [, One Democratic senator talked to a CEO from Boston], and
[& [a [Republican] F] did, to [[every] Fp CEOfrom [NY] F (3 >V) *(V>3)
(38a) is identical (in all relevant respects) to (13a). (38b) differs minimally in a way
that allows the satisfaction of (26). (The non-F-dominated material a CEO from indicates
the need for accommodation.) I suggest it is for this reason that the (V>3) interpretation is
not so bad in (38b). Finally, in (38c) there is no way to satisfy Indirect Parallelism. As
we've seen in the previous section, there is no LF which is entailed by PA and would be
isomorphic to the LF that yields the (V>3) interpretation for PE. The contrast between (38b)
and (38c) is very surprising from the perspective of the ordering account, and follows
straightforwardly from the account proposed here.23
3.5. Conclusion
This chapter re-examined data which (in Fox 1995) I have taken to argue that Economy is
sensitive to the demands of Parallelism. The data involved a Putative asymmetry in the
nature of the ESG; a second Scopally Uninformative conjunct can disambiguate an
Scopally Informative first conjunct but not vice versa. I have argued that the apparent
asymmetry is not real. There are cases in which disambiguation holds in both directions
(12-13) and cases in which it only holds in the opposite direction from that assumed in Fox
(1995a), (38). I have suggested that in principle Economy predicts disambiguation in both
directions, but that sometimes the effects of Economy are obviated by Indirect Parallelism.
I have argued for this suggestion (a) by demonstrating a correlation between patterns of
23 The careful reader must have noticed that, for examples such as (i), Indirect Parallelism
predicts Surface Scope in PA with Inverse Scope in fE.
(i) Many CEOs from NY talked to every senator. At least one CEOsfromn [Boston] F
did, too.
My impression is that the prediction is false, though establishing this is not a trivial matter
(see Abusch (1994), among others). My hope is either that my impression is wrong or that
there is a natural way to state (24) which would avoid the problem
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entailment and anti-disambiguation (Anti-disambiguation is possible only when the
entailment needed for Indirect Parallelism holds.) and (b) by verifying the predictions of an
independently motivated condition on Indirect Parallelism.
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Chapter 4: Economy and Variable Binding
In chapers 2 and 3, I have investigated the scopal properties of Scopally Uninformative
sentences, such as those in (1).
(1) a. Every student admires every teacher. (Scopally Uninformative)
b. John admires every teacher. (Scopally Uninformative)
In these sentences, it is impossible to use intuitions about meaning in order to determine
scopal relationships. Nevertheless, I argued that there are ways to study the scopal
properties of these sentences. One experimental tool that was used extensively is based on
Parallelism. Parallelism ensures that two sentences are scopally isomorphic. Therefore, it
allows a Scopally Informative sentence to serve as a Scope Detector, which can then
indicate the scopal properties of Scopally Uninformative sentences. A variety of
experiments indicated the following generalization:
(2) Scopally Uninformative sentences are restricted to Surface Scope.
In this chapter, I would like to use Parallelism to study the nature of variable
binding in sentences which we can call Binding Uninformative. To see what is meant, we
have to start by looking at sentences which are Binding Informative, such as those in (3).
(3) a. Every boy thought that every man likes his mother.
b. Every boy thought that only he likes his mother.
The sentences in (3) receive two interpretations in which the pronoun his is a bound
variable. Under one interpretation, his is bound from the embedded subject position (local
binding), and under the other interpretation, it is bound from the matrix subject position
(non-local binding):
(3') al. Every boy Xx(x thought that every man Xy(y likes y's mother)).
(local binding)
a2. Every boy Xx(x thought that every man Xy(y likes x's mother)).
(non-local binding)
bl. Every boy Xx(x thought that [only x] Xy(y likes y's mother)).
(local binding)
b2. Every boy Xx(x thought that [only x] Xy(y likes x's mother)).
(non-local binding)
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Binding Informative sentences are sentences which are semantically distinct under
local and non-local variable binding. Binding Uninformative sentences, by contrast, are
semantically identical under the two binding relationships. In the sentence in (4), for
example, local binding as in (4'a), and non-local binding as in (4'b) are semantically
identical.
(4) Every boy thought that he likes his mother. (Binding Uninformative)
(4') a. Every boy Xx(x thought that x Xy(y likes y's mother)).
(local binding)
b. Every boy Xx(x thought that x Xy(y likes x's mother)).
(non-local binding)
In such Binding Uninformative sentences, it is impossible to use intuitions about meaning
in order to determine binding relationships. However, I would like to suggest that we can
use Parallelism for this determination. Specifically I would like to suggest that in an
ellipsis environment a Binding Informative sentence can serve as a Binding Detector, which
can indicate the binding properties of Binding Uninformative sentences. Specifically,
using Parallelism I would like to argue for the following generalization:
(5) Binding Uninformative sentences are restricted to local binding.
The argument for the generalization about variable binding in (5) is thus identical to
one of the argument for the generalization about scope in (2). Furthermore, the two
generalizations are very similar. It is therefore plausible that they have a unified
explanation. More specifically, the generalization in (2) suggests that the operation that
yields Inverse Scope cannot be semantically vacuous. We would like to say that the
generaliation in (5) suggests that there is something that allows for non-local variable
binding (preferably something similar to the operation that yields Inverse Scope) and that
this 'something' cannot be semantically vacuous. The problem for unification, however, is
that it is not very common to think of non-local variable binding as a result of an operation
(though, see Kayne 1998). Nevertheless, I will provide a tentative statement of an
economy condition that applies both to scope and to veriable binding. However, this
statement will be inconsistent with the details of Scope-Economy as they have been spelled-
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out in chapter 2. I will leave this inconsistency as an unresolved problem.
The idea that non-local binding is impossible when it is semantically identical to
local-variable binding was suggested on independent grounds by Heim (1993). Modifying
work by Reinhart (1983), Heim demonstrates that certain obviations of Binding Theory
(BT) can be accounted for by this suggestion. Given the logic outlined above, we can say
that Binding Theory, just like Parallelism, enables us to distinguish between (interpretively
identical) representation, and in doing so it vindicates the gencralization in (5).
The argument that I present for the generalization in (5) relies heavily on work by
Heim and Reinhart. This intelectual debt is reflected in Fox (1998a) which is what follows
with minor revisions.
Heim (1993) argues for a locality condition on variable binding, which I will call
Rule H. Rule H states that a variable, x, cannot be bound by an antecedent, a, in cases
where a more local antecedent, P, could bind x and yield the same semantic interpretation.'
We can view Rule H as an optimality consideration. In particular, we can say that grammar
prefers representations in which a variable is locally bound, and that (given this preference)
Optimality blocks non-local binding. This statement, like any other statement about
Optimality, can be evaluated only when accompanied by a claim about the nature of the set
of candidates out of which the most optimal is chosen (the reference set). If we say that the
reference set is restricted to linguistic objects that have identical semantic interpretations, we
get an optimality characterization of Rule H. This partially semantic view of the reference
set was taken in independent work on Economy by Golan (1993), Reinhart (1995) and Fox
(1995a). The obvious question is whether Rule H and the relevant principle of Economy
call for unification. This chapter has two goals. The first is to provide new evidence in
favor of Rule H. The second is to draw possible guidelines for unification.
My evidence in support of Rule H is based on the observation that it can solve a
puzzle having to do with the interpretation of pronouns in VP ellipsis constructions. The
puzzle, which was first presented in Dahl (1974), and has since been discussed by many
researchers (cf. Sag (1976), Ristad (1992), Kehler (1993) and Fiengo and May (1994)),
relates to the distribution of strict and sloppy ambiguities in constructions that involve two
Heim proposed Rule H as an extension (and modification) of work by Reinhart (Reinhart
(1983), Grodzinsky and Reinhart (1993)). Whether it is an appropriate extension is a
controversial matter which bears on many issues outside the scope of this chapter. For the
purposes of this chapter it is enough that Rule H is well motivated. The role that it plays
relative to the various principles proposed by Reinhart doesn't bear directly on issues
discussed here. Though see note 15.
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or more pronouns linked to the same antecedent. What is puzzling is that the first pronoun
cannot be interpreted by strict identity if the second pronoun is interpreted by sloppy
identity.2 This is exemplified in (6) and (7).3 If the first pronoun is interpreted by strict
identity, the second one must be interpreted by strict identity as well, hence the
unavailability of the interpretation in (7).
(6) John said that he, liked his , mother.(7) a. Bill did too.
a. Bill said that John likes John's mother. (Strict, Strict)
b. Bill said that Bill likes Bill's mother. (Sloppy, Sloppy)
c. Bill said that Bill likes John's mother. (Sloppy, Strict)
d. *Bill said that John likes Bill's mother. (Strict, Sloppy)
I will show that Rule H, interacting with an independent requirement on parallelism
in ellipsis constructions, provides a solution for Dahl's puzzle. This solution will in turn
generate some new predictions which I will attempt to corroborate. Specifically, I will
demonstrate that the following generalization holds: in an ellipsis construction, a pronoun
can be non-locally bound only if non-local binding is semantically distinct from local
binding, both in the elided and the antecedent VP. This generalization follows from the
interaction I suggest exists between Rule H and Parallelism. Further, it is exactly parallel to
another generalization which we have seen in Chapter 2: in an ellipsis construction, a
quantifier can have non-local scope only if non-local scope is semantically distinct from
local scope, both in the elided and the antecedent VP. I will conclude this chapter with an
outline of a unified account for both generalizations.
The chapter is organized as follows. In section 4.1., I present the basics of the
solution for Dahl's puzzle and the nature of the new predictions that it makes. In order to
test whether the predictions hold, I have to present some background. In particular, I have
to go over some of Heim's original arguments in favor of Rule H. This is done in section
4.2. In section 4.3. and 4.4., I demonstrate that the predictions of my proposal are in fact
borne out. In section 4.5., I present an outline for a unification of Rule H with the
semantically-based economy condition that I proposed in Fox (1995a). This unification is
2 In the course of this chapter, it will become clear that the generalization is somewhat
different.
' Indexation is meant as a notational device. This device should not be mistaken as an
indication of any theoretical persuasion. For my assumptions regarding the computational
representation of variable binding, see section 2.
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inconsistent with the local implementation of this condition which I defended in chapter 2.
This inconsistency is left as an open problem.
4.1. The Basic Proposal
In this section I demonstrate that Rule H can be used to explain Dahl's puzzle. In particular,
I demonstrate that the restriction on the interpretation of (7) (the unavailability of (7d))
follows from an interaction of two principles. One principle is Rule H. The other principle,
which is needed on independent grounds, requires parallelism between an elided VP and its
antecedent. The basic idea is that Rule H excludes a representation (6) which would be
parallel to (7d).4
4.1.1 Rule H: Rule H is an optimality condition which prefers representations where a
pronoun iL locally bound over representations where binding is more distant. In other
words, Rule H requires that a pronoun be bound by the most local antecedent available. In
this respect Rule H is very similar to other locality conditions (cf. Rizzi (1990) and Aoun
(1987)). However, it is also very different.
Take, for example, condition A of the binding theory.5 This condition requires
(under certain formulations) that an anaphor be bound by the most local antecedent
available, hence the Specified Subject Condition. However, Rule H, obviously, can't
require from pronouns what condition A requires from anaphors. The difference between
Rule H and condition A is related to the way they interpret the word available. To see this,
consider the way condition A would rule out a sentence such as (8). (8b) is bad because
4 The proposal made here is very similar, though not identical, to a proposal made in
Kehler (1993), which was recently brought to my attention. Kehler proposes that Dahl's
observation is the result of an interaction of a copying algorithm (for ellipsis resolution) and
a locality condition on linking (Kehler's (26)). However, because Kehler's locality
condition is not an optimality condition, because it doesn't make reference to the
grammatical and (in particular) the interpretive status of competitors, it doesn't generate the
predictions that my proposal does.
Condition A of the binding theory might not be the best example, because it is not at all
clear that this condition is best understood as an optimality condition that involves
comparison, though certain ideas in the literature are suggestive (for example the definition
of accessible SUBJECT suggested in Chomsky (1981) and developed in an optimality-like
fashion in Aoun (1987), the definition of a CFC in Chomsky (1986), or the relationship
between 'blocking' and 'antecedence' in Burzio (1998)). I use condition A to illustrate the
nature of Rule H only because it, too, relates to anaphora (broadly construed).
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there is an available representation, (8a), in which the anaphor is bound by a more local
antecedent.
(8) a. John said that Bill liked himself.
I I
b. *John said that Bill liked himself.I I
Consider now the way Rule H applies to pronouns. (9b) is not blocked by (9a).
The reason is that Rule H compares only representations which are semantically equivalent.
(9b) and (9a) are not semantically equivalent and are therefore not compared by Rule H.
(9) a. John said that Bill liked his mother.I I
b. John said that Bill liked his mother.
I I
Condition A requires that an anaphor be bound by the most local antecedent available for
well-formed binding. Rule H requires that a pronoun be bound by the most local antecedent
available for well-formed binding with a designated interpretation. The two conditions are
stated in (10) and (11) respectively.
(10) Condition A: An anaphor, a, can be bound by an antecedent, P, only if there is
no closer antecedent, y, such that it is possible to bind a by 7.
(11) Rule-H: A pronoun, a, can be bound by an antecedent, 0, only if there is
no closer antecedent, y, such that it is possible to bind a by y and
get the same semantic interpretation.
Rule H does not compare the representations in (9). However, it does compare the
possible representations of (6) in (6'); these representations are semantically equivalent and
(6'a) blocks (6'b)6
(6') a. John said that he liked his mother.
b. John said that he liked his mother.
6 The notation I use is borrowed from Higginbotham (1983). Of course, in order to give
more substantial content to my claim that (6'a) and (6'b) yield the same interpretation, we
have to go over the system of interpretation for Higginbotham's notation. Heim (1993)
develops this system in detail, and I will touch upon it in section 2.
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4.1.2 Parallelism: Parallelism is a general constraint which ensures that in ellipsis
constructions the antecedent and elided VP receive parallel interpretations. (See chapter 3
and references therein.) Here I will only be concerned with the implications of Parallelism
for the interpretation of pronouns. It is well known, since Ross (1967), that pronouns in an
elided VP must receive parallel interpretations to the parallel pronouns in the antecedent VP.
Thus, in a sentence such as (12), the pronoun in the antecedent and in the elided VP must
receive the same referential value.
(12) Mary likes him and Sue does too <likes him>.
However, sameness in reference isn't always required. If the antecedent of the
pronoun is within the first conjunct (and if certain other conditions hold, see Fiengo and
May (1994) and Tomioka (1995)), Parallelism can be achieved in another way. In a
sentence such as (13), for example, Parallelism can be achieved either by letting the
pronouns have an identical referential value, as represented in (13'a) ("strict identity"), or
by letting them be linked to their respective antecedents by identical dependencies, as
represented in (8'b) ("sloppy identity"). Other options, such as (13'c), are ruled out by
Parallelism .
(13) John likes his mother. Bill does too.
Same refer. value Identical depend. No parallelism
(13') a. John likes his mother.' b. John likes his m. c. * John likes his m.
I I I I I I
Bill likes John's mother. Bill likes his m. Bill likes Phil's m.
I I
The descriptive generalization is stated in (14).
(14) NPs in the elided and antecedent VP must either (a) have the same referential value
or (b) be linked by identical dependencies.
We would like this descriptive generalization to follow from a general theory of
Parallelism, and indeed most theories are designed to capture the generalization. However,
7 Here, and in other places in the chapter, I use an r..expression in order to represent
identity in referential value. I use this merely as a notational device. Note, however, that
Fiengo and May propose that a pronoun can actually be replaced by an r-expression in the
elided VP (by vehicle change).
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I believe that none of the theories capture the generalization in the appropriate manner.
Consider, for example, theories such as those of Sag (1976) and Williams (1977).
These theories assume that the generalization follows from a requirement of semantic
identity between the antecedent and the elided VPs. Under this assumption, strict identity,
as in (8'a), is the result of accidental coreference. In other words, the claim is that the
strict/sloppy ambiguity is the result of an ambiguity in the sentence that includes the
antecedent VP. However, Dahl (1973) has demonstrated that the identity requirement is
too strong. Specifically, it predicts that in a discourse which involves more than one elided
VP, the interpretation will either be strict across-the-board or sloppy across-the-board.
Mixed readings such as those in (15) are predicted to be unavailable."'-
(15) a. Smithers, thinks that his, job sucks. Homer does, too <think that Homer's job
sucks>. However, Homer's wife doesn't <think that Homer's job sucks>.
b. Smithers, thinks that his, job sucks. Homer does, too <think that Homer's job
sucks>. However, Marge doesn't <think that Homer's job sucks>.
I do not know how to derive the generalization in (14) from a principled theory. I will
therefore elevate it to the status of a principle:
(16) NP Parallelism: NPs in the antecedent in the elided VP must either:
(a) have the same referential value.(Referential-Parallelism) or
(b) be linked by identical dependencies.(Structural-Parallelism)
8 The proposal about Parallelism that I made in chapter 3 suffers from the same problem
since it appeals to structured propositions. Rooth's theory which appeals to unstructured
propositions is too weak since it predicts that an antecedent sentence which is Scopally
Uninformative (as well as one which is Binding Uninformative) will never disambiguate
the ellipsis sentence (contrary to what we've seen in the previous chapter). See Fox
(1995a: note 67). As far as I can see, the same problem holds for other proposals that
don't make reference to the structure of the antecedent or the ellipsis sentence (e.g.,
Dalrymple et. al. (1991)).
9 Fiengo and May (1994) assume that the mixed reading depends on the referential
properties of the subject in the third clause. More specifically, they assume that when there
is sloppy identity between the first pair of VPs, strict identity is possible in the second pair
only if the subject of the third sentence contains an NP which is coreferential with the
subject of the second sentence. Although this is generally correct, I don't think that it
should be captured by a formal constraint. This can be seen in (15b) were the mixed
reading is available for educated people (those who know that Marge is Homer's wife).
My suspicion is that the general tendency is to have all three sentences parallel to each
other. This would block a mixed reading given the descriptive generalization in (14). The
only way to get a mixed reading is by dividing the sentences in to two groups and checking
Parallelism independently for each group. The referential properties of the subject help in
the grouping.
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4.1.3 Deriving Dahl's observation: Suppose that Parallelism applies to the output of
Rule H. This means that (6) and (7) above will each be subject to Rule H, and that
optimality considerations will be blind to Parallelism. This derives Dahl's observation. The
basic idea is that Rule H doesn't allow the second pronoun in (6) to be bound by the matrix
subject. However, the second pronoun in (7d) is bound by the matrix subject. Therefore
(6) and (7d) cannot be parallel.
Let's see in more detail how, given Rule H, Parallelism distinguishes between (7a-
c), on the one hand, and (7d) on the other. Recall that Rule H excludes (6'b) given the
availability of (6'a) (and given that the two are semantically indistinguishable). Now,
consider the representations that are given to (7a-d) by Rule H. These are presented in (7'a-
d). What we have to show is that, given (6'a), (7'a-c) obey Parallelism, while (7'd)
doesn't.
(6') a. John said that he likes his mother.
I II I
b. *John said that he likes his mother.
1I . I
(7') a. Bill said that John likes his mother. (obeys Parallelism, with (6'a))
I I
b. Bill said that he likes his mother. (obeys Parallelism, with (6'a))
I it L
c. Bill said that he likes John's mother. (obeys Parallelism, with (6'a))
I I
d. Bill said that John likes his mother. (doesn't obey Parallelism with (6"a);
I I would obey Parallelism with (61b))
Each of the NPs in the VPs of the sentences in (7') must obey Parallelism with
respect to the parallel NPs in (6'a). Consider first (7'a). Here the NP John obeys
referential-parallelism with the first pronoun in (6'a). The pronoun in (7'a) is linked by an
identical dependency to that which links the parallel pronoun in (6'a) to its antecedent, and
thus obeys structural-parallelism."' Consider now (7'b). Here it is easy to see that both
pronouns obey structural-parallelism with the parallel pronouns in (6'a). In (7'c) the first
pronoun obeys structural-parallelism with the first pronoun in (6'a) and the NP John obeys
io This pronoun obeys referential-parallelism as well. For ease of presentation, I will ignore
referential-parallelism in cases in which structural-parallelism holds.
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referential-parallelism with the second pronoun in (6'a). Consider now (7'd). Here the NP
John obeys referential-parallelism with the first pronoun in (6'a), but the pronoun in (7'd)
doesn't obey Parallelism at all. It receives a different referential value from that of the
second pronoun in (6'a), and is linked by a different dependency. The only way in which
(7'd) could obey Parallelism would be if somehow non-local binding for (6), as in (6'b),
were allowed. (7'd) would be parallel to (6'b) by virtue of referential-parallelism for the NP
John and structural-parallelism for the pronoun his.
4.1.4 An extension : Before I go on to specify sophisticated predictions of the account
presented here, let me present one prediction which might not be unique to this particular
account, but is nevertheless interesting (and will be important later on). The prediction is
that Dahl's puzzle can re-emerge with judgments of acceptability. The basic idea is that we
can make (7), under its four possible readings, into the antecedent for ellipsis, and turn (6)
into the sentence that includes the elided VP. The prediction is that when a sentence with a
meaning like that of (7d) will be the antecedent for ellipsis, the result will be unacceptable.
Of course, for the experiment to work, we have to find a way of keeping the interpretation
of (6) constant. This is achieved by manipulating independent factors having to do with
agreement and quantification.
Consider the paradigm in (17)."
(17) a. Every boy said that Mary liked her dog.
I I
Well, Mary did too
<said that she liked her dog>
I II I
b. Every boy said that he liked his dog.
I I!L I
Well, Mary did too
<said that she liked her dog>
I I J
" Some speakers require parallelism in the morphological properties of the pronouns in the
antecedent and the elided VPs (i.e., they do not accept sloppy identity is an ellipsis
construction such as John likes his mother and Mary does, too. For such speakers, the
judgments in (17), and in many other places, are not very clear. However, this problem is
overcome if the elided VPs are replaced with phonologically reduced VPs.
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c. Every boy said that he liked Mary's dog.
I I
Well, Mary did too
<said that she liked her dog>
I II I
d.* Every boy said that Mary liked his dog.
I I
Well, Mary did too
<said that she liked her dog>
I II * by Parallelism
I I *by Rule H
Let's examine the pronouns in the elided VP beginning with (17a). The first sentence of
(17a) is the equivalent of (7a) and the second is the equivalent of (6). There is no ambiguity
here because of the gender switch. Parallelism between the sentences of (17a) is obeyed,
just as it was in the pair <6, 7a>; the first pronoun in the elided VP obeys referential-
parallelism, and the second pronoun obeys structural-parallelism. Consider now (17b).
Here, just as in the pair <6,7b>, structural-parallelism is obeyed for both pronouns. Once
again, there is no ambiguity; the "sloppy-identity" interpretation is forced, because
quantifiers don't have a referential value, and only structural-parallelism can be obeyed.
Consider now (17c). Here, as in the pair <6,7c>, structural-parallelism is obeyed for the
first pronoun in the elided VP and referential-parallelism is obeyed for the second pronoun.
Consider now (17d). As in the pair <6,7d>, there is no parallelism. The reason is that the
pronoun in the first sentence of (17d) does not have a referential value, and therefore
referential-parallelism can't hold. Further, structural-parallelism doesn't hold because the
pronoun in the first sentence is linked to the matrix subject and the parallel pronoun in the
second sentence is linked to the embedded subject. The only way in which Parallelism
could hold would be if Rule H didn't apply and long distance binding were allowed in the
second sentence of (17d).
4.1.5 New predictions: The explanation of Dahl's observation was crucially
dependent on the idea that non-local binding was impossible (for (6) and for the second
sentence of (17d)) due to Rule H. This generates a prediction; in environments in which
Rule H allows for non-local binding, Dahl's puzzle would be obviated. There are two
environments in which Rule H allows for non-local binding. One environment is where
local binding and non-local binding yield different semantic interpretations. Another
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environment is where local binding is impossible (for syntactic reasons). In both cases,
local-binding and non-local-binding are not compared by Rule H. We therefore predict that
in both cases sentences such as (17d) and (7d) will be licensed. Before we test for these
predictions, we must understand in what range of cases local and non-local binding yield
different semantic interpretations (besides trivial cases, such as (9) above), In other words,
we have to understand how the lines we have drawn in the representations above match up
to interpretive notions.
4.2. More on Local and Non-local Binding
In the previous section we have assumed a system in which the bound variable
interpretation of (18) could (in principle) be the result of two distinct representations, as in
(18'). This system differs from the standard system of indexation in which there is nothing
on the bound variable which designates who (out of a set of coindexed elements) is its
binder. Therefore, the standard system of indexation provides only one representation for
the intended interpretation of (18), given in (18").
(18) Every boy knows that he likes his mother.
(18') a. Every boy knows that he likes his mother.
I I kes his mother.
b. Every boy knows that he likes his mother.
(18") Every boy, knows that he, likes his, mother.
The question is whether there are any reasons to assume representations such as those in
(18'). Heim (1993) argues that there are." Consider the sentence in (19).
(19) Every boy knows that only he likes his mother.
Focus on the interpretations in which the two pronouns are bound variables. There are two
such interpretations. To see this, consider what property must hold of every boy for the
sentence to be true. Suppose John is a boy. For (19) to be true, John, like any other boy,
12 See Higginbotham (1983) and Partee and Bach (1984) for additional arguments in favor
of representations such as those in (18').
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must have a certain property. Namely, he must know that he is the only person who has
some (other) property. Now, what is that property? This is where the ambiguity comes in.
Under one interpretation, the property is that of liking one's own mother. Under the other
interpretation, the property is that of liking John's mother. To see the interpretive
difference, consider what the two interpretations entail. One interpretation entails that John
knows that I, for instance, don't like my mother. The other interpretation entails that John
knows that I don't like his mother.
Now, what could be the source of this ambiguity? Heim suggests that it is the
existence of two representations, such as those in (18'). (19), just like (18), can in principle
have two representations, which are presented in (19').
(19') a. Every boy knows that only he likes his mother.
I II I
b. Every boy knows that only he likes his mother.
II I I
To see how this could help, we have to understand how the lines in the representations
match up to interpretive notions. This is developed in detail by Heim and embedded within
a general theory of compositional interpretation. The basic idea is that when a pronoun is
bound by an antecedent, there is predication over the antecedent with the pronoun bound by
the predicate abstractor (the A operator). Thus, for example, (19'a) and (19'b) are a
shorthand for representations such as those in (19"). These representations have the two
interpretations described above. (19"a) entails that every boy knows that I don't like my
mother; (19"b) entails that every boy knows that I don't like his mother.
(19") a. Every boy 3x (x knows that only (x, Ay (y likes y's mother))) =>
Every boy knows that I don't like my mother.
b. Every boy Ax (x knows that only (x, Ay (y likes x's mother))) =
Every boy knows that I don't like his mother.
In the case of (18) the two representations happen to be interpretively identical, as we can
see by the lambda notations in (18"') below.
(18'") a. Every boy Ax (x knows that x Ay (y likes y's mother))
b. Every boy Ax (x knows that x Ay (y pities x's mother))
One motivation for a system of representation with lines such as those in (18') and
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(19') is the need to account for the ambiguity of sentences such as (19). Another, perhaps
more important, motivation is that any account of the semantics of variable binding
involves something like lambda abstraction. Once lambda abstraction is admitted, it turns
out that representations such as (19") for (19) and (18"') for (18) 'come for free'. An
account of variable binding would need to justify ruling out any of these representations.
The representations in (18') and (19') are just a shorthand for the lambda notations and as
such are justified.
Assume, then, that representations such as those in (18') are, in principle, justified.
Now we should ask, what is the motivation for Rule H? We have seen that when local and
non-local binding yield different interpretations, as in (19), both are licensed. Rule H states
that when they yield the same interpretation, as in (18), non-local binding, (18b), is
blocked. What could be the motivation for this statement? Obviously, the motivation cannot
come from interpretation alone. Rule H states that a certain representation is impossible
when it is interpretively identical to another representation. In order to find evidence for
Rule H, we need a way to distinguish between representations which are interpretively
identical. Interpretation alone will be of no help. What we need is to utilize our knowledge
of non-interpretive mechanisms that might be sensitive to the difference between the two
representations.'" Heim suggests Binding Theory as such a mechanism.'4
Consider sentence (20). This sentence cannot have the interpretation of sentence
(21). The question is why. Sta.ldard wisdom is that Binding Theory can provide the
answer. Under a system that utilizes indexation, as in (18"), the only way for (20) to get
the interpretation of (21) would be by the representation in (20'). In this representation, the
pronoun him is bound in its Governing Category in violation of Principle B. However,
3 I discuss a similar problem in Fox (1995a). There the issue was how to find evidence for
a principle that allows QR only if QR affects interpretation. There the idea was to look for
grammatical mechanisms, other than interpretation, that might be sensitive to the position of
a quantifier. Among these were grammatical constraints such as Parallelism and the
Coordinate Structure Constraint. Here the idea is to look for mechanisms that are sensitive
to the distinction between local and non-local binding. Here, too, an obvious thing to look
at is grammatical constraints. As we will see, Heim argues that Binding Theory is one such
constraint. I will argue that Parallelism is another. In fact, Parallelism argues for Rule H in
exactly the same way that it argued for the economy principle of Fox (1995a). See section
4.4.
•'4 Heim doesn't describe the role that Binding Theory plays in her proposal in exactly these
terms. The main goal of her chapter was not to present evidence for Rule H. Rather, her
aim was to show that arguments in favor of an optimality consideration proposed in
Reinhart (1983) (Rule I, cf. Grodzinsky and Reinhart (1993)) can be extended to
arguments in favor of Rule H.
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given the system we have argued for above, this simple answer cannot be maintained.
Sentence (20) can get the interpretation of (21) with both representations in (20"). (20"a)
violates Condition B, but (20"b) does not.
(20) John said that he likes him.
(20') John, said that he, likes him,.(20") a. John said that he likes him.
I II I
b. John said that he likes him.
(21) John said that he likes himself.
This problem was noticed by Higginbotham (1983), who proposed to deal with it
by complicating Binding Theory. Heim suggests keeping Binding Theory intact and
utilizing Rule H instead. Specifically, she suggests that the ill-formedness of (20), under
the intended interpretation, follows from an interaction of two principles. One principle is
Rule H; the other is Principle B. Rule H is an optimality principle which blocks (20"b),
given the availability of (20"a) (and given that the two are interpretively identical). Binding
theory applies to the output of Rule H and rules out (20"a).
This account makes a new prediction. Namely, it predicts that in cases in which
local and non-local binding yield a different interpretation, sentences similar to those in (20)
will be good with a representation along the lines of (20"b). This representation will allow
an obviation of Principle B. To see that this is the case, consider the sentences in (22).
(22) a. Everybody hates Lucifer. In fact, Lucifer knows very well that only he
(himself) pities him.
b. Everybody hates every devil. In fact, every devil knows very well that only he
(himself) pities him. '1
'5 Rule H is a modification of Reinhart's non-coreference rule. As such, it should also
account for BT(C) obviations in constructions such as (i).
(i) Every body hates John. Only he himself likes John.
Such cases are problematic if we assume that proper names denote individuals. Under this
assumption, (i) contains no variables to which Rule H can apply. Irene Heim (p.c.) points
out that this problem will not arise if we assume that proper names denote variables with
the presupposition that the veriable is identical to a given individual (John denotes a
variable x and presupposes that x is identical to some individual JOHN). If an r-
expression is c-commanded by a potential antecedent, Rule-H will force variable binding
(unless non-variable binding is semantically distinct). In turn, variable binding from an A-
position is blocked by BT(C). In (i), variable binding is semantically distinct from
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In (22) Principle B is obviated. The explanation is straightforward. The existence of
the focus particle only brings about an interpretive difference between the cases of local and
non-local binding, along the lines of (19). Therefore, Rule H licenses non-local binding.
Non-local bindinlg doesn't violate Principle B and the sentences are okay. In fact, it is
possible to tell from the interpretation that only non-local binding is possible in (22). The
sentences in (22) are well-formed only under the interpretation of non-local binding as in
(23). The interpretation of local binding, as in (24), is ruled out by Principle B. This could
be seen by comparing (22) with (25). The sentences in (25), in contrast with those in (22),
can have the interpretations in (24).
(23) a. Lucifer knows that only he (himself) pities him.
IL  I I
Lucifer Ax (x knows that only (x, Ay (y pities x))) =>
Lucifer knows that I don't pity him.
b. Every devil knows that only he (himself) pities him.
II I I
Every devil Ax (x knows that only (x, Ay (y pities x))) =
Every devil knows that I don't pity him.
(24) a. Lucifer knows that only he (himself) pities him.
I II I
Lucifer Ax (x knows that only (x, Ay (y pities y))) =
Lucifer knows that I don't pity myself.
b. Every devil knows that only he (himself) pities him.
I II I
Every devil Ax (x knows that only (x, Ay (y pities y))) -
Every devil knows that I don't pity myself.
(25) a. Lucifer knows that only he pities himself.
Lucifer Ax (x knows that only (x, Ay (y pities y))) =,
Lucifer knows that I don't pity myself.
b. Every devil knows that only he pities himself.
Every devil Ax (x knows that only (x, Ay (y pities y))) =-
Every devil knows that I don't pity myself.
Notice that Heim's explanation for the ill-formedness of (20) (under the intended
interpretation) is almost identical to the explanation that I proposed in the previous section
coreference and the latter is licensed.
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for Dahl's puzzle.
(20) John said that he likes him.
Heim suggests that the ill-formedness of (20) follows from a certain interaction of Rule H
and Binding Theory. I suggest that an identical interaction holds between Rule H and
Parallelism and that this interaction accounts for Dahl's puzzle. Parallelism, just like
Binding Theory, applies to the output of Rule H. The ordering is crucial for both accounts.
Rule H must be oblivious to the requirements of Binding Theory and Parallelism,
otherwise the fact that local binding is violated by these constraints could serve as
justification for non-local binding.
Binding Theory and Parallelism provide the kind of evidence that one can expect to
find for Rule H. Both are constraints that are sensitive to the difference between local and
non-local binding, and both show that when the two representations are interpretively
identical non-local binding is not licensed.
Of course, in order to be convinced that the accounts are correct, we have to show
that in cases in which local and non-local binding yield different semantic effects, Binding
Theory and Parallelism show us that non-local binding is possible. Heim showed that this
is the case for Binding Theory. In the next section we will show that this is also the case
for Parallelism.
4. 3. When Local and Non-Local Binding Yield Different Interpretations
In the previous section we have seen a case in which local and non-local binding yield
different semantic interpretations. We have seen that in this case Principle B was obviated,
thus supporting Heim's general approach. The aim of this section is to show that whenever
a difference in interpretation brings about an obviation of Principle B, it also brings about
an obviation of Dahl's puzzle. This is one of the two predictions which the account of
Dahl's puzzle makes and which were spelled out at the end of section i.
Consider the contrast between (26) and (27). In (26), just as in (20), local and non-
local binding yield the same semantic effect. Non-local binding is ruled out by Rule H, and
subsequently local binding is ruled out by Principle B. In (27), by contrast, Principle B is
obviated. The reason is, presumably, that local binding, (27'a), and non-local binding,
(27%b), yield different semantic interpretations.
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(26) John said that he likes him.
(27) Every boy said that John likes him. Even John, himself, said that he likes him.
(27') a. ... Even John, himself, said that he likes him.
I II I
Even (John, Ax (x said that x Ay(y likes y))
b. ... Even John, himself, said that he likes him.'" (he = John)
II
Even (John, Ax (x said that he Ay(y likes x)) (he = John)
The difference in interpretation between the representations in (27') is similar, though not
identical, to the difference we have seen in (22). The similarity stems from the existence of
a focus particle. Focus particles, such as only (in (22)) and even (in (27)), affect
interpretation via reference to the focus value of the constituent with which they compose
(see Rooth (1985)). When there are no focus particles, the difference in the focus value of
certain constituents doesn't affect the interpretation of the sentence. However, when focus
particles are around, focus values become relevant for interpretation. Focus values, in turn,
can be affected by the kind of dependencies that exist between pronouns and their
antecedents. In particular, they sometimes care about the differcnce between local and non-
local binding. For this reason, the presence of a focus particle has the potential of making
the difference between local and non-local binding relevant for interpretation. We have seen
this happen in the case of only in (22). Let us now see how it happens in the case of even
in (27).
The difference between (22) and (27) is directly linked to the different contributions
that only and even make to the interpretations of sentences in which they are contained.
Only contrtlutes to interpretation by affecting truth conditions whereas even contributes to
interpretation by affecting presuppositions (See Rooth (1985) and Wilkinson (1996),
among others). A sentence with the structure of (28a) is true just in case there is no person,
x, other than John, such that 4(x). A sentence with the structure of (28b) is true just in case
i(John) is true. However, it makes an additional requirement on presuppositions. For a
16 The representation in (20'b) differs from the representation in (1I3"b) in that the
intermediate pronoun is not bound by the matrix subject, but rather enters a relationship of
coreference with it. We see that both representations obviate BT(B). The difference
between them is not relevant for Dahl's puzzle, under the account presented here, since
both involve non-local binding by the matrix subject and, therefore, both should allow
obviation of Dahl's puzzle.
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sentence with the structure of (28b) to be uttered, it must be agreed that John is one of the
least likely people to have the property Ax4(x).
(28) a. Only (John, ,Axox))
b. Even (John, Ax4(x))
We can now be precise about the difference in the interpretations of (27'a) and
(27'b). The difference has to do with the contribution that even makes to interpretation. In
other words, it has to do with presuppositions. In (27'a) the presupposition is that John is
one of the least likely people to have the property Ax (x said that x Ay(y likes y)). This
entails, for instance, that I, for one, am probably more likely than John to say that I like
myself. In (27'b) the presupposition is that John is one of the least likely people to have the
property Ax (x said that he Ay(y likes x)), where he=John. This entails, for instance, that I,
for one, am probably more likely to say that he, that is John, likes me. There is obviously a
formal difference in the presuppositions of the two sentences. This difference licenses non-
local binding. The availability of non-local binding, (27'b), allows (27) to obviate Principle
B.17
Given this analysis, we predict that Dahl's puzzle will be obviated in an
environment such as that of (27). That this is the case is demonstrated by the contrast in
(29). (29a) is bad because non-local binding is ruled out in the second sentence and, as a
consequence, Parallelism is not maintained. (29b) is okay because in the second sentence
local and non-local binding yield different semantic interpretation. Non-local binding is
allowed, and Parallelism is maintained.
(29) a. *Every adult thought that the little kid liked him. The little kid did too. <thought
that the little kid liked the little kid>
b. Every kid thought that the little kid liked him. Even the little kid, himself, did.
Notice that the second sentence in (29a) might also be ruled out by Principle B
when applied to the elided VP (see, Kitagawa (1992), Ristad (1992), Fiengo and May
17 Kai von Fintel and Irene Heim (p.c.) pointed out a problem that arises at this point. If the
meaning of even licenses non-local variable binding why is the same not true for the
meaning of the sentential particle too.
It might be possible to address this problem by assuming a local application of
Rule-H. The basic idea would be that in the case of too local veriable binding is determined
before the semantics of the focus particle are taken into account. However, it remains to be
seen whether the details of such a suggestion can be worked-out in a natural way.
F
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(1994), among others). Therefore, (30) might serve as a better minimal pair.
(30) a. *Every boy, said that Mary liked his, dog. Well, Mary did too
<said that she liked her dog> (= (10d))
b. Every person, said that Mary liked his, dog. Even Mary, herself, did
<said she liked her dog>
Consider now the contrast in (31). Once again, the explanation of the contrast is
that in (31 b) non-local binding yields a different semantic effect than that of local binding
(the difference has to do with the semantic contribution of the focus particle only. By now,
this difference should be clear to the reader, and I will not go over it.). Noll-local binding
is, thus, licensed by Rule H, and Principle B is obviated.
(31) a. John believes that he likes him.
b. Almost no one believes that John likes him. Probably John is the only one who
believes that he likes him.
c. Almost no one believes that John likes him. Probably John is the only one who
does <believes that he likes him>.
Once again we predict that Dahl's puzzle would be obviated as well. This is demonstrated
in (3 1c), and by the contrast in (32)
(32) a. *No boy, believes that Mary likes his, mother. However, she does.
b. No one, believes that Mary likes his, mother. Probably, Mary is the only one
who does.
Consider now the sentences in (22) and their two conceivable representations in
(23-24), repeated below. This case is different from (31) with respect to the position of the
focus particle.'" However, as we have seen in the previous section, this is also an
environment in which local and non-local binding yield a different semantic effect and in
which Principle B is obviated.
(22) a. Everybody hates Lucifer. In fact, Lucifer knows very well that only he(himself) pities him.
b. Everybody hates every devil. In fact, every devil knows very well that only he
(himself) pities him.
'8 It is also different in that the first pronoun is linked to the matrix subject via direct
binding and not via coreference (see note 16).
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(23) a. Lucifer kne o s that only he (himself) pities him.
II p 1
Lucifer Ax (x knows that only (x, Ay (y pities x))) -=
Lucifer knows that I don't pity him.
b. Every devil knows that only he (himself) pities him.
II ..- I I
Every devil Ax (x knows that only (x, Ay (y pities x))) =
Every devil knows that I don't pity him.
(24) a. Lucifer knows that only he (himself) pities him.
I II I
Lucifer x (x knows that only (x, Ay (y pities y))) =
Lucifer knows that I don't pity myself.
b. Every devil knows that only he (himself) pities him.
I II I
Every devil Ax (x knows that only (x, Ay (y pities y))) =>
Every devil knows that I don't pity myself.
As we see by the contrasts in (33) and in (34), this is an environment in which Dahl's
puzzle is obviated as well.
(33) a. *Every boy believes that Mary likes his mother. Mary does too <believe that she
likes her mother>.
b. Every boy believes that only Mary likes his mother. Mary does too <believe that
only she likes her mother>. 9.
(34) a. *John believes that he likes his mother. Bill does too
<believe that John likes Bill's mother>.
b. John believes that only he likes his mother. Bill does too
<believe that only John likes Bill's mother>.
As in the case of (22b), we can tell by the interpretation that only non-local binding
is possible in (33b) and in (34b). Thus, in (33b) the belief that is attributed to Mary is the
belief that Mary is the only person who likes Mary's mother, not the belief that she is the
only person who likes her own mother. The same is true of the belief that is attributed to
Bill in (34b). Once again this follows from the proposal; local binding would violate
Parallelism.
'9 As in the case of (22), we can tell by the interpretation that only non-local binding is
possible. This is explained by the fact that local binding would violate Parallelism.
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4.4. When Local Binding Is Impossible
In the previous section, I have argued that when local and non-local binding yield different
semantic interpretations, Dahi's puzzle is obviated. This was predicted by the explanation I
offered for Dahl's puzzle in section 1. The basic idea was that whenever there is a choice,
Rule H prefers local binding to non-local binding. One place where there isn't a choice
(given the way the comparison set is constructed) is where local and non-local binding
yield different interpretations. As mentioned in section 1, there is also another place where
there isn't a choice: if local binding is impossible for grammatical reasons, non-local
binding would be the only candidate in the reference set, and would thus be licensed. In
this section, I will demonstrate that also in this place Dahl's puzzle is obviated.
I will discuss two principles that under certain circumstances might force non-local
binding. One principle is that which requires c-command for binding; the other is the theta
criterion. I will assume that these principles differ from Parallelism and from Binding
Theory in that they exclude elements from the comparison set.2'
4.4.1 C-command: C-command is a prerequisite for Binding. Consider a sentence
such as (35). In this sentence, the matrix subject must bind both of the pronouns, as in
(35'a), since the local binding, in (35'b), is impossible (for lack of c-command).2 ' Rule H
licenses (35'a) since (35'b) is an illegitimate competitor. We therefore predict that when we
embed a sentence such as (35) in an ellipsis construction, we will not see the effects of
Dahl's puzzle. That this is the case is demonstrated in Fiengo and May (1994:156) (see also
20 This distinction is similar in nature to Chomsky's distinction between principles that
cause a derivation to crash and principles that can rule out a converging derivation (such as
the principles of Binding theory). It is possible that the difference between the theta
criterion and the c-command requirement on the one hand and Binding Theory and
Parallelism on the other is that the former are prerequisites for interpretation. C-command
might be necessary for the interpretation of a bound variable relationship (in fact, it is,
under many semantic theories). Satisfying the argument structure of a predicate (the theta
criterion) is also necessary for achieving an interpretation. If the comparison set is
composed of representations with a designated interpretation, it follows, trivially, that all
representations in the reference set must be interpretable.
21 Notice that even if c-command were not a prerequisite for binding, it is not clear that in
(35) the linearly closer antecedent is more local under the appropriate measure of locality.
If, as some assume, locality is defined by c-command (a is more local to x than 3, just in
case a c-commands x and is c-commanded by (), then, even if c-command were not a
prerequisite for binding, Dahl's puzzle would be obviated (since both the representations in
(35') would be licensed, neither involving more local binding than the other).
130
Kehler (1993)). It is further demonstrated by the minimal pairs in (36) and in (37).
(35) Bill said that all of his friends like his mother.
(35') a. Bill said that all of his friends like his mother.
11 I I
b. *Bill said that all of his friends like his mother.
I II I
(36) a. Bill said that he likes his mother.
John did too <*say that Bill likes John's mother>
b. uAJ said that all of his friends like his mother.
John did too <said that all of Bill's friends like John's mother>
(37) a. No boy said that Mary likes his mother.
*Mary, however, did <said she likes her mother>
b. No boy said that all of Mary's friends like his mother.
Mary, however, did <said that all of her friends like her mother>
4.4.2 The theta criterion: Some component of grammar must require that a binding
relationship will hold between a moved constituent and its trace--call it the theta criterion. 22
Consider the implications for a sentence such as (38). In particular, consider the two
representations in (38'). (38'a) involves non-local binding of the trace, and does not violate
the theta criterion. (38'b) involves local binding of the trace but violates the theta criterion
(c.f. Rizzi (1986)).23 Given the assumption that theta-criterion violators are not legitimate
competitors for Rule H, (38'a) is licensed by Rule H.
(38) John seems to himself [t to be a genius]
22 Noam Chomsky (p.c.) points out that under natural assumptions regarding the formation
of A-chains, a representation such as the one in (38'b) is meaningless. Therefore, nothing
special needs to be sated in order to account for the fact that (39'b) is the only
representation in the reference set.
23 Rizzi suggested his chain-formation algorithm in order to account for the ill-formedness
of strong-crossover in many environments. In particular, he suggested that the algorithm
requires that (38'b) will be the representation of (38) and it predicts that the sentence will be
ruled out by the theta criterion. (38) poses a problem for Rizzi's suggestion, as noted in
Chomsky (1986b). The support for the algorithm comes from the ungrammaticality of the
Italian parallels of (38).
Rizzi's algorithm is very similar to Rule H. In particular, if we would assume that
the theta criterion, like Binding Theory and Parallelism, applies to the output of Rule H, we
would get Rizzi's results. In the spirit of Reinhart (1998), this could be the proposal for
SCO in the case of A-bar movement.
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(38') a. John seems to himself [t to be a genius]I' I I
b. John seems to hi self [t to be a genius]
Now consider (39). Given the fact that (39'a) is a violation of the theta criterion,
only (39'b) and (39'c) compete with respect to Rule H. (39'b) is preferred. The prediction
is that if (39) is embedded in an ellipsis construction, Dahl's puzzle will be obviated.
(39) John seems to himself [t to be smarter than his classmates]
(38') a. John seems to himself [t to be a genius]
I I - - 11
b. John seems to himself [t to be a genius]I I It
(39') a. John seems to himself [ t to be smarter than is classmates]I II T
b. John seems to himself [t to be smarter than his classmates]
If ' II I
c. John,_seems to himself [t to be smarter than his classmates]
To see that this is the prediction, consider an ellipsis construction such as that in
(40a). In the first sentence of this construction, the pronoun his is bound by the chain
<John, t>. Therefore, the parallel pronoun of the second sentence can be bound by the
chain <Bill, t> without violating Parallelism. To see that the prediction is borne out,
consider the contrasts in (40) and in (41).24
(40) a. John seems to himself [t to be smarter than everyone in his class].
Bill does too <seems to John [t to be smarter than everyone in Bill's class>.
b. John believes [himself to be smarter than everyone in his class].
*Bill does too <believes John to be smarter than everyone in Bill's class>."5
(41) a. [No girl in the committee], seems to John to be smarter than her, classmates.
John, however, does.
b. *[No girl in the committee], believes John to be smarter than her, classmates.
John, however, does.
24 TO assist you with the judgments in the (a) cases, consider a context in which John is
searching in each class for the smartest person; say, to form an elite club.
25 Note that there is no independent problem with strict identity for reflexives in ECM
constructions. (See Fiengo and May (1994) and Fox (1993) for some discussion.)
132
4.5. Rule H and Scope-Economy
In this section, I would like to show that my argument in favor of Rule H is identical to one
of the arguments that I presented in favor of Scope-Economy (in Fox (1995a) and in
another form in chapter 2). Further, I would like to show that the generalization that I
present in this chapter is very similar to the generalization presented in Fox (1995a), and
that, in fact, there is a simple statement that encompasses both of these generalizations.
Finally, I would like to suggest an outline for a potential unification of Rule H and Scope-
Economy. However, as mention in the outset, this unificiation will be inconsistent with the
local definition of Scope-Economy for which I argued in chapter 2.
4.5.1 The Ellipsis Binding Generalization: In the previous sections, I have
argued for Rule H on the basis of the fact that it provides a solution for Dahl's puzzle.
Stated somewhat differently, the argument was based on the following generalization:
(42) The Ellipsis Binding Generalization (EBG): In an ellipsis construction, a
pronoun can have a non-local antecedent only if binding by a local antecedent will
yield a different interpretation, both in the sentence that includes the elided VP and
in the sentence that includes the antecedent VP.
The generalization is partially exemplified by the paradigm in (43). In (43a), local and non-
local binding yield a different interpretation in the sentence that includes the elided VP, but
not in the sentence that includes the antecedent VP; therefore, according to the EBG, non-
local binding is impossible (this is Dahl's puzzle). In (43b, c) non-local binding yields a
different interpretation in both sentences, and it is allowed according to the EBG.
(43) a. John said that he liked his mother. Bill did too *<said that John liked Bill's
mother>.
b. John said that Mary liked his mother. Bill did too <said that M. liked B's
mother>.
c. John said that only he liked his mother. Bill did too <said that only J. liked B's
mother>.
The explanation of the EBG was based on an interaction between Rule H and
Parallelism. Rule H applies before Parallelism. If in both sentences non-local binding is
semantically distinct from local binding, the two options are not compared by Rule H.
Non-local binding is allowed in both sentences, and Parallelism can be maintained. If,
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however, non-local binding is semantically indistinguishable from local binding in one of
the sentences, then Rule H doesn't allow non-local binding in that sentence, and
consequently Parallelism doesn't allow non-local binding in the other sentence.
4.5.2 The Ellipsis Scope Generalization: In Fox (1995a), I have presented an
identical argument for a semantically based Economy principle. There, the argument was
based on the Ellipsis Scope Generalization:
(44) The Ellipsis Scope Generalization (ESG): In an ellipsis construction, a
quantifier can have non-local scope only if local scope will yield a different
interpretation, both in the sentence that includes the elided VP and in the sentence
that includes the antecedent VP.
The generalization is partially exemplified by the paradigm in (45). In (45a, b),
local and non-local scope yield a different interpretation in the sentence that includes the
antecedent VP, but not in the sentence that includes the elided VP; therefore, by the ESG,
non-local scope is impossible. In (45c,d) non-local scope yields a different interpretation in
both sentences, and it is allowed according to the ESG.
(45) a. Some boy admires every teacher. Mary does too. (3 > V) *(V > 3)
b. Some boy admires every teacher. Every girl does too. (3 > V) *(V > 3)
c. Some boy admires every teacher. Some girl does too. (3 > V) (V > 3)
d. Some boy admires every teacher. Many girls do too. (3 > V) (V > 3)
The explanation of the ESG was based on an interaction between Parallelism and a
semantically based economy principle. Economy applies before Parallelism. If in both
sentences, non-local scope is semantically distinct from local scope, the two options are not
compared by Economy. Non-local scope is allowed in both sentences, and Parallelism is
maintained. If, however, non-local scope is semantically indistinguishable from local scope
in one of the sentences, then Economy doesn't allow non-local scope in that sentence, and
consequently Parallelism doesn't allow non-local scope in the other sentence.
4.5.3 An outline of a unification: The ESG and the EBG are strikingly similar. In
fact, the only difference between them is that whenever the EBG talks about local or non-
local binding, the ESG talks about local or non-local scope. Also the account of the two
generalizations seems almost identical. Here, the only difference is that whenever Rule H
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prefers local binding to non-local binding, Economy prefers local scope to non-local scope.
The question is, can we unify the two accounts? Can we state a natural generalization that
will encompass both the ESG and the EBG, and can we state a single optimality condition
which will prefer both local to non-local binding and local to non-local scope?
In order for a unification to succeed, we need to find a feature that is shared by local
binding and local scope and that distinguishes them from their non-local counterparts. I
would like to suggest, tentatively, that the feature is related to length of dependencies. In a
structure such as (46a), which involves local scope, there is a shorter dependency, than that
in (46b), which is the result of a longer instance of QR. The structures are identical in all
other respects. In a structure such as (47a), which involves local binding, there is a shorter
dependency than that in (47b), which involves non-local binding. Once again, the
structures are identical in all other respects.
(46) a. [,, XP... [v, Everyone [v, likes t]]]I I
b. [,pEveryone [,, XP... [vp likes t]]]
I I
(47) a. John said he likes his motherI - - I
b. John said he likes his mother
I .1
Suppose that we had the optimality condition in (48). This condition prefers (46a)
to (46b) and (47a) to (47b). If we assume that the comparison set for this condition
includes only linguistic objects with the same semantic interpretation and if we assume that
Parallelism applies to the output of this condition, we account for both the ESG and the
EBG, which can now be stated together as in (49).
(48) Prefer (representations with) shorter dependencies."6
26 This unification raises a problem for Quantifier Lowering. In Fox (1995a) as well as
chapter 2, I argue that economy prefers to reduce instances of Quantifier Lowering. This
preference makes perfect sense under a derivational approach in which Optimality
considerations attempt to reduce derivational effort. Quantifier Lowering, just like
Quantifier Raising, involves derivational effort and is expected to be avoided if possible.
Under the representational approach suggested in (48), the attempt to reduce instances of
Quantifier Lowering makes little sense. Quantifier Lowering has the effect of reducing the
length of dependencies and thus should be preferred under (48). See Fox (1995c) where I
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(49) The Ellipsis Dependency Generalization (EDG): In an ellipsis
construction, a non-local dependency can exist only if more local dependencies
yield different interpretations, both in the sentence that includes the elided VP and in
the sentence that includes the antecedent VP.
4.6. Conclusion
This chapter provides new arguments for an economy condition which has been postulated
in Heim (1993), Rule H. Rule H is sensitive to certain aspects of interpretation and is
oblivious to Parallelism. As such, Rule H is very similar to Scope-Economy. I provided
the guidelines of a potential unification for the two economy conditions. However, this
unification is stated as a global economy condition and is therefore at the moment
inconsistent with the local algorithm that I have advocated for Scope Economy in chapter 2.
This inconsistency is left as an open problem.
propose an alternative unification.
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Part II: Binding Theory and the Representation of Scope
In chapter 2-3, various mechanisms were utilized to test the predictions of Scope-
Economy. Special attention was paid to the idea that Parallelism can help us detect the
structure of Scopally Uninformative sentences. The same logic was applied in chapter 4 to
the investigation of Binding Uninformative sentences. The result of this investigation
revealed an economy condition on variable binding (VB-Economy) which is very similar in
its nature to Scope-Economy.
As mentioned, VB-Economy was suggested on independent grounds in Helm
(1993). Modifying work by Reinhart (1983), Heim demonstrates that certain obviations of
Binding Theory (BT) can be accounted for by the postulation of VB-Economy. The
argument for VB-Economy from BT is identical in its logic to the argument from
Parallelism. BT, just like Parallelism, enables us to distinguish between Binding
Uninformative representations, and in doing so it vindicates the predictions of Economy.
Stated somewhat differently, what we've learned up to this point is that Parallelism
can be used to study scope, and that Parallelism and BT can be used to study variable
binding. The obvious question to ask is whether BT can be used to study scope as well.
A necessary condition for a positive answer is that BT applies at LF. In chapter 5-
6, I will argue that at least condition C of BT (BT(C)) applies at LF and only at LF. As
such, this condition provides a very powerful tool for studying the covert structure of
quantification. Based on this tool, I will argue (in chapter 5) that Scope Reconstruction is
the result of "literal" reconstruction in the syntax and (in chapter 6) that A-bar chains are
converted to operator variable constructions under an economy condition (suggested in
Chosmky (1993) in a somewhat different form) which I will call OV-Economy. This
economy condition allows deletion of material from the copy at the tail of an A-bar chain,
only if such deletion is needed for interpretability.
Assuming that Binding Theory applies at LF, we would like to see whether it can
be used to further test the predictions of Scope-Economy. As we will see, OV-Economy
makes it impossible to test the predictions of Scope-Economy based on BT(C). The case
of BT(A), which I address in the end of chapter 6, is different. It seems that although
normal cases of A-bar movement don't affect BT(C), they can affect BT(A). Although this
fact is ill-understood, it can be utilized to test the predictions of Scope-Economy and once
again the predictions are borne out.
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Chapter 5: Condition C and Scope Reconstruction I
In the early days of generative grammar, overt movement was characterized as involving a
disparity between the position at which an item is interpreted and the position at which it is
overtly realized. However, since the 60s, it has been known that this is not strictly true.
Although certain interpretive properties of a moved constituent are determined in the base
position, other properties can be determined at the landing site. 2 Specifically, although
aspects of interpretation having to do with predicate argument relations -- with theta
assignment -- are determined at the base position, aspects of interpretation having to do
with scope and variable binding are determined at the landing site (see Chomsky (1977)
and references therein.) 3 This has led to a different view of the grammar's architecture.
Under this view, overt displacement affects meaning as well as sound. 4  Structures
involving movement serve as the input for both the conceptual and the articulatory systems.
In the articulatory system, the base position is ignored. However, in the conceptual
system, both positions are taken into account, and the interpretive properties are distributed
among them according to the division outlined above.
This new picture itself had to be revised given the observation that the effects of
movement on scope and variable binding are not obligatorily present; there are cases where
the semantic effects of movement (predicted by the new picture) are "undone" (henceforth,
cases of "Scope Reconstruction"). The attempts to deal with Scope Reconstruction, and
the resulting accommodation to the picture, can be divided into two types. The first type of
accommodation assumes that Scope Reconstruction is the outcome of semantic procedures.
What is claimed is that the interpretive principles can deal with movement chains in at least
two ways. One way results in an interpretation in which scope is determined at the base
position; the other, in which scope is interpreted at the landing site. The second type of
accommodation assumes that Scope Reconstruction is already determined in the syntax. In
I Many of the arguments in section 5.2.-5.3. were made independently in Romero (1997).
2Some suggestions that this is the case were already present in Chomsky (1957). For a
collection of many of the original arguments, see Jackendoff (1972).
3Other aspects of interpretation which are affected by movement (e.g. topic/focus) are
outside the scope of this work.
4This new view (together with the postulation of traces) paved the road for an account of
scopal ambiguity in terms of movement operations that are invisible to phonology (such as
Quantifier Raising).
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other words, it is claimed that the structures that serve as the input to semantic interpretation
(the structures of LF) determine whether or not there is Scope Reconstruction.
This chapter argues for various interactions between Condition C of the Binding
Theory (henceforth, BT(C)) and Scope Reconstruction. More specifically, it is argued that
BT(C) indicates the position in a chain at which a scope bearing element is interpreted.
This correlation is mysterious under the semantic approach to Scope Reconstruction.
However, it follows straight-forwardly from the syntactic approach under the assumption
that Binding Theory is sensitive to LF positions. As such, it argues that Scope
Reconstruction is syntactic and that Binding Theory applies at LF.
The structure of the chapter is as follows. In section 5.1, I will elaborate on the
two approaches to the phenomenon of Scope Reconstruction and establish that a specific
correlation between this phenomenon and BT(C) effects is predicted by the syntactic
approach. In sections 5.2 and 5.3, I will demonstrate that the prediction is born out, for A-
bar and A movement respectively. Finally, in section 5.4, I will discuss the ramifications of
the arguments in favor of syntactic reconstruction for the status of the semantic mechanism
of type shifting.
5.1. Semantic vs. Syntactic Accounts of Scope Reconstruction
It is well known that overt movement can affect scope. This has been established in many
ways. The simplest examples are probably from scrambling languages (see Hoji, 1985). 5
However, we can also see this by English examples such as (1).6 In (lb), the embedded
5 For some reason, which is not completely clear to me, the ability to affect scope is
restricted to short-distance scrambling. See Tada (1993).
6The English examples that are standardly invoked to make this point are simpler. For
example, Jackendoff (1972), argues that movement affects scope based on contrasts such
as (i); In (ia) many prefers to have wide scope relative to negation; in (ib) the preference
goes in the other direction.
(i) a. Many arrows didn't hit the target.
b. The target wasn't hit by many arrows.
The examples demonstrate that overt movement affects interpretive preferences. However,
they do not demonstrate that overt movement yields interpretations that would be
unavailable otherwise. Given the availability of covert scope shifting operations, both
sentences in (i) are ambiguous. In order to demonstrate that scope is affected by
movement, overt movement must do something that QR cannot do. In other words, the
demonstration is dependent on the existence of constraints which apply to QR and not to
overt movement. In (1) the constraint might follow from an account of the "clause-
boundedness" of QR. There might be additional constraints on specific types of quantifiers
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object is overtly displaced and the result of this displacement allows it to receive wide scope
relative to another scope-bearing element (the existential quantifier). This scope relation
would have been impossible without overt movement, as demonstrated in (1a). 7
(1) a. John seems to a (#different) teacher [ t to be likely to solve every one of these
problems]. (3 > ) *( v > 3)8
b. [Every one of these problems] seems to a (different) teacher [ t to be likely t to
be solved t by John. (3> V)(v> 3)
However, overt movement does not obligatorily affect scope. This has been
known at least since May (1977). Consider constructions that involve successive cyclic
raising such as those in (2). In these constructions the scope of the moved quantifier can
be affected by movement. However it need not; the scope may be construed in the base
position or in any of the intermediate landing sites.
(2) a. Someone from New York is very likely t to win the lottery.
b. Someone from New York seems t to be very likely t' to win the lottery.
c. Many soldiers seem t to be very likely t' to die in the battle.
Take (2a), which is two-ways ambiguous. One interpretation results from the quantifier
taking scope in the final landing site. For the sentence to be true under this interpretation,
there must be a person from NY who is very likely to win the lottery (e.g., a person who
bought a sufficient number of tickets to make winning a likely outcome). Under the second
interpretation, in which the quantifier has scope in the position of t, the truth conditions are
(e.g. monotone decreasing, see McCawley (1998: 618-628)) which will yield a similar
argument. (See Liu (1990), Beghelli (1993) and Beghelli and Stowell (1995) for a detailed
investigation of the properties of different quantificational elements.)
7A similar point can be made when we consider variable binding. In (ia), the universal
quantifier cannot bind a variable which is outside of its scope. In (ib), overt movement
gives the quantifier wider scope and allows it to bind the variable.
(i) a. *The teacher is expected by hisl mother [ t to encourage every boy I].
b. Every boy I is expected by his I mother [ t to be encouraged t by the teacher].
8The impossibility of wide scope for the universal quantifier can be seen by the
ungrammaticality of (la) when different receives a bound interpretation as in a diffrrent
guard is standing on top of every building. We can further demonstrate the impossibility of
the (V > 3) scope relation by considering cases in which the alternative scope relation
results in an interpretation which is cognitively anomalous, e.g.: # This soldier seems to
someone to be likely to die in every battle. or #The ball seems to a boy to be under every
shell. (c.f. Every shell seems to a (different) boy to be over the ball .)
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much less demanding; they merely require that there be enough ticket buyers from NY to
make it likely that the city would yield a winner.
The examples in (2) demonstrate the availability of Scope Reconstruction. This
availability can be further demonstrated in ways that are not based on any assumptions
regarding the interpretation of modality. The demonstration is based on the constructions
in (3, 4), partially due to Lebeaux (1994).9
(3) a. [At least one soldier], seems (to Napoleon) [tl to be likely to die in every
battle].
b. [At least one soldier]l seems to himselfl [tl to be likely to die in every battle].
c. [At least one soldier]1 seems to his, commanders [tl to be likely to die in every
battle].
(4) a. One soldier is expected (by Napoleon) [t to die in every battle].
b. One soldierl is expected by his, commander [tl to die in every battle].
In the (a) sentences in (3,4) the universal quantifier in the embedded clause can take scope
over the matrix subject ( V > 3). In other words, the sentences can be understood with the
soldiers varying with the battles. The sentences can also receive an interpretation in which
the matrix subject takes wide scope (3 > V). This is the implausible interpretation which
asserts the existence of a single soldier who is expected to die in all of the battles.
One could imagine that the source of the ambiguity in the (a) sentences is the
availability of long distance Quantifier Raising (QR). The universal quantifier can move by
QR over the existential quantifier, and the optionality of this movement, one might think, is
the cause of the ambiguity. However, this is most likely not the case. The (b, c) sentences
show that the ambiguity in the (a) sentences requires Scope Reconstruction. If QR was
sufficient to yield the ambiguity in the (a) sentences, we would expect to find the same kind
of ambiguity in the (b,c) sentences. However, the latter sentences are unambiguous. Their
meaning is restricted to the implausible interpretation which results from assigning wide
9 Similar data is noted in Aoun (1982), attributed to Rizzi. I changed Lebeaux's examples
slightly. The first change has to do with the choice of lexical items. I tried to make the
interpretation resulting from wide scope for the matrix subject (3 > V) conflict with world
knowledge. This change makes the unavailability of the alternative scopal relation in (b,c)
(V > 3) very striking. The second change is the addition of (3c) and (4b) which contain a
bound pronoun (rather than a reflexive) within the dative PP (see also Hornstein
(1994:160)). This change is meant to explain why I don't draw the same conclusions that
Lebeaux does (see next note).
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scope to the existential quantifier. While this restriction is unaccounted for under the
assumption that QR alone is the source of the ambiguity in the (a) sentences, the
assumption that Scope Reconstruction is needed accounts for the restriction straight-
forwardly. In the (b) and (c) sentences, the existential quantifier must bind a variable in a
position outside its scope as determined by Scope Reconstruction. Hence Scope
Reconstruction is impossible.' 0 We must assume that the (V > 3) interpretation of the (a)
sentences results from a combination of Scope Reconstruction and short distance QR. The
matrix subject receives scope in the position of t and the universal quantifier receives scope
above this position (via QR).
Consider next the contrast between the sentences in (5,6). Some speakers find the
(a) sentences slightly marginal. This is accounted for by Weak Crossover (WCO) under
the assumption that QR involves A-bar movement. However, the (b) sentences are
acceptable. This contrast is explained if we assume that QR is not necessary to get wide
scope for the universal quantifier. This assumption, in turn, is explained by the availability
of Scope Reconstruction in the (b) sentences.
(5) a. ??[Someone from his, class]2 shouted to every professor1 [PRO, to be careful].
b. [Someone from his, classl2 seems to every professorl [t2 to be a genius].
(6) a. ??[His, father] 2 wrote to every boy, [PRO, to be a genius].
b. [His, father] 2 seems to every boyI [t2 to be a genius].
5.1.1. Syntactic Accounts of Scope Reconstruction: Under the syntactic accounts
of Scope Reconstruction, the ambiguous sentences in (2-4) are disambiguated at LF.
Under one disambiguation the Quantifier Phrase is in its surface position and binds a
variable in the trace position. Under other disambiguations, the Quantifier Phrase is in one
of the intermediate trace positions (or, alternatively, in a position that binds such
positions1 1). This is illustrated with the two LF structures of (2a) given in (2a')
o1Lebeaux (1994) draws a more radical conclusion. Given the unavailability of (V > 3) in
(3b), he concludes that BT(A) must be satisfied at LF. Although the conclusion seems
plausible to me, I don't think the example bears on it. All we can argue for on the basis of
(3b), as is perhaps clearer from (3c) and (4b), is that (V > 3) in the (a) sentences requires
Scope Reconstruction. The facts follow with the addition of a (virtual) tautology that a
quantifier cannot bind a variable outside of its scope.
11 Such binding would be the result of a Quantifier Lowering operation as in May (1977).
See Chomsky (1995: 327).
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(2a') LFI. [Someone from NY]I is very likely [ti to win the lottery]
LF2. is very likely [[Someone from NY] to win the lottery].
Such syntactic reconstruction could be achieved by various mechanisms. Among
these mechanisms is quantifier lowering suggested for A-movement by May (1977) and the
copy theory of movement suggested for A-bar reconstruction by Chomsky (1993) and
applied by many to A-movement (see, among others, Hornstein (1994)). However, at the
moment I will abstract away from the details of the implementation (see, however, 6.5-
6.6). What matters right now is the property that all the syntactic accounts share; they all
assume that Scope Reconstruction involves an LF structure in which the Quantifier Phrase
is literally in the reconstructed position. This account of Scope Reconstruction extends
straightforwardly to all the cases discussed including the cases of variable binding. I.e.,
under this account it is straightforward to explain the fact that the (b) sentences in (5,6) do
not show a WCO effect.
5.1.2. Semantic Accounts of Scope Reconstruction: Semantic accounts assume
that syntactic reconstruction is not necessary for Scope Reconstruction. (See Chierchia
(1995a), Cresti (1995) and Rullmann (1995).) In other words, they assume that there is a
semantic mechanism that yields the two interpretations of sentence such as (2a) from a
structure with no syntactic reconstruction such as LF, (in (2a')). The existence of such a
semantic mechanism is tacitly assumed in the scope principle suggested by Aoun and Li
(1994) and explored by Frey (1989) 2, Kitahara (1994) and Krifka (1998), among others.
The semantic nature of this mechanism has been developed explicitly within
frameworks which assume that a semantic type is associated with each syntactic
expression. A further assumption is that the sister of a moved constituent is interpreted as a
function which can be expressed with X abstraction over a variable in the trace position.
The question is, of course, a variable of what type. The assumption is that in cases in
which a Quantifier Phrase undergoes movement, the variable can either range over
individuals (i.e. be interpreted as a variable of type e) or over generalized quantifiers -- that
is, second order predicates (i.e. be interpreted as a variable of type <et,t>). For an
incomplete illustration, consider the two options for interpreting LFI. (For a more complete
12Thanks to Uli Sauerland for conveying to me the contents of this work (in German)
which I unfortunately am unable to read.
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discussion, see Heim and Kratzer (forthcoming).) These two options are represented in
(2") where x ranges over individuals and Q ranges over generalized quantifiers.
(2") a. [Someone from NY] Xx (is very likely [x to win the lottery])
b. [Someone from NY] XQ (is very likely [Q to win the lottery])
In (2"a), where the variable is of type e, the sister of the moved Quantifier Phrase is
interpreted as a function from individuals to truth values (type et). Since the moved
Quantifier Phrase is of type <et,t>, the Quantifier Phrase takes its sister as argument. It is
easy to see that the resulting interpretation is one in which the existential quantifier has
scope over the modal verb. In (2"b), the sister of the quantifier is interpreted as a function
from generalized quantifiers to truth-values (type <<et,t>,t>), In this case the Quantifier
Phrase is the argument of its sister, and it is easy to see (once we consider lambda-
conversion) that the modal verb receives wide scope. 13
The semantic account of Scope Reconstruction extends straightforwardly to all the
cases discussed besides the cases of variable binding via reconstruction (the (b) sentences
in (5,6)). A few further assumptions need to be made in order for semantic reconstruction
to allow for variable binding (into the reconstructed element). I will not go over the
assumptions and instead refer the reader to Engdahl (1986), Sternefeld (1997), Chierchia
(1995b) and Sharvit (1997).
5.1.3. Distinguishing the two Accounts via BT(C): Consider the structural
configuration in (7), in which linear precedence represents c-command. If BT(C) is
sensitive to LF structures, the syntactic account predicts that Scope Reconstruction would
be impossible in (7). This prediction is stated in (8).
(7) [Qp ...r-expression I...]2......pronoun I....t2
(8) Scope Reconstruction feeds BT(C): Scope Reconstruction should be
impossible in the structural configuration in (7).
13Note that this semantic account, just like the syntactic account, captures straightforwardly
the virtual tautology that Scope Reconstruction to a position of a trace is incompatible with
the binding of a variable outside the c-command domain of this trace. For example, this
account is on a par with the syntactic account with respect to the contrasts in (3-4). See
notes 9 and 10.
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In order for this prediction to follow under the semantic account of Scope
Reconstruction, one would have to assume that condition C makes reference to the
semantic type of traces and that the LF in (7) is ruled out iff the semantic type of the trace is
<et,t>. (See Sternefeld (1997).) This, however, cannot be considered an explanation. The
necessary assumption is a post hoc stipulation which doesn't tell us why things are the way
they are. In particular, it would be just as plausible to make the opposite assumption (i.e.,
that BT(C) rules out (7) when the semantic type of the trace is e) from which it would
follow that Scope Reconstruction is obligatory in (7).14
Under the syntactic account of Scope Reconstruction (8) is explained. Condition C
receives the simple definition based on constructions for which the structural analysis is not
debated (constructions without movement). Under the natural assumption that an
interpretive principle (such as Bindng Theory) is sensitive to LF structures, (8) follows.
Therefore, if we can show that the prediction holds, we will have an argument in tandem
for both the syntactic account and the assumption that BT(C) applies at LF. In the
following sections I will demonstrate that the prediction holds and that indeed we have the
argument. 15
14Gennaro Chierchia (personal conmmunication; attributing the idea to work in progress by
Yael Sharvit) points out that the correlation in (8) could follow from Semantic
Reconstruction if (certain) BT(C) effects are viewed as the results of a preference for
variable binding over coreference (as in Reinhart's Rule I, see Grodzinsky and Reinhart
(1993)). In particular, he suggests that if the semantic type of the trace yields a
"reconstructed" interpretation, variable binding is possible and thus coreference is ruled
out. Although this is conceivable, I think that many questions need to be answered before
we know whether this is a real alternative. For example, what is the status of a basic
semantic type such as <et,t> which allows for scope reconstruction with no variable
binding reconstruction (see 2"b)? While it is possible for Semantic Reconstruction to
predict that BT(C) will be affected by variable binding reconstruction, is there a non-
stripulative way to predict that it will be affected by simple Scope Reconstruction (via a
trace of type <et,t>)? Another questions relates specifically to A-bar movement; is there a
way for the proposed alternative to account for the fact that under normal circumstances QR
(as well as wh-mnovement) does not obviate BT(C) effects (chapter 6)?
15Romero (1996) presents additional arguments against the semantic account. In
particular, she spells out the modifications in the Binding Theory that the semantic
approach would require and displays their stipulative nature. Furthermore, she develops
additional unwelcome results related to the interpretation of sluicing.
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5.2. A-bar Reconstruction
In this section I will show that the prediction in (8) holds for A-bar movement. The section
has three parts. Section 3.2.1 will focus on how many questions and will contain an
elaboration on data from Heycock (1995). Section 5.2.2 will explore standard constituent
questions. The discussion will be based on data from Lebeaux (1990) which uses variable
binding as diagnostic of Scope Reconstruction. Section 5.2.3 will continue the discussion
of standard constituent questions. This time, indirect binding via adverbs of quantification
will serve as the diagnostic for Scope Reconstruction.
Before we begin, a point of caution is in order. It is well known that certain cases
of A-bar movement cannot bleed BT(C) (van Riemsdijk and Williams (1981), Freidin
(1986) and Lebeaux (1988)). This inability holds independently of Scope. Consider for
example Lebeaux's pair in (9).
(9) a. [Which argument that Johnl made] did hel believe t?
b. ??/*[Which argument that John, is a genius] did he 1 believe t?
(9b) is bad independently of Scope Reconstruction. The discussion in this section will
focus on cases such as (9a) in which A-bar movement does bleed BT(C). We will see that
in these cases bleeding is incompatible with Scope Reconstruction. In other words, we
will see that if an A-bar construction of the type in (7) is acceptable, it is disambiguated in
favor of the non-Scope-Reconstructed interpretation.
5.2.1. How Many questions - an elaboration on Heycock (1995): Consider
how many questions of the sort in (10). A plausible analysis of such questions assumes
that the Wh-phrase how many NP has two parts. One part consists of the Wh-word how
(which could be paraphrased as what n) and the other consists of the DP many NP (see
Frampton (1991), Cresti (1995), Rullman (1995)). Roughly speaking a how many
question asks for an integer n, such that n many people satisfy a certain property. This is
illustrated in (10') and schematized in (ll).
(10) [How many people]i did you meet tl today.
(10') How n: n many people Xt you met t today.
What is the number n, s.t. there are n many people that you met today
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(11) [How many NP]I 4(t1)
How n: n many NP Xt 0(t) 16
Consider now what happens when scope-sensitive elements intervene between the final
landing site of the moved constituent and its trace position. In such a case, the scope of the
quantificational DP, many NP, can be construed either above or below this element (see,
among others, Longobardi (1987), Cresti (1995)). This is demonstrated by the question in
(12).
(12) How many people did Mary decide to hire.
Two readings:
a. many > decide:
What is the number n, s.t.
there are n many people x, s.t.
Mary decided to hire x.
b. decide > many:
What is the number n, s.t.
Mary decided to hire n many people
The two readings of the question become visible once we consider situations in which they
would demand different answers.17 Consider the following scenario:
(S1) After a day of interviews, Mary finds 7 people who really impress her, and she
decides to hire them. None of the other people impress her. However she knows that she
needs more than 40 people for the job. After thinking about it for a while she decides to
hire 50 -- the 7 that she likes and 43 others to be decided by a lottery.
'
6 Obviously, stating the semantic type of t would beg the question we are investigating.
The claim that Scope Reconstruction is syntactic (for which I argue) amounts to the claim
that the trace left by DPs always ranges over individuals (of type e). (See section 5.4.)
17As Kai von Fintel (personal communication) has pointed out, the two readings become
even more visible once we insert the adverb already. This adverb tends (though doesn't
have to) mark the scope of the quantificational DP. Thus, How many people did Mary
already decide to hire prefers the interpretation in (12a) and would, thus, receive 7 as its
natural answer under (SI1). The reader who has problems with the scope judgments that
follow might try to make use of the adverb.
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It is clear that under (S 1) there are two appropriate answers for (12). One answer is seven,
which corresponds to the interpretation of (12a), and the other, which corresponds to the
meaning of (12b), is fifty.18
The ambiguity of (12) shows that the DP many NP can undergo Scope
Reconstruction in how many questions. 19 In this section I will present evidence from
Heycock (1995) and expand on it to demonstrate that such reconstruction obeys the
predictions in (8). The evidence will argue that Scope Reconstruction in how many
questions should be dealt with by syntactic mechanisms.
Consider the sentences in (13-15). 20 In none of these sentences is BT(C) an issue.
The sentences, however, differ minimally in a way that Heycock exploits to test the
prediction in (8).2 I The semantics of the embedded predicates in the (a) sentences forces,
18Noam Chomsky (personal communication) points out a possible caveat. Tense is not
represented in (12). However, if we take tense into account, it is conceivable that the two
interpretations would result from variability in the interpretation of Tense (with no recourse
to scope). More specifically, the two answers (given SI) could correspond to the two
moments in time in which Mary made her decisions.
However, I think there are good reasons to believe that there is a pragmatic
principle which forces the answer to correspond to the later moment in time. Take a
sentence parallel to (12) which is not scopally ambiguous such as Which people did Mary
decide to hire? The proposal about tense would incorrectly predict a similar ambiguity in
this sentence. I believe the prediction is incorrect because of the pragmatic principle.
Without any clear context, it makes no sense to give an answer that would correspond to
tentative decisions that Mary made along the way.
Note that not much bears on this pragmatic explanation. The arguments in this
section can be restated with the verb want, which is ambiguous in the present tense (e.g.
How many people does Mary want to hire). Furthermore, the French examples in note 18
make it pretty clear that the ambiguity in (12) has to do with scope. Thanks to Kai von
Fintel for a helpful discussion of this issue.
19As noted in Dobrovie-Sorin (1992) (and Heycock (1995)), French has overt forms
which disambiguate in favor of Scope Reconstruction. While the (a) sentences in (i) and
(ii) are equivalent to their English counterparts, the (b,c) sentences are unambiguous (with
narrow scope for many). Thus, given S 1, (ib,c) have fifty as their only answer. (Marie
Claude Boivin, personal communication.)
(i) a. Combien de personnes Marie a-t-elle d6cid6 d'engager?
b. ? Combien Marie a-t-elle d6cid6 d'engager de personnes?
c. Combien Marie a-t-elle d6cid6 d'en engager?
(ii) a. Combien de livres Marie a-t-elle d6cid6 d'acheter?
b. ? Combien Marie a-t-elle d6cid6 d'acheter de livres?
c. Combien Marie a-t-elle d6cid6 d'en acheter?
2 0David Pesetsky suggested the use of the pair in (13) for the exposition of Heycock's
results.
21 I am not completelysure whether what follows is entirely faithful to Heycock. The
reason for this uncertainty is that Heycock alternates between an account of the ambiguity
in (12) in terms of scope and an account in terms of a notion of referentiality (that will
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or at least highly prefers, Scope Reconstruction. The (b,c) sentences, by contrast, are
compatible with the non-reconstructed reading. 22 The sentences in (b,c) are ambiguous
along the lines of (12), whereas the (a) sentences are limited to the interpretation in which
the DP many NP has narrowest scope.
(13) a. [How many stories] is Diana likely to invent t? (likely > many;
*many > likely)
b. [How many stories] is Diana likely to re-invent t? (likely > many;
many > likely)
(14) a. [How many houses] does John think you should build t? (think > many;
*many > think)
b. [How many houses] does John think you should re-build t? (think > many;
many > think)
c. [How many houses] does John think you should demolish t?(think > many;
many > think)
(15) a. [How many papers that hel writes] (think > many;
does John; think t will be published? 23  *many > think)
b. [How many papers that he, wrote] (think > many;
does Johnl think t will be published? many > think)
To see the contrast between the (a) and the (b) sentences, let's focus on (13b).
Consider what an interpretation without Scope Reconstruction would be like. Such an
interpretation would presuppose that there are certain stories such that Diana is likely to
invent them. However, such a presupposition is virtually a contradiction; we think about
the objects of invention as being created at the time of invention and we, therefore, can't
talk about these objects at earlier moments, hence the weirdness of #John will invent this
story, #Which of these stories is John likely to invent?
extend to an explanation of why VPs must reconstruct). Under the referentiality account
that Heycock suggests, "non-referential" phrases (whatever exactly this means, see Cinque
(1991), Rizzi (1990), Frampton (1991)) must show connectedness effects (i.e. BT
Reconstruction). The reason we get connectedness effects in the (b) sentences is that the
DP is interpreted non-referentially. However, once we consider the structural
configurations in (22) below we will see that scope is not only the clearer notion, it is also
the empirically appropriate one.
22The sentences in (15b,c) are actually three-ways ambiguous. However, for the moment,
we can ignore the intermediate scope (think > many > should).
23The sentence should be understood with a future interpretation for the tense in the relative
clause. Wide scope for many would require John to have thoughts about specific papers.
However, at the time of thinking there are no papers to have thoughts about; the papers will
come to exist only in the future.
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As Heycock notes, this difference allows us to test the prediction in (8). Consider
the sentences in (16-18). Only in the (a) cases, in which Scope Reconstruction is forced,
do we get a BT(C) effect. (Only the (a) cases are unacceptable.) 24
(16) a. *[How many stories about Diana'sl brother] is shel likely to invent t?
b. [How many stories about Diana'sl brother] is shel likely to re-invent t?2 5
(17) a. *[How many houses in John'sl city] does her think you should build t?
b. [How many houses in John's, city] does hel think you should re-build t?
c. [How many houses in John'sl city] does hel think you should demolish t?
(18) a. *[How many papers that John, writes]
does he1 think t will be published?
b. [How many papers that Johnl wrote]
does hel think t will be published?
We can also demonstrate that the unacceptability of the (a) cases is related to BT(C) when
we compare these sentences with the sentences in (19). The latter sentences demonstrate
that aside from BT(C) there is nothing the matter with the coindexation in the (a) sentences.
(19) a. [How many stories about herl brother] is Dianal likely to invent t?
b. [How many houses in hisl city] does John1 think you should build t?
24In section 6.5 I will follow Lebeaux (1988) in assuming that A-bar movement can bleed
BT(C) only if an adjunct is inserted after movement. The discussion in 6.5 will, thus,
imply that the PPs in (16-17) are adjuncts. This implication, which might seem
problematic at first sight, is argued for in Heycock (1995). See Sctitze (1995) to appreciate
the hairiness of the complement adjunct distinction (at least within the nominal domain).
I would like to point out that a few speakers I've consulted find the (b) sentences in
(16) and (17) slightly degraded. These speakers find the (a) sentences still worse. It
seems plausible to suggest that these speakers prefer to analyze the PP as a complement.
Still, they can marginally analyze it as an adjunct, which would allow BT(C) obviation in
(b) but not in (a).
25 There is a potential problem with (16a). The problem is that this sentence might be bad
independently of Reconstruction. To see this consider the contrast in (i) and (ii). This
contrast might be accounted for by postulating a PRO in the subject of the NPs in the (b)
sentences along the lines of Chomsky (1986b). (See also Higgenbotham (1983) and
Williams (1985, 1987)). If the correct account is along these lines, (16a) would have a
BT(C) violation (in the moved position) irrespective of whether or not there is
Reconstruction. This confound is overcome in (17) and (19).
(i) a. Dianal objected to many stories about her l.
a. *Dianal invented many [PROi stories about herl].
(ii) a. Clifford l expected many lies about himl to be effective.
a. *Cliffordl is planning to come up with many [PROI lies about himl].
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c. [How many papers that he, writes] does John1 think t will be published?
A similar paradigm to Heycock's can be constructed when we consider sentences in
which the Definiteness Effect (DE) holds. Consider the contrast between the sentences in
(20). In (20a) the DE forces Scope Reconstruction. (See Heim (1987), Frampton (1991)).
Therefore, this question is restricted to the interpretation in which many people has narrow
scope relative to the verb think. (20b), by contrast, is ambiguous. 26
(20) a. How many people does Diana think there are t at the party? (think > many)
*(many > think)
b. How many people does Diana think t are at the party? (think > many)
(many > think)
Consider now the contrast in (21). (21a) is unacceptable because the obligatory Scope
Reconstruction yields a BT(C) violation. (21b) and (21c) are minimally different. In (21b)
Scope Reconstruction is not obligatory and in (21c) it doesn't yield a BT(C) effect. The
latter sentences are, thus, both acceptable.
(21) a. *How many people from Diana'sl neighborhood does shel think there are t at
the party?
b. How many people from Diana'sl neighborhood does she think t are at the
party?
c. How many people from her, neighborhood does Dianal think there are t at the
party?
(13-21) demonstrate that when Scope Reconstruction is forced there are
ramifications for BT(C). This provides strong support for the assumption in (8) that Scope
Reconstruction feeds BT(C). However, there are further predictions that (8) makes for
how many questions that we should be able to put to test. To see the range of these
predictions, let's look again at (8) and the structural configuration, (7), to which it applies:
(7) [QP ...r-expressionlj..]2.....pronounl .... t2
(8) Scope Reconstruction feeds BT(C): Scope Reconstruction should be
impossible in the structural configuration in (7).
26To see the difference between the sentences, it might be helpful to construct scenarios
parallel to the one in (S1).
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If (8) is right, there are two predictions for the configuration (7). On the one hand, QP is
obliged to take scope over all of the scope-bearing elements c-commanded by the pronoun.
On the other hand, such an obligation does not hold with respect to the scope-bearing
elements that c-command the pronoun. This is stated in (22).
(22) Predictions of (8): a. In (23), QP must take scope over the scope-bearing
element SB 1.
b. In (24), QP need not take scope over the scope-bearing
element SB 2.27
(23) [QP ...r-expression I...]2 .. .. . . . ..pronoun I..SB 1..t 2
(24) [Qp ...r-expression ...-12...SB 2 ...pronounl 
. . . . .
...... t2
(13-21) demonstrate that when independent factors force QP to take narrow scope
with respect to SB 1, the result is ill-formed. I will now try to show that the predictions of
(22) are attested also when these factors are not active.
Compare the pairs in (25) and (26).
(25) a. [How many slides of Jonathan'si trip to Kamchatka] did hei decide to show t at
the party? (many > decide) (*decide > many)
b. [How many slides of hisi trip to Kamchatka] did Jonathani decide to show t at
the party? (nanny > decide) (decide > many)
(26) a. How many people from Diana's neighborhood does she, think t are at the
party? (many > think) (*th1ink > many)
b. How many people from herl neighborhood does Dianal think t are at the
party? (manny > think) (think > many)
The (a) sentences in these pairs are instantiations of the structural configuration in
(23), with the modal verbs decide and think standing for SB 1. In these sentences nmany
NP must have wide scope over SB 1 as predicted by (22). This can be seen when we
compare the possible answers to (a) and to (b) under the crucial scenarios.
27The prediction in (b) depends on the additional assumption that there is a position for
reconstruction between SB 2 and pronounl. This assumption is probably uncontroversial
for the cases discussed in this section, since for all of these cases there is a CP node
intervening between the two positions. In the next sub-section, there will be evidence for
more reconstruction positions (see section 5.2.2.2.).
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The two readings of (25b) are paraphrased in (25'). The difference between them
is illustrated by the possible answers given the scenario (S2):
(25') Two readings:
a. many >decide:
What is the number n, s.t.
there are n many slides of the trip to Kamchatka x, s.t.
Jonathan decided to show x at the party (answer given S2: 52)
b. decide > many:
What is the number n, s.t.
Jonathan decided to show n many slides at the party (answer given S2: 100)
(S2) Jonathan wants to show slides from his trip to Kamchatka at a party. He tries to
figure out how many slides he can show within an hour. After consulting with his
roommate, Uli, he decides to show 100 slides (out of the 1000 he has). Now it's time to
choose the actual slides. After an hour of internal debate, he decides on 52 slides that he
really likes and prepares them for display. The remaining 48 slides will be chosen at
random at the time of the party.
(25a) by contrast can only have the interpretation of (25'a); the only possible answer to this
question given S2 is 52.
(26b) can have either the (think > many) interpretation, the interpretation of (2 1c),
in which Diana doesn't need to have thoughts about any particular person, or the (many >
think) interpretation, in which it is presupposed that there are certain people which Diana
thinks are at the party and the number of those is inquired. Only the latter interpretation is
available for (26a). (I invite the reader to construct the relevant scenarios.)
(25-26) show that QP in (23) cannot take scope under SB 1. Now I would like to
show that it can take scope under SB 2 in (24). Furthermore, I would like to show that
when SB 2 and SB 1 appear in the same construction (when we put (23) and (24) together),
QP can have scope under the former but must take scope over the latter. 28
Consider the contrast between the sentences in (27). (27a) is an instantiation of
(23) and (27b) is an instantiation of (24). (Decide is the instantiation of both SB 2 and
SB 1.) As (8) (/(22)) predicts, Scope Reconstruction is possible only in (27b). We have
28 The importance of this prediction is in demonstrating that the phenomena should be
accounted for by reference to scope and not to a notion such as referentiality as is perhaps
suggested by Heycock (see note 21). This is also the logic of Frampton's argument that
scope (and not referentiality) is the relevant notion for the account of certain weak island
phenomena (Frampton (1991)).
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already concluded that Scope Reconstruction is impossible in (27a (=25a)) with the
assistance of (S2). (S3) is a minimal variation on (S2) (with the changes in boldface),
which demonstrates the contrast between the two questions. Under (S3) there are two
possible answers to (27b), which correspond to the two possible scope relations.
(27) a. [How many slides of Jonathan'si trip to Kamchatka] did hei decide to show t at
the party? (many > decide) (*decide > many)
b. [How many slides of Jonathan'si trip to Kamchatka] did Susi decide that hei
would show t at the party? (many > decide) (decide > many)
(S3) Jonathan wants to show slides from his trip to Kamchatka at a party. Susi tries to
figure out how many slides he can show within an hour. After consulting with their
roommate, Uli, sL2 decides that Jonathan will show 100 slides (out of the 1000 he
has). Now it's rime to choose the actual slides. After an hour of internal debate, she
decides on 52 slic .s that she really likes and prepares them for Jonathan's display. The
remaining 48 slides will be chosen at random at the time of the party.
Consider now (S4) which starts with (S2) and then has a short continuation:
(S4) Jonathan wants to show slides from his trip to Kamchatka at a party. He tries to
figure out how many slides he can show within an hour. After consulting with his
roommate, Uli, he decides to show 100 slides (out of the 1000 he has). Now it's time to
choose the actual slides. After an hour of internal debate, he decides on 52 slides that he
really likes and prepares them for display. The remaining 48 slides will be chosen at
random at the time of the party.
After all of this Jonathan tells Susi about his two decisions, and wishes to show her
the 52 chosen slides. He shows her 30 of the slides, at which point Susi gets bored and
asks to go to sleep. Jonathan tells her that there are 22 more slides to see, and Susi says
that she will see them during the party.
The relevant facts:
1. Susi knows a. that Jonathan decided to show 100 slides at the party.
b. that there are 52 slides such that J. decides to show them.
2. There are 30 slides such that Susi knows that J. decided to show them.
With the use of (S4) we can see that (28) is three-ways ambiguous; under (S4), (28) has
three possible answers.
(28) How many slides did Susi know that Jonathan decided to show at the party?
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Answers:
a. 30 (many > know > decide)
b. 52 (know > many > decide)
C. 100 (know > decide > many)
Now consider the contrast in (29). (29b) is three-ways ambiguous, just as (28) is.
(29a), by contrast, is only two-ways ambiguous. In (29a), many can take scope either
above or below know (= SB 2 ). However, the scope of many relative to decide (= SB 1) is
fixed (many > decide); under (S4), the only possible answers to (29a) are 30 and 52. This
is exactly the prediction of (22).
(29) a. [How many slides of Jonathan'si trip to Kamchatka] did Susi know that hei
decided to show t at the party?
b. [How many slides of hisi trip to Kamchatka] did Susi know that Jonathani
decided to show t at the party?
We have thus seen that the predictions of syntactic reconstruction hold for how
many questions. Scope Reconstruction has consequences for BT(C) in exactly the manner
predicted by (8).29
5.2.2. Variable binding - an elaboration on Lebeaux (1990): Consider the
option for variable binding in the constituent questions in (30). As is well-known, this
option is available only if the trace of the wh-element is c-commanded by the binder of the
variable. This is illustrated by the unacceptability of the questions in (31).
(30) a. Which of hisl students did every professor1 talk to t?
b. Which student of his, did no professorl talk to t?
c. Which student of his, did you think every professor1 talked to t?
d. Which of hisi students did you think no professorl talked to t?
(31) a. *Which of his 1 students t talked to every professor, ?
b. *Which student of his, t talked to no professor1 ?
c. *Which student of hisi did you think t talked to every professorl?
d. *Which of his, students did you think t talked to no professor, ?
29 Although the questions in (29) seem extremely complex, speakers judgments converge.
The scenario in (S4) was read to 5 speakers and they all agreed that 100 is an appropriate r
answer only to (29b) whereas 30 and 52 are possible answers to both (29a) and (29b).
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5.2.2.1: The correlation with BT(C): Just as in the previous cases we've looked at,
there are two possible approaches. Under one approach, which is due to Engdahl (1980),
part of the wh-element is in the trace position, and this syntactic configuration allows for
variable binding (Syntactic Reconstruction). Under another approach, due to Engdahl
(1986), various semantic mechanisms are postulated to yield the semantic effects of
variable binding without actual reconstruction (Semantic Reconstruction).
These two approaches can be distinguished by the prediction (of the syntactic
approach) that Scope Reconstruction feeds BT(C). If the cases in (30) require
reconstruction in the syntax, there should be consequences for BT(C). If, however, there
are semantic mechaniisms that allow for the interpretations in (30) without actual
reconstruction, there should be no such consequences. Lebeaux's pair in (32)
demonstrates that the prediction of syntactic reconstruction is correct.
(32) a. [Which (of the) paper(s) that hei gave to Ms. Brownj] did every studenti hope t'
that shej will read t?
b. *[Which (of the) paper(s) that hei gave to Ms. Brownj] did shej hope t' that
every studenti will revise t?
In both sentences in (32) part of the wh-phrase must undergo Scope Reconstruction to a
position c-commanded by the Quantifier Phrase every student (the antecedent of the bound-
variable he). In (32b), every student is c-commanded by the pronoun she which is, in
turn, co-indexed with Ms. Brown. Therefore, in (32b) Scope Reconstruction yields a
BT(C) effect. In (32a), every student is not c-commanded by the pronoun, she, and
therefore there is a position for reconstruction (perhaps the position of t') which is within
the scope of the antecedent of he, but not low enough to yield a BT(C) effect. The contrast
is thus explained under the assumption that Scope Reconstruction feeds BT(C).
In fact, once we understand the logic of (32), we see that the conclusion regarding
the relation between Scope Reconstruction and BT(C) can be demonstrated with additional
examples, some of which come close to real minimal pairs. The logic is basically the logic
of (7) and (8), repeated below:
(7) [QP ...r-expression i...1]2.....pronoun l .... t2
(8) Scope Reconstruction feeds BT(C): Scope Reconstruction should be
impossible in the structural configuration in (7).
156
(32b) is bad because it is an instance of (7) which requires Scope Reconstruction to a
position below the pronoun. We know that Scope Reconstruction is necessary because
there is a quantifier below the pronoun that must have a variable dominated by QP within
its scope. In (32a), the quantifier is above the pronoun and hence Scope Reconstruction
need not bring about a BT(C) effect.
The predictions of (8) for the constructions that Lebeaux investigated can be
summarized by the schemes in (33), in which the underlined blanks represent potential
reconstruction positions. Instances of (33a) should be acceptable because they do not
require Scope Reconstruction of the wh-element to a position below pronounj; there could
be reconstruction to a position between the pronoun and QP in which the variable is bound
and nevertheless BT(C) is satisfied. 30 Instances of (33b) should be unacceptable because
Scope Reconstruction of the wh-element must be to a position below QPi which is, in
turn, below pronounj; any form of reconstruction that would allow thfe variable to be
bound will necessarily bring about a BT(C) effect.
(33) a. [Which .... pronouni .... r-expressionj] ..... QPi .......... .pronounj .... .
b. *[Which ...pronouni .... r-expressionj] ..... pronounj...j..QPi .........
The important difference between the schemes in (33) is that in (33b), and only in
(33b), does the kind of Scope Reconstruction that is needed bring about a BT(C) effect.
However, there is an additional difference between the structures. In (33b), a more radical
kind of Scope Reconstruction is needed. We should therefore add a control to the
paradigm. We need to compare (33b) with (34) which needs the same kind of Scope
Reconstruction but is irrelevant to BT(C).3 1
(34) [Which ...pronouni .... pronounj] ..... r-expressionj...*_. Q Pi 
. . . . . .
.....
3 0Note that the prediction holds only under the assumption that there is a reconistruction
position between QPi and pronounj. See section 5.2.2.2.
31 From the tests I conducted it seems that it is really important to put pronounj and QPi in
(33) as close as possible to each other, so as to minimize the differences between the
sentences with respect to the distance between the bound variable and its antecedent. It
seems that when the distance is very great, (33b) and (34) involve a terrible parsing load.
This parsing load makes the judgment very difficult and it is hard to detect the effects of
BT(C). Thus, although (i) seems better than (32b), it seems worse than (32a).
(i) ?? [Which (of the) paper(s)that hei gave to herj] did Ms. Brownj hope
t' that every studenti will revise t?
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Even with the control, the tests continue to confirm the predictions of syntactic
reconstruction. This is demonstrated in (35-37). The (a) and (b) examples are
instantiations of (33a) and (33b) respectively; the (c) examples are instantiations of the
control in (34). The results show that Scope Reconstruction, which is diagnosed by
variable binding, feeds BT(C).
(35) a. [Which of the books that hei asked Ms. Brownj for]
did every studenti .. get from herj * ?
b. *[Which of the books that hei asked Ms. Brownj for]
did shej __ give every studenti * ?
c. [Which of the books that hei asked herj for]
did Ms. Brownj * give every studenti ?
(36) a. [Which (of the) paper(s) that hei wrote for Ms. Brownj]
did every studenti - get herj * to grade?
b. *[Which (of the) paper(s) that hei wrote for Ms. Brownj]
did shej * get every studenti * to revise?
c. [Which (of the) paper(s) that hei wrote for herj]
did Ms. Brownj * get every studenti to revise?
(37) a. [Which (of the) paper(s) that hei gave Ms. Brownj]
did every studenti ask herj to read * carefully?
b. *[Which (of the) paper(s) that hei gave Ms. Brownj]
did shej * ask every studenti to revise * ?
c. [Which (of the) paper(s) that hei gave herj]
did Ms. Brownj * ask every studenti to revise_?
5.2.2.2. The multitude of intermediate landing sites: In the previous sub-
section, we have used the scheme in (33) (repeated below) to argue that Scope
Reconstruction feeds BT(C).
(33) a. [Which .... pronouni .... r-expressionj] ..... QPi .......... .pronounj...._*
b. *[Which ...pronouni .... r-expressionj] ..... pronounj...* .QPi .........
A crucial assumption of the investigation was that in (33a) there is an intermediate position
for Scope Reconstruction between QPi and pronounj. Now, I would like to point out that
one could conduct an investigation in the other direction. In particular (assuming that the
arguments in this chapter are compelling) one can attempt to take for granted the
assumption that Scope Reconstruction feeds BT(C), and use the scheme in (33) to test what
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type of intermediate Scopc Reconstruction positions are available. Such an investigation is
beyond the scope of this chapter. Nevertheless, I would like to point out one conclusion
that would necessarily follow. This conclusion, although irrelevant at this point in the
discussion, will play a crucial role in later sections. (See, in particular, 6.4. See also 2.1.)
Consider the acceptability of the (a) sentences in (36-37). Under the assumption
that Scope Reconstruction feeds BT(C), the grammatical status of these s :ntences forces
the conclusion that there is a reconstruction position between the subject and the object. To
illustrate this, I repeat the examples below with the crucial reconstruction position in
brackets: 32
(36a) [Which (of the) paper(s) that hei wrote for Ms. Brownj]
did every studenti [_ ] get herj * to grade?
(37a) [Which (of the) paper(s) that hei gave Ms. Brownj]
did every studenti [_ ] ask herj to read *_carefully?
If we believe that reconstruction should follow from the copy theory of movement
(Chomsky (1993)), we have a direct argument that there must be an intermediate landing
site for A-bar movement between the subject and the object. This is the landing site that I
assumed in chapter 2 for obligatory QR. Forthermore, I present additional arguments for
this landing site when I discuss interactions between BT(C) and Antecedent Contained
Deletion (6.4). For presentational purposes I will assume that the landing site is adjunction
to VP, along the lines of Chomsky (1986a). 3 3
5.2.3. Unselective Binding: 34 In the previous sub-section we have used variable
binding as diagnostic of Scope Reconstruction. We have seen that when part of a
3 20ne might suggest that there are fewer reconstruction positions, and that QR over higher
reconstruction positions (than the bracketed ones in the (a) sentences of (35-37)) allows for
variable binding. However, binding from QRed positions should be ruled by WCO.
Furthermore, without WCO it is hard to see how the (b) sentences could be ruled-out.
3 3Nissenbaum (1998) provides independent evidence for VP adjoined traces in A-bar
movement. From a rudimentary investigation of constructions that fall under the scheme in
(33) it seems to me that a stronger conclusion will follow. In particular, I believe one can
construct an argument for the existence of intermediate landing sites in every maximal
projection (See Fox (1998b).)
34 The idea of using unselective binding as diagnostic of Scope Reconstruction was
inspired by Chapter 3 of Chierchia (1995a) (although the construction I test and the
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constituent Wh-question needs to be reconstructed for variable binding there are
consequences for BT(C). In this sub-section we will see that the same holds for
unselective binding.
Consider the sentences in (38) and (39). In (38) we can get an interpretation in
which the indefinite is bound by the unselective binder. In (39), this interpretation is
unavailable. To see what is meant, let's focus on the (a) sentences. (38a) has an
interpretation under which the indefinite an artist is bound by the unselective binder,
usually. Under this interpretation the question can be paraphrased as something like which
are the types of friendsx s.t. you said that for most artistsy x-type friends of y aire
available? The question in (39a) does not have a comparable interpretation.
(38). a. [Which friends of an artistl ]
[did you say t are usually, available]?
b. [Which of the people that an artistl meets]
[did you say t neverl impress himl]?
(39) a. *[Which friends of an artist, ]
[t said that they are usually available]?
b. *[Which of the people that an artist, meets]
[t said that they neverl impress himl]?
The contrast follows straightforwardly from the assumption that an indefinite which is
bound by an adverb of quantification must be within its scope at LF. 35 In (38) the trace of
the Wh-phrase is within the scope of the adverb and the necessary configuration can be
achieved via Scope Reconstruction. In (39), the trace of the Wh-phrase is outside the
scope of the adverb and the necessary configuration for binding cannot be achieved.
The sentences in (38) and (39) contrast with respect to the availability of the
intended interpretation. We can make the judgment sharper by considering constructions in
which the intended interpretation is the only one available. Specifically, we will consider
constructions in which independent factors require that the indefinite be bound by the
adverb of quantification. In such constructions, the parallels of (38) will be ungrammatical
independently of interpretation.
conclusion I draw are very different). Thanks to Orin Percus for help in constructing the
experimental paradigms.
35 Many different theories have been proposed for the binding of indefinites by adverbs of
quantification (i.e. for the Quantificational Variability of indefinites). I think that all the
theories share the assumption that the indefinite must be within the scope of the adverb.
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Kratzer (1995a) observes that in individual-level predicates, an adverb of
quantification must co-occur with an indefinite. This observation is demonstrated by the
contrast in (40). (40a) is ungrammatical because there is no variable that is supplied to the
adverb of quantification (vacuous quantification). (40b) is licensed because the indefinite
supplies the variable.
(40) a. *John usually, knows French.
b. A Moroccanl usually I knows French
Consider now the contrast in the grammaticality of the questions in (41). In (41a,b)
the indefinite can get into the scope of the adverb via Scope Reconstruction. In (41c), this
is impossible since the trace of the Wh-element is outside the scope of the adverb. (4 Ic) is
ungrammatical because binding of the indefinite is on the one hand impossible and on the
other hand required (given the ban on vacuous quantification).
(41) a. [Which residents of a French town ] [t usuallyl know English]?
b. [Which residents of a French towni]
[did you say t usually, know English]?
c. *[Which residents of a French town ]
[t said that they usually know English]?
With this much at hand, we have an additional test for the prediction that Scope
Reconstruction feeds BT(C). In this test the binding of an indefinite by all adverb of
quantification will serve as diagnostic of Scope Reconstruction and the consequences for
BT(C) will be examined. The examination will be based on the assumption that, as far as
BT(C) is concerned, an indefinite acts like an r-expression even when it is bound by an
adverb of quantification. (See Lasnik (1976) and Chierchia (1995a).) This assumption is
based on contrasts such as those in (42).
(42) a. *Hel usually1 thinks that an artistl is creative.
b. An artistl usually1 thinks that he 1's creative.
c. Hisl parents usuallyl think that an artists is creative.
d. The parents of an artisti usuallyl think that he'sl creative.
Although the case of unselective binding seems a little more complicated than the
cases we have looked at before, the logic is identical. Just as before, we will look at
constructions such as those in (7) and test the prediction in (8). The r-expression in our
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test will be an indefinite, and the diagnostic for Scope Reconstruction will be the binding of
this indefinite by an adverb of quantification.
(7) [QP ...r-expressionli ...]2......pronoun l ....t2
(8) Scope Reconstruction feeds BT(C): Scope Reconstruction should be
impossible in the structural configuration in (7).
It seems that the prediction in (8) is correct. To see this, consider first the contrast
between the sentences in (43). In (43a), the principle that bans vacuous quantification
forces Scope Reconstruction. Scope Reconstruction, in turn, yields a BT(C) effect, and
the sentence is ruled-out. In (43b,c), by contrast, Scope Reconstruction does not yield a
violation of BT(C). In (43d), the individual level predicate is replaced by a stage level
predicate. For this reason, Scope Reconsdtruction is not forced and BT(C) is not affected.
(43) a. *[Which languages spoken in the country a linguistl comes from]
does hel usually know t?
b. [Which languages spoken in the country hel comes from]
does a linguistl usually, know t?
c. [Which languages spoken in the country a linguist, comes from]
do his, students usuallyi know t?
d. [Which languages spoken in the country a (certain) linguistl comes from]
does he usually enjoy speaking t?
Consider next the contrast in (44). In (44a) the position of the adverb of
quantification forces Scope Reconstruction to a position c-commanded by the pronoun. In
(44b), by contrast, there is a position, t', which satisfies the requirements of the adverb,
and yet does not yield a BT(C) effect. In (44c,d), Scope Reconstruction is forced to the
position of t, but the result does not violate BT(C). (This indicates that the problem with
(44a) is related to BT(C) and is not an independent problem with Scope Reconstruction.) 36
(44) a. *[Which languages spoken in the country a linguistl comes from]
did you say that hel usuallyl knows t ?
b. [Which languages spoken in the country a linguist1 comes from]
do you usuallyl say t' that he1 knows t?
36I am ignoring various questions regarding the necessary focus structure of the constituent
questions. My hope is that the answer to these question will not affect the results reported
here.
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c. [Which languages spoken in the country that hel comes from]
did you say that a linguist, usuallyl knows t ?
d. [Which languages spoken in the country a linguistl comes from]
did you say that his, students usuallyl know t ?
(43) and (44), thus, provide us with an additional argument that Scope Reconstruction
feeds BT(C).
5.3. A-Reconstruction
In the previous section, we have seen that A-bar Reconstruction feeds BT(C) and thus
obeys the predictions of the syntactic account. In this section, I argue that the same is true
of A-reconstruction.
Let's look at cases of A-reconstruction of the sort we introduced in section 5. 1.
Consider the ambiguous sentences in (45), and focus on (45a). Under one of its
interpretations, the sentence would be true only if there were a particular first-year student
who David believed was at the party (3 > seem). Under the other interpretation, there
doesn't need to be such a student. The sentence would be true if David is at the party and
happens to hear a conversation regarding the topics discussed in the intro-class, and if this
conversation prompts him to conclude that at least one first-year student had to be in the
room (seem > 3).
(45) a. [A first-year student] seems to David t to be at the party.
b. [Someone from NY] is very likely t to win the lottery.
As mentioned in section 5.1, this ambiguity should be accounted for by the availability of
Scope Reconstruction to the position of the trace. If Scope Reconstruction does not occur,
the resulting interpretation is (3> seem) interpretation. If Scope Reconstruction occurs the
resulting interpretation is (seem > 3).
Now we can test whether Scope Reconstruction feeds BT(C) in the case of A-
movement. It seems that it does. To see this consider the sentences in (46-47). It seems
that the (a) sentences are disambiguated in favor of the (3 > seem) interpretation. To see
this focus on (46a). This sentence would be true only if David had a thought about a
particular student of his. It would not be true in the situation I used for illustrating the
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(seem > 3) interpretation of (45a). This follows straightforwardly from the assumption
that Scope Reconstruction feeds BT(C).37
(46) a. [A student of David's I ] seems to him1 t to be at the party. (3> seem) *(seen, > 3)
b. [A student of his] seems to Davidl t to be at the party. (3> seem) (seem > 3)
(47) a. [Someone fiom David's, city] seems to him, t to be likely to win the lottery.
(3> seem) *(seem > 3)
b. [Someone from his1 city] seems to Davidl t to be likely to win the lottery.
(3> seem) (seem: > 3)
The contrast is more evident in (48) where tlhe semantics of the construction requires Scope
Reconstruction. (See the discussion of creation verbs in 5.2.1.)
(48) a. For these issues to be clarified,
[Many more/new papers about his, philosophy] seem to Quinel [t to be
needed].
a. #For these issues to be clarified,
[Many more/new papers about Quine'sl philosophy] seem to him 1 [t to be
needed].
5.4. Ramifications for the Interpretation of Chains
In the previous sections we have seen that Scope Reconstruction feeds BT(C). This fact,
which follows straightforwardly from syntactic accounts of Scope Reconstruction, cannot
37(46-47) were tested up to this point with 12 speakers. Eight of the speakers got the effect
and some of them thought that the judgments were strong. Four speakers got no effect.
Data similar to that which I'm presenting was reported independently in Romero (1996)
and Sportiche (1996). I assume that this lends support to the reality of the effect. I also
got more or less the same results using Lebeaux's observation that inverse scope in
constructions such as (i) and (ii) depends on Scope Reconstruction (see section 5.1 above).
I got the same kind of split. A little more than half the speakers get inverse scope only in(i).
(i) a. At least one of his I soldiers is expected by Napoleon 1 to die in every battle.
b. One of his I soldiers is expected by Napoleon l to die in every battle.
(ii) a. At least one of Napoleon's i soldiers is expected by himl to die in every battle.
b. One of Napoleon's l soldiers is expected by himl to die in every battle.
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be explained by the semantic account. We thus have an argument in favor of syntactic
accounts. This argument has certain consequences for semantics. In particular, it implies
that the procedures that were suggested for semantic reconstruction must be restricted.
To appreciate this implication, let's look again at the chain in (2), repeated as (49).
As mentioned in section 5.1.2, plausible principles for the interpretation of chains (Heim
and Kratzer (forthcoming)) yield the interpretations in (49").
(49) [Someone from NY] is very likely [t to win the lottery]
(49") a. [Someone from NY] Xx (is very likely [x to win the lottery])
b. [Someone from NY] XQ (is very likely [Q to win the lottery])
(49"b) yields the semantic effects of Scope Reconstruction without actual reconstruction.
If this semantic interpretation is possible, we incorrectly predict no correlation between
Scope and BT(C). We, therefore, need to rule out (49"b). We need a principle from
which it would follow that a trace in a theta position is interpreted as a variable which
ranges over individuals (type e). Space limitations do not allow me to discuss various
possibilities. (See Beck (1996) for a promising proposal.) Nevertheless, I think it is
important to stress the obvious consequence for semantics: If type-shifting operations are
allowed in the semantic component at all, they must be restricted; something must be added
in order to insure that the scope of moved constituents will be reflected in the syntax.3 8
5.5. Conclusion
In this chapter, I have argued for a correlation between BT(C) and Scope Reconstruction:
whenever overt movement bleeds BT(C), Scope Reconstruction is impossible. This
correlation argues that BT(C) is sensitive to the position in which overtly moved
constituents are interpreted. As such, it argues that BT(C) applies at LF. This, in turn,
suggests that BT(C) can be used to investigate various properties of LF representations. In
this chapter, I tried to investigate the nature of Scope Reconstruction. In the next chapter, I
will argue that we can also use BT(C) to investigate the nature of QR. The result of the
3 8At the moment I see two possibilities both of which seem pretty natural. The first
possibility is that traces like pronouns are always interpreted as variables that range over
individuals (type e). The second possibility is that the semantic type of a trace is determined
to be the lowest type compatible with the syntactic environment (as suggested in Beck
1996).
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investigation will motivate certain conclusions regarding the structure and interpretation of
A-bar chains. These conclusions will help us specify the nature of the mechanisms that are
involved in Scope Reconstruction.
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Chapter 6 - Economy and Operator Variable Formation
The correlation between Scope Reconstruction and BT(C), which I attempted to establish in
chapter 5, argues in favor of two conclusions. First, it argues that Scope Reconstruction
should be represented structurally (i.e., that there is syntactic reconstruction). Second, it
argues that Binding Theory should be sensitive to the LF position of quantificational
expressions, that is, it argues that Binding Theory applies at LF. However, it is widely
believed that covert QR does not affect BT(C) (Chomsky (1981)). This can be taken as an
argument that BT(C) applies at SS, as well as at LF (Lebeaux (1994)).
What I would like to claim now is that Binding Theory, or at least BT(C), applies
only at LF. My argument will have two steps familiar from Chomsky (1993). The first
step -- which was actually already taken by Chomsky and in which I will basically follow
his assumptions (though not the mode of the implementation) -- argues that, contrary to
initial appearance, there is a coherent story to be told in which Binding Theory applies only
at LF. The second step argues that the alternative, in which Binding Theory, and
specifically BT(C), applies also at other levels of representation, is empirically inferior.
This second step of the argument is based on Fox (1995b).'
The first step makes crucial use of the copy theory of movement and of an economy
condition which governs the way in which A-bar chains are converted to interpretable
objects. More specifically, it is claimed that covert movement cannot bleed BT(C) because
the relevant operator variable constructions contain a copy at the tail of the chain. The
second step argues that a natural formulation of the economy condition allows us to explain
an observation made in Fiengo and May (1994, henceforth F&M). The observation is that
when Antecedent Contained Deletion (ACD) is involved, QR does bleed BT(C). The basic
idea I will advocate is that whenever Parallelism requires an operator variable construction
which lacks a copy at the tail of the chain, QR has effects on BT(C).
The structure of this chapter is the following. In 6.1., I present the first step of the
argument (from Chomsky 1993). In 6.2., I discuss the way in which F&M's observation
can provide us with the second step of the argument. In 6.3., I argue against F&M's
account of the observation, which relies on the idea that Binding Theory applies at many
levels of representation. In 6.4., I characterize a generalization which is predicted from my
Chomsky (1993) also presents the second step of the argument. His argument, however,
is based on BT(A) and is unrelated to scope.
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account and argue that the generalization holds. In 6.5.-6.6., I return to Scope
Reconstruction. Specifically, I discuss the ramifications of the copy theory of movement
for the theory of the syntactic mechanisms that yield Scope Reconstruction for A and A-bar
chains. Finally, in 6.7., I discuss the effects of A-bar movement on BT(A), and attempt to
provide additional evidence in favor of Scope-Economy.
6.1. The First Step (Chomsky 1993)
Let's begin by reviewing the evidence that was taken to show that BT(C) applies at S S.
Consider the contrast between (1) and (2). Under certain assumptions about the nature of
covert QR (Chomsky (1977), May (1977; 1985)), the LF structures of the sentences in (1)
are those in (1'). These structures are identical with respect to BT(C) to the surface
structures in (2). If BT(C) applied only at LF, there would be no obvious way of
accounting for the contrast. If BT(C) applied also at SS, the contrast would follow
straightforwardly.2
(1) a. */?? you bought himi every picture that Johni liked.
b. * Hei bought you every picture that Johni liked.
(2) a. [[which picture that Johni liked] [did you buy himi t]]?
b. [[which picture that Johni liked] [did hei buy you t]]?
(1') a. [[every picture that Johni liked] [I bought himi i]]
b. [[every picture that Johni liked] [hei bought you t]]
6.1.1. Chomsky's proposal: Chomsky (1993), however, provides a way of
accounting for the contrast without the assumption that BT(C) applies at SS. In particular,
2 Given Scope-Economy, the structures in (1) involve very short QR. Therefore, it is not
obvious that they pose a problem for the assumption that BT(C) applies only at LF.
However, it turns out that the argument based on (1) carries over to structures for which
this objection does not hold:
(i) a. */?? A different girl bought himi every picture that John i liked.
b. * A different girl wanted him i to buy every picture that John i liked.
(ii) a. A different girl bought John i every picture that he i liked.
b. A different girl wanted John i to buy every picture that hei liked.
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he suggests that A-bar movement always leaves a copy and that this copy (under certain
circumstances) yields a BT(C) effect, even if BT(C) applies only to the output of
movement. In (1), the true output of QR is quite different from (1'). Specifically, it still
has a copy of the moved constituent at the position of the trace and it is the r-expression
within this copy that yields the violation of condition C. In (2) -- Chomsky claims
(following Lebeaux (1988)) -- A-bar movement applies prior to the insertion of the relative
clause that contains the r-expression. Therefore, in (2), the copy of the moved constituent
does not yield a BT(C) effect. The difference between overt and covert movement under
this proposal is not related to their respective ordering relative to Binding Theory but rather
to their respective ordering relative to lexical insertion." Covert movement is never
followed by lexical insertion, and therefore never appears to get around a BT(C) violation.
As it turns out, certain cases of overt movement are similar to the cases of covert
movement in that they are unable to get around a BT(C) violation. These cases are
demonstrated by Lebeaux's (1988) contrast that was mentioned in the previous chapter and
is repeated in (3). (See also van Riemsdijk and Williams (1981) and Freidin (1986).)
Chomsky accounts for this contrast on the basis of a distinction between the timing of
adjunct and complement insertion, which he also borrows from Lebeaux. According to
this distinction the insertion of complements, in contrast to adjuncts, must take place prior
to movement (in accordance with the extension/projection principle). From this it follows
that complements, such as the boldfaced phrases in (3b), in contrast to adjuncts, such as
the relative clauses in (3a), cannot bypass BT(C) via overt A-bar movement.4
(3) a. [Which argument that John made] did he believe t?
b. ??/*[Which argument that John is a genius] did he believe t?
3 "Note that the claim that overt and covert movement differ in their ordering relative to
lexical insertion is strongly motivated on independent grounds. There is strong
independent motivation for the claim that lexical insertion cannot follow covert operations
(at least not without severe constraints). If this claim were false, it is hard to imagine how
we would account for any correspondence between meaning and sound.
4 The reader might wonder whether the possibility of inserting adjuncts at various points in
the derivation is consistent with the observation in section 5.2. that A-bar Scope
Reconstruction feeds BT(C). In 6.5, I will show that it is consistent. The basic idea is that
Scope Reconstruction is the result of interpreting a large part of the copy at the base
position. I will show that such an interpretation is available only if the adjunct is inserted at
the base position; the option of late insertion necessarily yields the non-reconstructed
interpretation.
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It turns out that overt A-bar movement of certain phrases (phrases that contain
complements and no adjuncts) is identical to covert movement with respect to Condition C.
This weakens the argument from (1-2) that Condition C makes an overt/covert distinction.
Nevertheless, this provides us only with the first stage of the argument that BT(C) applies
only at LF. It is still possible to account for all the data under the assumption that BT(C)
applies both at SS and at LF (See Lebeaux (1988, 1994)). I would now like to present the
argument from Fox (1995b) that BT(C) must apply only at LF. The argument is based on
an observation of Fiengo and May (1994) that certain cases of covert movement do in fact
obviate BT(C). This observation cannot be accounted for under the assumption that BT(C)
applies at Surface Structure.
6.1.2. The interpretation of A-bar chains (a slight modification): The
discussion thus far hasn't spelled out the nature of the structures that get interpreted. As
noted by Chomsky (1993), interpreting an operator variable construction probably requires
some alterations of the copies created by movement. In particular, Chomsky suggests that
the output of movement in structures such as (4), which is fully represented in (4'),
undergoes a later process which forms one of the structures in (4").
(4) Which book did Mary read t?
(4') Which book did Mary read which book?
(4") a. Which bookx did Mary read x?
b. Which x did Mary read book x?S
Further he assumes that the structure in (4"b) is preferred to the structure in (4"a), thus
accounting for the BT(C) violation in (3b). I will basically follow this assumption, but will
make a small modification in the implementation. This modification will make the
interpretation of the QRed structures more straightforward and will perhaps allow the
5 It is conceivable that these structures should be interpreted via quantification over choice
functions (Reinhart (1995), Kratzer (1995b), Winter (1995) and Engdahl (1980: 131-
141)). However, as pointed out to me by Irene Heim, Uli Sauerland and Yoad Winter, it is
not clear how such an analysis would extend to proportional quantifiers (e.g. most, alnoslt
every, etc.) This is one of the motivations for the modification that follows. See,
however, Sauerland (forthcoming).
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assumption to follow from general principles of Economy. Under the modification, the
two structures are those in (4"').
(4"') a. Which bookx did Mary read x?
b. Which bookx did Mary read book x?
(4'"a) is interpreted standardly. For (4"'b) something novel needs to be proposed. There
are various possibilities that come to mind. For concreteness, I will make a suggestion
inspired by work by Rullmann and Beck (1997), Sauerland (forthcoming) and Wold
(forthcoming). According to this suggestion book x is interpreted as a definite description
the book identical to x yielding an interpretation paraphrasable as which is the book, x,
such that Mary read the book identical to x.6 The specifics of this proposal are not crucial
for the purposes of this chapter. What is crucial is that there is a not implausible semantic
method for interpreting (4'"b). Assuming this method is secure, we can state Chomsky's
economy condition in the following manner:
(5) OV-Economy: Given an A-bar chain, a, choose the operator variable
construction that is closest to a given the set of interpretable options.7
An operator variable construction O, is closer to a chain a than 02 if the set of
positions at the tail of a that are maintained in 02 is a proper sub-set of the parallel
set in O,.
For the A-bar chain in (4'), there are two interpretable operator variable constructions (the
one in (4"'a) and the one in (4'"b)). Assuming that both are interpretable, OV-Economy
prefer (4"'b) to (4"'a). H
(4"') a. *Which bookx did Mary read x? (ruled out by OV-Economy)
b. Which bookx did Mary read book x?
6 Rullmann and Beck consider this possibility as a method for interpreting 4wh-in situ.
Sauerland, suggests a somewhat different semantic approach which relies on the notion ol1
a minimal choice function.
7 It is an open question whether OV-Economy is sensitive to semantic interpretation (in a
way similar to Scope-Economy and VB-Economy). If it is, we could replace 'the set of
interpretable options' with 'the set of options that yield a given interpretation M' (with the
relevant qualifications discussed in 2.5).
8 For similar, though not identical, ideas see Cresti (1996).
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For QR, similar issues arise. A sentence such as (6) has (6') as the output of QR,
which can in turn be converted to one of the structures in (6").9 OV-Economy determines
that the interpreted structure is (6"b).10
(6) Johni [vp tl likes every boy].
(6') John1 [every boy [vp tl likes every boy]].
(6") a. *Johnl [every boyx [vp tl likes x]] (ruled out by OV-Economty)
b. John I [every boyx [vpt Ilikes boy x]]
The explanation of the inability of QR to by-pass BT(C) is the same as the explanation of
the inability in the case of overt Wh-movement. The explanation is based on an economy
principle that prefers structures in which the restrictor of the quantifier is not eliminated
from the base position.
6.2. The Second Step (Fox 1995b)
With this much in hand, we are in a position to present the argument that BT(C) must apply
only at LF. The logic of the argument is based on the nature of economy principles. These
principles choose an object from a set of competitors (a reference set). If under certain
circumstances, the reference set is restricted so as not to include the most optimal object, it
is predicted that an otherwise unacceptable object will be licensed. In our case, we predict
that (6"a) will be licensed uinder circumstances in which (6"b) is not a member of the
reference set. Under such circumstances, QR should obviate BT(C) effects. The question
is whether such circumstances exist.
In Fox (1995b) I suggest that they do. In particular, I suggest that in cases
involving Antecedent Contained Deletion (ACD), the parallel of (6"b) is not licensed and
the parallel of (6"a) is the only element in the reference set and hence is acceptable. As is
9 I assume, based on the discussion in chapter 2, that in sentences such as (6') QR is
limited to the VP level.
0o Note that OV-Economy is very similar to the economy condition which prefers the least
amount of pied-piping needed for interpretation (Minimize PP, Chomsky 1995). On the
basis of this similarity, I suggested in Fox (1995b) a restatement of the ideas reported here
in terms of Minimize PP. The reason I avoid this formulation here is because I feel more
comfortable with operator variable constructions in which the whole restrictor is at the head
of the chain. However, see Wold (forthcoming) where a semantic procedure is proposed
for interpreting the output of QR under the assumption that only the determiner is raised.
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well-known, QR is needed in ACD constructions in order for VP deletion to be licensed
(Sag (1977), May (1985), Kennedy (1997), among others.) However, the problem of
ACD is solved only if the restrictor is eliminated from the base position. For illustration,
take (7) and suppose a theory of VP ellipsis which involves PF deletion (in our case of the
<bracketed> material) licensed by LF Parallelism. If (7"a) were the interpreted structure,
all would be well; the antecedent VP (in the squared brackets) would be exactly identical
(up to alphabetical variance) to the elided VP. If, however, (7"b) were the chosen
structure, Parallelism would not be obeyed; the antecedent VP would still contain within it a
copy of the elided VP." For this reason, it is plausible to assume that (7"a) is the only
element in the reference set, and is therefore licensed.' 2
(7) John1 [vP ti likes every boy Mary2 does <t2 likes t>].
(7') John I [every boy Mary does <likes t> [vp t, likes every boy Mary, does <t, likes t>]].
(7") a. John1 [every boy Mary2 does <t2 likes x>]x
[vp tl likes x]]
b. *John, [every boy Mary2 does <t2 likes x>]x
[vP tl likes x boy Mary2 does <t2 likes x>]]
(doesn't I obe) Parallelism)
Given these considerations, we predict that QR in ACD constructions will obviate
BT(C). In fact, this seems to be the case, as noted by Fiengo and May (1994) (henceforth
F&M). Consider the contrast between (8) and (9). The sentences in (8) end up with the;
logical forms in (8'), which violate BT(C). The sentences in (9), however, involve ACD,
and thus end up with the logical forms in (9') where there is no BT(C) violation.
(8) a. ??/* You sent himi the letter that Johni expected you would write.
" I believe that there is good evidence for a theory of ellipsis involving PF deletion. (See
Lasnik (1972), Tancredi (1992), Chomsky and Lasnik (1992) and Wold (1996). See also
section 1.1.1, 2.2.2 and chapter 3.) However, the ideas developed here do not depend on
such a theory. They could just as easily be stated in a theory involving LF copying such as
that suggested in Williams (1977). Under such a theory, (7"b) would be eliminated from
the reference set because it would not allow LF copying without an infinite regress problem
(May (1985)).
12 A plausible conclusion from the discussion of Scope-Economy is that Parallelism is not
accessible to Economy considerations, i.e. it does not motivate QR (See chapter 3). If we
combine this conclusion with the proposal I make for ACD, the natural conclusion would
be that Parallelism is not accessible to the Economy conditions which determine whether or
not QR is to apply. However, it is accessible to the considerations which determine how
the output of QR is to be converted to an operator variable construction. This might
suggest something interesting about the fine structure of the rule system.
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b. ??/* You introduced himi to everyone that John'si mother met.
c. ??/* You reported himi to every cop that Johni was afraid of
(9) a. You sent himi the letter that Johni expected you would.
b. You introduced himi to everyone that John'si mother did.
c. You reported himi to every cop that Johni was afraid you would.
(8') a. You [the letter that Johni expected you would write]x
[sent himi x letter that Johni expected you would write].
b. You [everyone that John'si mother met]x
[introduced himi to x one that John'si mother met].
a. You [every cop that Johni was afraid of]x
[reported himi to x cop that Johni was afraid of]
(9') a. You [the letter that Johni expected you would <send him x>]x
[sent himi x].
b. You [everyone that John'si mother did <introduce him to X>]x
[introduced himi to x].
c. You [everyone that Johni was afraid you would <report him to x>]x
[reported himi to x].
OV-Economy makes additional predictions. However, before I introduce these
predictions, I would like to go over F&M's account of the contrast between (8) and (9).
6.3. F&M's Account
The fact that QR can obviate BT(C) seems to me to suggest that this condition applies only
at LF. However, F&M (who, as mentioned, discovered the fact) draw a different
conclusion. Specifically, they suggest that in the cases in which BT(C) is obviated by QR
(cases such as (9)), the condition applies only at LF. However, in the cases in which
BT(C) is not obviated by QR (cases such as (8)), they maintain the claim that the condition
applies also at SS. More specifically, they postulate an algorithm which determines at what
levels of representation BT(C) applies. The algorithm is sensitive to whether or not there is
ACD, and thus captures the contrast between (8) and (9). Since I want to take the ACD
facts as evidence in favor of the conclusion that BT(C) applies only at LF, I need to address
the alternative.
F&M suggest that BT(C) applies at every level of representation in which it can
apply. In other words, they assume that a structure is ruled out if it violates BT(C) at any
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level of representation (at which BT(C) can apply). Further, they suggest that BT(C)
applies to indices, and that it can apply to an index, i, only when all occurrences of i are
"projected" in the structure. In addition, they assume a theory of ellipsis from which it
follows that elided material is "projected" only when Parallelism is met. For the sake of
this discussion, we can say that they assume an LF copying theory of ellipsis. That is to
say, they assume that interpretable material which is not present at PF is also not present at
syntactic levels which are the input to PF. Such material is not deleted at PF, but rather
added (copied/reconstructed/projected) in the covert component." With these assumptions,
they propose to explain the contrast between (8) and (9).
BT(C) fails to apply to a certain index under one condition: when an occurrence of
index is absent from the structure. Therefore, QR could affect the way BT(C) applies to a
given index, only if there is an occurrence of the index such that QR is a prerequisite for its
presence in the structure. Only in such a case will BT have to wait for QR in order to
apply. Given F&M's assumption about ellipsis (the assumption that the "elided" VP enters
the structure only in the covert component), QR is a prerequisite for an index to enter a
structure when the index is contained in an "elided" VP and when QR is necessary for the
LF copying of this VP (i.e., when there is ACD). This accounts for the contrast between
(8) and (9). To see this, compare (8c) and (9c):
(8c) ??/* You reported himi to every cop that Johni was afraid of
(9c) You reported himi to every cop that Johni was afraid you would.
(8c) doesn't involve ACD, and should be ruled-out by BT(C). This result is
predicted by F&M in the following way. Because (8c) doesn't involve ellipsis, all of the
LF material is already present at SS. Consequently, BT(C) can, and therefore must, apply
at SS. At SS, (8c) is ruled out, and QR cannot reverse the verdict. The obviation of
BT(C) when ACD is involved is predicted by F&M based on the idea that the missing
structure, the elided VP, contains an occurrence of the index, i. Therefore, BT(C) can
apply only after LF-copying. LF copying, in turn, can take place only after QR. By
transitivity, QR must apply before BT(C) and, consequently, can obviate this condition.
" It is important to point out that this assumption is crucial only for F&M's treatment of
ACD. It i; not important for their other claims about ellipsis.
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F&M's account relies heavily on the notion of "an index occurrence". As such, we
would like to have evidence that this notion is relevant. The evidence that F&M provide is
based on the contrast in (10-11).
(10) a. You bought himi [every picture that Johni wanted you to <buy himi>].
b. *Hei bought you [every picture that Johni wanted to <buy you>].
(11) a. You talked to himi about [every topic that John'si teacher did <talked to himi
about>].
b. *Hei talked to you about [every topic that John'si colleague did <talked to you
about>].
F&M assume that QR can always target IP. Under this assumption, the contrast between
the (a) and (b) sentences is somewhat puzzling. F&M notice, however, that it follows
from the notion of "index occurrence" together with the assumption that BT(C) applies to
an index only once all of the occurrences of the index have been reconstructed from the
antecedent VP. In the (b) sentences, in contrast to the (a) sentences, the elided VP does not
contain an occurrence of the index, i. Therefore, BT(C) can, hence must, apply before the
missing structure is filled. BT(C) applies at SS, and the (b) sentences are ruled out before
QR has its say.
However, consider the sentences in (12). In these sentences there is an occurrence
of the index, i, within the elided VP Therefore, F&M incorrectly predict that BT(C) would
be obviated by QR.
(12) a. *He, bought his, brother [ ,everything John, wanted to <buy his, brother t>].
b. *Her introduced his, brother to [op everyone John, wanted to <introduce his,
brother to t>].
The unacceptability of the sentences in (12) eliminates F&M's argument for the
notion of an index occurrence.14
'4 An LI reviewer has pointed out that, although (12) eliminates F&M's argument for index
occurrences, it does not rule out their proposal entirely. Given the arguments in favor of
Scope-Economy (c.f., chapter 2), it is implausible to conclude that QR targets IP in (10-
12). In these cases, optional QR over the subject does not reverse the relative scope of two
non-commutative quantifiers. For this reason, optional QR is not licensed and the
sentences are confined to the representations that would result from obligatory QR to the
VP level. In other words, even if in (O10b), (1 lb) and (12), BT applies after QR, the
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A more direct argument against F&M's proposal involves constructions with
phonological reduction. These constructions behave just like ellipsis constructions with
respect to BT(C):
(13) a. You bought himi [every picture that Johni wanted you to <buy himi>].
b. You bought himi [every picture that Johni wanted you to buy himi].
(14) a. You talked to himi about [every topic that John'si teacher did <talked to himi
about>].
b. You talked to himi about [every topic that John'si teacher talked to himi about].
This result is unexpected under F&M's proposal.'5 (All occurrences of the index i are
present at SS in the case of down-stressing.) However, it follows straightforwardly under
sentences should be ruled out since QR does not remove the r-expression from the c-
command domain of the coindexed pronoun.
The case in (i) would be more problematic for F&M. In order to account for
unacceptability of these sentences, F&M would have to claim that QR cannot target the
matrix sentence. However, it can, as indicated by the option for matrix scope in (ii).
(i) a. *At least one boy expected him, to buy his, brother every book that John's,
mother did <buy his, brother>.
b. *I wanted him, to buy his, brother a book that John's, mother did
<buy his, brother>.
(ii) a. At least one boy expected John, to buy his, brother every book that his,
mother did <buy his1 brother>. (3 > V) (V > 3)
b. I wanted John, to buy his, brother a book that his, mother did
<buy his, brother>. (3 > want] (want > 31
My analysis of (i) will become clear in the next section.
" Another direct argument against F&M's proposal is based on an observation made
independently in Merchant (1998) and Sauerland (forthcoming) that BT(C) is possible only
if the r-expression is contained in the relative clause that dominates the (antecedent
contained) ellipsis site:
(i) *I told him, [every story about John's, brother [that Mary did]].
(ii) I told him, [every story about Mary [that John's, brother did]].
Both authors have pointed out that the contrast would follow from OV-Economy if we
assume a head internal analysis for the relative clause. Assuming a head internal analysis,
Parallelism would be satisfied in an LF representation in which the material external to the
relative clause is not deleted from the copy of the QRed constituent (since this material has a
copy internal to the relative clause). OV-Economy, thus, determines the following LFs for
(i) and (ii) (ignoring, for simplicity, the requirements of Scope-Economy):
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the suggestion I made in the previous section, since (as discussed in chapter 3)
constructions involving phonological deletion and reduction are subject to the same
Parallelism constraints.'
6.4. A Predicted Generalization
Now, I would like to return to the proposal that I made in 6.2. According to this proposal,
A-bar chains are converted to operator variable constructions in a manner determined by
OV-Economy. Regular A-bar chains will always keep a copy of the moved constituent at
the tail of the chain, and thus will never affect BT(C). However, chains that take an elided
constituent outside of its antecedent (i.e., chains that are necessary for ACD resolution) are
interpretable only if there is no copy at the tail of the chain. The copy is, therefore,
removed, and BT(C) is obviated.
Let us consider now successive cyclic A-bar movement. Such movement creates
multiple chains each of which needs to be converted to an operator variable construction.
Suppose that one step of successive movement is necessary for ACD resolution, and
another isn't:
(15) [Qp..r-exp.].......[Qp..r-exp.].[AntecdeC ntVP.. QP..r-exp.]]
I I I I
(i') *levery story about John's, fatherl. [that Mary told him, Ix story about John's, brotherll
[I told him, [x story about John's, brotherll.
(ii') *[every story about Mary], [that John's, brother told him, [x story about Mary]]
[I told him, [x story about Mary]l.
16 Kennedy (1997) discusses the fact that there is no detectable contrast between the
examples in (ii).
(ii) a. Polly introduced him i to everyone Erik wanted her to.
b. Polly introduced himi to everyone Erik i wanted to meet.
In Fox (1995b: 116-1i18), I provide an account of this fact based on the theory of
Parallelism for phonological reduction. The basic idea is that (iib), in contrast to the
sentence in (8), involves a case of what I call Antecedent Contained Deaccenting. The
embedded VP is optionaly non-F-dominated (and this is licensed given accommodation,
see chapter 3). When it is non-F-dominated, Parallelism forces the otherwise uneconomical
deletion at the tail of the chain. See Wald (forthcoming) for a formal presentation of this
proposal.
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In such a case the higher chain will contain a copy at its tail, and the lower chain will not.
The final structure will be the following:
(16) [Qp..r-exp.]Xx.......[,,.x ..r-exp]X y.[,AntcedenlVP..y.]
The prediction for BT(C) is obvious. The first step of QR should affect BT(C) and the
second step of QR should not. More generally we predict the following:
(17) The BT(C) and ACD correlation: In an ACD construction, QR can bleed
BT(C) iff the relevant step of QR (the one which might bleed BT(C)) is necessary
for ACD resolution.
6.4.1. ACD construction which depend on more than one instance of QR: In
order to see whether the predicted correlation holds, we have to look at ACD constructions
which are resolved by successive steps of QR. Consider a construction such as (18).
This construction is ambiguous with respect to the size of the VP that is elided (with the
two options specified in (a) and (b)).
(18) 1 expected Johni to buy everything that hei thought I did.
a. <bought>
b. <expected him to buy>.
In addition there is a potential ambiguity with respect to the relative scope of the universal
quantifier and the intentional verb expect. Putting aside Parallelism, the sentence in (18) is
potentially four-ways ambiguous; the universal quantifier may take scope either below or
above the intentional verb expect and VP ellipsis may target either the embedded or the
matrix VP. Under the copy theory of movement and the assumption that A-bar movement
has an intermediate VP adjunction step (see section 5.2.2.2 as well as chapter 2.) we have
the four potential LFs in (18').
(18') a. I expected Johni to
[Qp everything that hei thought I did <buy t>]
buy [QP everything that hei thought I did <buy t>].
(embedded scope; embedded ellipsis)
b. I expected Johni to
[Qp everything that hei thought I did<expected himi to buy t>]
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buy [QP everything that hei thought I did <expected himi to buy t>].
(embedded scope; matrix ellipsis)
C. I
[Qp everything that hei thought I did <buy t>]
expected Johni to
[Qp everything that hei thought I did <buy t>]
buy [QP everything that hei thought I did <buy t>].
(matrix scope; embedded ellipsis)
d. I
[Qp everything that hei thought I did <expected himi to buy t>]
expected Johni to
[Qp everything that hei thought I did <expected himi to buy t>]
buy [QP everything that hei thought I did <expected himi to buy t>].
(matrix scope; matrix ellipsis)
However, as pointed out in Larson and May (1990) and Sag (1976:73), (18'b) has no way
of achieving Parallelism. We are, thus, left with (a), (c) and (d). Each of these must be
converted into an operator variable construction under OV-Economy. This Economy
principle chooses the most optimal operator variable construction that obeys Parallelism. In
other words, each chain contains a copy at the tail of the chain unless the chains resolves
antecedent containment. We thus end up with the three structures in (18").
(18") a. Iexpected Johni to
[Qp everything that hei thought I did <buy t>]
buy t.
(embedded scope; embedded ellipsis)
C. I
[Qp everything that hei thought I did <buy t>]x
expected Johni to
[Qp x thing that hei thought I did <buy t>]
buy t.
(matrix scope; embedded ellipsis)
d. I
[Qp everything that hei thought I did <expected himi to buy t>]
expected Johni to buy t.
(matrix scope; matrix ellipsis)
In (a) there is a single instance of QR, hence a single chain; in (d) and (c) there axe two
chains. In all three constructions Parallelism forces a simple trace at the theta position. (d)
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and (c) differ in that Parallelism requires the elimination of the intermediate copy in (d) but
not in (c).
The predictions for BT(C) are obvious. In (d), both instances of QR are necessary
for ACD resolution, and hence both should bleed BT(C). In (a) and (c) only one instance
of QR resolves ACD and hence only one instance of QR should bleed BT(C).
6.4.2. Testing the predictions: Consider now the sentence in (19). This sentence
is different from (18) in that it allows only matrix VP ellipsis. This is exactly what is
predicted; the structures which involve embedded VP deletion (19'a and 19'c) violate
BT(C), while the structure in (19'd) does not.
(19) I expected himi to buy everything that Johni thought I did.
a. *<bought t>
b. <expected himi to buy t>
(19') a. *I expectedhimi to
[Qp everything that Johni thought I did <buy t>]
buy t.
(embedded scope; embedded ellipsis)
c. *I
[Qp everything that Johni thought I did <buy t>]x
expected himi to
[Qp x thing that Johni thought I did <buy t>]
buy t.
(matrix scope; embedded ellipsis)
d. I
[Qp everything that Johni thought I did <expected himi to buy t>]
expected himi to buy t.
(matrix scope; matrix ellipsis)
The proposal predicts that QR would bleed BT(C) only if QR is long enough to get out of
the c-command domain of the "dangerous" pronoun, and only if QR is needed for ACD
resolution and thus requires elimination of the offending material at the tail of the chain.
That this prediction is correct can be demonstrated with additional examples.
Consider the contrast between the sentences in (20). (20a) is ambiguous. (20b) requires
matrix VP deletion. Once again, this is predicted; only matrix VP deletion forces the less
economical structure which avoids a BT(C) violation.
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(20) a. In the end, I demanded that Johni read exactly those books that hei suspected I
would. a. <read t> b. <demand that he read t>
b. In the end, I demanded that hei read exactly those books that Johni suspected I
would. a. *<read t> b. <demand that he read t>
Consider now the contrast between (21) and (22). In (21), embedded VP deletion is
preferred to matrix VP deletion (for some speakers, the latter is impossible). In (22),
where embedded VP deletion would bring about a BT(C) effect, the judgments are
reversed. '7
(21) I sa d that Billi bought everything he i thought I did.
a. <bought t>
b. ? <said that he bought t>
(22) I said that he i bought everything Bill i thought I did.
a. *<bought t>
b. ? <said that he bouFht t>
In sections 5.2-5.3, we have seen that Scope Reconstruction feeds BT(C). This
forces the conclusion that Binding Theory applies (also) at LF. In this section we have
seen that (a) it is possible to maintain that BT(C) applies only at LF albeit what appear to be
evidence to the contrary (Chomsky (1993)) and (b) this stance is virtually necessary on
empirical grounds (Fox (1995b)).
6.5. Scope Reconstruction in A-bar Chains
In the previous section, we have seen that under normal circumstances A-bar movement
fails to affect BT(C) irrespective of whether or not the moved constituent is reconstructed.
This means that under normal circumstances, we do not expect A-bar movement to show
an interesting correlation between Scope Reconstruction and BT(C). This might raise a
question regarding the status of the correlation we have seen in section 5.2. The answer to
'7 The (a) readings require focal stress on the pronolun I. This should follow fronm
independent principles (See Rooth (1992) and Tancredi (1992). See also chapter 3.). As
David Pesetsky (personal communication) points out, it might be nmore accurate to state our
correlation as a correlation between focal stress and BT(C), which is explained by the
proposal I make together with an independently motivated correlation between the size of
ellipsis and the site of focal stress.
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this question is simple. Normal cases of A-bar movement do not affect BT(C) irrespective
of reconstruction. What we've seen in section 5.2 is that when there is reconstruction the
"abnormal" cases of A-bar movement behave like the normal cases. In other words, we
have seen that the method which allows A-bar movement to affect BT(C) does not allow
for reconstruction. Let's see how this result follows from the view of syntactic
reconstruction that the copy theory of movement provides.
Under the copy theory of movement, A-bar movement can affect BT(C) only if the
r-expression is within an adjunct and (modulo ACD) only if the adjunct is inserted after
movement. This is illustrated schematically in (23-24).
(23) *[Qp .[complement..r-expression 1.]..]2
...... pronounI....I[Qp .[complement..r-expressionl.1..]2
(24) a. *[Qp .[adjunct..r-expressionI .]..]2 (adjunct inserted belfore mnovemenelt)
......pronoun i....[Qp .[adjunct..r-expressionl.]..]2
b. [Qp .[adjunct..r-expressionl.]..]2 (adjunct inserted after movement)
...... pronounl.....[Qp ...]2
Reconstruction, on the other hand, is achieved via the deletion of the head of the chain and
the interpret.tion of the tail alone, as in (25)
(25) QP 2 ......pronoun l ....QP 2 ---reconstruction---->
....... pronoun .... QP 2
If an adjunct is inserted after movement, reconstruction is blocked since it will not allow tne
adjunct to get an interpretation.' " It thus follows that A-bar movement cannot affect BT(C)
when the moved constituent is reconstructed.
This explanation is based on the idea that the moved constituent is fully
reconstructed. However, the cases of Wh-movement we've looked at in section 5.2
involve forms of partial reconstruction; in these cases the Wh-operator is interpreted in the
surface position and only a part of it is reconstructed to the base position. What I would
like to do, therefore, is show that all the cases we've looked at nevertheless involve
18 There are many ways to capture the idea that unrecoverable deletion of the adjunct is
blocked. One possibility, among many others, is that an element can be deleted only under
identity with a copy. Late insertion of an adjunct makes the head of the chain nonident
to the tail.
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reconstruction of a constituent that includes the adjunct and thus are captured by the
explanation given above. Furthermore, I would like to show a case of partial
reconstruction which does not necessarily include the adjunct. In this case, the prediction
of the copy theory is that a violation of BT(C) would occur iff the adjunct that contains the
r-expression is reconstructed.'"
6.5.1. The Cases Discussed in chapter 5: In section 5.2 we've looked at two basic
cases of reconstruction. Let's begin with the simple case discussed in section 5.2.2-5.2.3.
In this case a relative clause contains a variable which must be bound in the reconstructed
position. It was shown that if the relative clause contains an r-expression as well and if the
r-expression is c-commanded by a co-indexed element in the reconstructed position, a
BT(C) effect emerges:2'
(26) *[Which book that hei asked Ms. Brownj for]
did shej give every studenti ?
This case follows straightforwardly from the copy theory of movement. If the adjunct is
inserted after movement, there is no way for the variable to be bound. For concreteness,
let's assume, following Engdahl (1980), that (26) has the following LF:
(26') Which (choice function) f
did shej give every studenti f (book that hei asked Ms. Brownj for)?
This LF has the adjunct in the base position and thus cannot result from its late insertion.
Now let's move to the slightly more complex case which was discussed in section
5.2.1. In this case a how many question is separated with how interpreted in the surface
position and tmany NP reconstructed to the base position:
(27) How many ideas is John likely to come up with?
How n: John is likely to come up with n many ideas?
What is the number n s.t. John is likely to come up with n many ideas?
'" This prediction would fol!ow under any syntactic account of partial reconstruction.
20 Similar considerations apply to the cases of unselective binding in which the relative
clause contains a variable bound in the base position by an adverb of quantification (section
5.2.3).
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In (27) the creation verb come up with requires reconstruction. As we've seen in section
5.2.1, this reconstruction brings about a BT(C) effect even when an r-expression is
contained within an adjunct:
(28) *[How many ideas related to John's1 theory] is hel likely to come up with?
How n: hel is likely to come up with n many ideas related to John's theory?
Once again, the reason for this is straightforward. The adjunct must modify the NP ideas.
If the DP many ideas is deleted from the surface position and interpreted at the base
position (if it is reconstructed), the adjunct must be in the base position as well. 2"
6.5.2. A Case or Partial Reconstruction that Doesn't Need to Include the
Adjunct: Consider the following how many question.
21 An LI reviewer raised the following question: under the copy theory of movement
shouldn't (67) be expected to have the LF in (i) and shouldn't this LF obviate BT(C)?
(i) How n : [it many ideas related to John's I theory]
is he I likely to come up with[n ideas]?
In fact, the question goes beyond BT(C). The LFs suggested by the reviewer must be
ruled out for independent reasons. Thus, a sentence such as How many ideas related to his
theory is John planning to come up) with? does not have the following LF:
(ii) How n : [n many ideas related to his l theory]
is John I likely to come up with[n ideas]?
'What is the number n s.t. there are n many ideas related to his l theory
and John l is likely to come up with [n ideas]?
The putative LF would have had a rather bizarre meaning in which what is questioned is the
number of ideas that John is planning to come up with (rather than the number of ideas of
the type determined by the relative clause).
As mentioned in section 5.2, I follow the standard assumption that the Wh-phrase
how many NP has two parts. One part consists of the Wh-word how (which could be
paraphrased as what n) and the other consists of the DP many NP which is a quantifier that
ranges over individuals:
(iii) [How many NP] I (t1)
How n: n many NP ,.x 4(x)
Under this assumption, the LF above has to be altered as follows:
(iv) How n: [ni many ideas related to hisl theory] Xx
is John I likely to come up with[n ideas]?
This LF violates the constraint against vacuous quantification (A•x does not bind a variable).
If we replace n ideas with x (ideas), we get rid of vacuous quantification. However, now
the LF has the wide scope reading, which is expected, and in fact does, obviate bT(C).
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(29) [How many more ideas than what's needed for hisi tenure]
is Johni planning to come up with?
This question is similar to (27) in that the semantics of the embedded creation verb forces
reconstruction of the DP N many ideas. However, in contrast to (27), (29) is ambiguous
with respect to the scopal position of the comparative quantifier. This ambiguity is
represented by the two LFs in (29').
(29') a. how n: (3N) N is n-more than (tM)[M many ideas are needed for hisi tenure]
[Johni is plannin ' to come with N many ideas]
(answer ,iven SI: 60)
b. how n: John; is planning
(3N) N is n-more than (t M)[M many ideas are needed for hisi tenure]
[PROi to come with N many ideas]
(answer given SI: 10)
To see this ambiguity consider the following situation:
(SI) John thinks that he needs 100 ideas for tenure. He wants to come up with 10 ideas
to be on the safe side (that is to say, he wants to have 10 more ideas than what's
needed). However, the truth is that he needs only 50 iucas for tenure.
Under (S5) there are two possible answers to (29). One answer is 60 and the other is 10.
The two answers correspond to the two LFs in (29'). If the comparative takes wide scope
relative to the intensional verb plan, the value of the definite description (t M)[M lmany
ideas are needed. for hisi tenure] is determined in the actual world to be 50 and the answer
to the question is 60. If, on the other hand, the comparative takes narrow scope relative to
the intensional verb, the value of the definite description is determined in the belief worlds
to be 100 and the answer to the question is 10.22
22 As pointed out to me by Irene Heim, this is not quite accurate. There are many
arguments that the definite description can be in the scope of the intensional verb and yet
have its value determined in the actual world. More specifically, there are arguments that
certain DPs contain world variables that (like pronouns) can be bound non-locally.
However, this does not affect the argument. The argument relies on the assumption
that there is no way for a definite description to be interpreted outside the scope of the
intensional verb and (at the same time) to have its value determined in the worlds that the
intensional verb quantifies over. I doubt that anyone would challenge this assumption.
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(29) is different from (27) in that in (29) there is an adjunct what's' needed fbr his
tenure which is not contained within the DP many ideas. Therefore in (29) it is possible to
reconstruct the DP without reconstructing the adjunct. We thus predict that (29) can be
transformed into (30) without yielding a BT(C) effect. This prediction is born out.
Furthermore, it is pretty clear that (30) has only one answer --"60"-- given the situation
described in S5. In other words, it seems that (30) has only the LF in (30'a), in which the
adjunct is inserted after movement.23
(30) [How many more ideas than what's needed for John'si tenure]
is hei planning to come up with?
(30') a. how n: (3N) N is n-more than (tM)[M many ideas are needed for John'si tenurel
Ihei is planning to come with N many ideasj
(answer gilen S5: 60)
b. *how n: hei is planning
(3N) N is n-more than (t M)IM many ideas are needed for John'si tenure)
IPROi to come with N many ideas i
(answer given SS: 10)
What we've seen in this section is that in cases of partial reconstruction late insertion of an
adjunct is possible if and only if the adjunct is not contained in the reconstructed material.
This is exactly what's expected under the copy theory of movement. Furthermore, this
result strengthens the idea that reconstruction is syntactic. It shows us that when there is
partial reconstruction, we find syntactic effects for exactly those elements that arue
reconstructed.
6.6. A Note on the A/A-bar Distinction
The conclusion that Scope Reconstruction feeds BT(C) (sections 5.2-5.3) is true for all
types of movement. However, the conclusion that movement bleeds BT(C) only when
there is reason to get rid of the restrictor (section 6.1-6.4) is true only with respect to A-bar
movement. A-movement bleeds BT(C) with no special proviso. This well-known contrast
is illustrated in (31) and (32).
23 This analysis would apply also to similar examples which were problematic for Heycock
(Heycock 1995: note 19). Thanks to Chris Kennedy for bringing these examples to my
attention.
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(31) Standard A-bar movement fails to bleed BT(C)
a. ??/*Which argument that John1 is a genius did he1 believe t?
b. *A different person told himl about every argument that John I is a genius.
(32) Standard A-movement bleeds BT(C)
Every argument that John i is a genius seems to him to be flawless.
I don't fully understand this contrast. Nevertheless, I will state it explicitly in the following
manner:
(33) a. A-movement (optionally) leaves a simple trace.
b. A-bar movement obligatorily leaves a copy which is converted to an operator
variable construction in accordance with economy considerations.
Given this distinction, we would like to know whether it is plausible to assume that A-
reconstruction is the result of the same mechanism that was proposed for A-bar movement
in the previous section. As far as I can see, there are two possibilities. One possibility is
that A-movement is incapable of leaving a copy at the tail of the chain, and that therefore it
must resort to another scope shifting operation such as Quantifier Lowering (as assumed in
chapter 2). " Another possibility is that A-movement can optionally leave a copy and that
when it does, Scope Reconstruction is available. In any event, Scope Reconstruction is
reflected in the syntax and the results of section 5.3 are predicted.
For presentational purposes, I assume that Quantifier Lowering is necessary for A
reconstruction. A sketch of the possible LF structures that are derived from the two types
of movement is illustrated in (34-35).
(34) Scope Reconstruction in A-movement.
SS: Someone [that she knows] is likely [t to win the lottery].
LF 1: Someone [that she knows] is likely [t to win the lottery].
LF2 : is likely [Someone[that she knows]
[t to win the lottery]].
24 For an argument in favor of this possibility see Chomsky (1995). As pointed out to me
by David Pesetsky and Irene Heim, the necessary stipulation about A movement could be
derived from an assumption that has an air of an explanation to it, namely the assumption
that copies must receive Case.
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(35) Scope Reconstruction in A-bar movement.
SS 1: How many people [that she knows] (adjunct inserted before movement)
is Mary likely to hire how many people [that she knows].
LF 1 ,1: Hown is Mary likely to hire n many people [that she knows].
LF 1 ,2: Hown n many people [that she knows] x
is Mary likely to hire x people [that she knows]
SS2: How many people [that she knows] (adjunct inserted after lmovenent)
is Mary likely to hire how many people.
LF 2: Hown n many people [that she knows] x
is Mary likely to hire x people.
For A-movement, there is one SS and two LFs that differ depending on whether or
not there is Quantifier Lowering. The latter yields what we have called Scope
Reconstruction, and has the consequences we have discussed for BT(C) (section 5.3). For
A-bar movement, there are two SSs that differ depending on whether the adjunct is inserted
before or after movement. Only SS2 can bleed BT(C). However, only SSI can bring
about Scope Reconstruction (hence the consequences in section 5.2).2"
6.7. Condition A and Scope-Economy
In the previous sections, I have argued that BT(C) applies at LF and only at LF. If this
conclusion is correct, BT(C) can be used to investigate various covert properties of LF
representations. One obvious question to ask is whether BT(C) can be used to test the
predictions of Scope-Economy.
Consider the structural configurations in (36) and (37), where linear precedence
represents structural prominence.
(36) a. [,,,) Someone] ....pronoun,... [,,j every... r-exp,...]
b. [_I,i Many boys] ....pronoun1 .... ['_ jevery... r-exp,...]
(37) a. [•,• Bill]....pronoun, .... [Df,jevery... r-exp,...]
b. [1, Every boy]....pronoun1 .... [DPjevery... r-exp,...]
2. SS2 has only one LF in which nmany has wide scope. SS has two LFs that differ in the
scope they assign to many
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In (36), QR of DPj over DP, is possible whereas in (37) it should be ruled-out by Scope-
Economy. If this is the case, there is an obvious potential prediction. It is a potential
prediction that in (36) BT(C) would be obviated via inverse scope whereas in (37) there
would be a condition C violation. Unfortunately, this prediction is not borne out.
Sentences such as (36) are bad independently of the relative scope of DP, and DP,:
(38) a. Someone introduced him, to every friend of John's,.
b. Many people introduced him, to every friend of John's,.
This, of course, doesn't cast doubt on the validity of Scope-Economy. Rather, it shows
that BT(C) cannot serve as a diagnostic for QR. The obvious question is why. In 6. 1.-
6.4, I suggested that OV-Economy provides the answer.
What we learned in these sections is that although we have ample evidence for the
fact that BT(C) applies after QR, there are no predicted interactions between the two unless
ACD is involved. For this reason, BT(C) cannot be used to test the predictions of Scope-
Economy. Here, I would like to point out on the basis of overt A-bar movement that
BT(A) is different. Althoi.gh I do not understand the difference, I would like to use it in
order to provide additional confirmation for the predictions of Scope-Economy.
Overt Wh-movement (as pointed out by van Riemsdijk and Williams 198 1) is
identical to QR in its inability to bleed BT(C) (unless the r-expression is contained within
an adjunct; Freidin (1986) and Lebeaux 1988):
(39) a. '??[which picture of John,] does he, likes t?
b. '??[Which of the claims that someone hated John's, mother]
did he, worry about'?
(cf. Which of' the claims that someone hated his, itother did John, worry t(•tNt)0?)
For some reason, which I don't understand (but see Chomsky 1993) BT(A) is different.
BT(A) can be affected by overt Wh-movement:
(40) John and Bill, wonder [which pictures of each other,] Mary bought t?
(cf. ??John and Bill, wonder who bought [which picture of each other1]?)
Although this fact is not well-understood, it seems reasonable to see whether it can be
utilized to test the predictions of Scope-Economy. Specifically, we might expect that an
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anaphor contained in a quantifier could be bound long-distance as long as QR can
appropriately extend the governing domain of the anaphor. If this expectation turns out to
be correct, we could use BT(A) to see what the restrictions on QR are.
Consider the contrast between (41) and (42). In (41), just as in (40), BT(A) is
satisfied. However, the sentences are acceptable only when the embedded clause is
interpreted with Inverse Scope. This suggests that the sentences in (41) are the covert
analogs of (40). In other words, it suggests that in these sentences covert QR can target the
embedded object and thus extend the domain in which the reciprocal needs to be bound so
as to include the matrix subject. (The embedded object QP can move by QR over the
embedded subject, and the output of QR is identical (in the relevant respects) to the output
of Wh-movement in (40).)
(41) a. The two rivals hoped that someone would hurt (every one of) each-other's
operations. *(3 > V) (V > 3)
b. John and Bill hoped that an inspector would supervise (every one of) each
other's buildings. *(3 > V) (V > 3)
c. John and Bill hoped that many inspectors would supervise (every one of) each
other's buildings. *(3 > V) (V > 3)
(42) a. *The two rivals hoped that Bill would hurt (every one of) each-other's
operations.
b. *John and Bill hoped that Mary would supervise (every one of) each other's
buildings.
c. *John and Bill hoped that every inspector would supervise (every one of) each
other's buildings.
In (42), BT(A) is not satisfied. The question is why? Scope-Economy provides an
answer. In (42), in contrast to (41), optional QR (over the embedded subject) does not
reverse the relative scope of two scopally non-commutative quantifiers and as such is ruled-
out by Scope-Economy. The resulting LF thus violates BT(A).
Obviously there are more predicted interaction between BT(A) and Scope-
Economy. More specifically, we can state a predicted generalization which is very similar
in its logic to other generalizations discussed in chapter 2. Unfortunately, many of the
sentences are too long and complicated to yield reliable judgments. Nevertheless, 1 find the
contrast between (41) and (42) encouraging, and would like to take it as further evidence in
favor of Scope-Economy and in favor of the assumption that BT applies at LF.
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6.8. Conclusion
To sum up the previous two chapters, we have seen evidence that the predictions of BT(C)
come out right only if we assume that this condition applies to the structures that get
interpreted. On the one hand, we have seen that (if Quantifier Lowering exists) BT(C)
must "see" the output of this LF operation (section 5.3). On the other hand, we have seen
that BT(C) doesn't see the SS input to the LF operation of Quantifier Raising (section 6.2-
6.4.). The reason it looks as though BT(C) inspects a pre-QR structure relates to a special
property of A-bar chains: movement leaves a copy which can be eliminated only when
necessary (under Antecedent Contained Deletion). This special property provides a
syntactic account of A-bar reconstruction (section 6.6) which, in turn, explains the
correlation with BT(C) (section 5.2). Reconstruction may work differently for A- and A-
bar movement. Nevertheless, in both cases it is reflected at LF. For this reason, the
semantic mechanism of type-lifting must be restricted (section 5.4).
Finally we considered the fact that BT(A), in contrast to BT(C), is affected by A-
bar movement (6.7.). Although we do not understand this difference, we can use it to
study scopal properties of' Scopally Uninformative sentences. The result of this
investigations yields new evidence in favor of Scope-Economy.
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